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I.

INTRODUCTION

No shortage of ink will be spilled on the Supreme Court’s recent
affirmative action decisions.1 And little imagination is needed to predict how
much of that commentary will run – as praise for the Court’s cautious, Solomonic,
sound balancing of the conflicting concerns of formal equality and racial justice in
light of the continuing consequences of slavery, or as condemnation of an
unprincipled, unsound departure from fundamental principles of equal justice
under law.2 In any event, the subject of the symposia, colloquia, special issues,
and other countless discussions devoted to these cases will be clear: Grutter and
Gratz belong to the Fourteenth Amendment caselaw, sub-genus affirmative
action.
I propose to leave that debate to one side. Notwithstanding the expertise
and the good intentions of many of those constitutional scholars who will enter
the lists on one side or another of the affirmative action debate, I suspect that a
good deal of discussion of Grutter and Gratz will simply rehearse positions long
since fixed on this divisive issue. Perhaps it is in the nature of the subject. As a
matter of policy and morality, affirmative action is too controversial to lend itself
to a principled resolution that can easily command popular consensus. As a
matter of constitutional law, the capacious terms of the Constitution, the
meandering course of the Court’s opinions, and the opaque nature of the Court’s
discussions will invariably lead the legal debate back to the intractable moral and
political questions.3 Discussion about affirmative action may simply be one more
1

Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Barbara Reskin, and Bill Lann Lee, Growing Beyond
Grutter, Jurist, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-aa/merritt.html (Sept. 9,
2003) (“Some praised Grutter and its companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, as a lawyerlike
compromise. Others scorned the opinions as a patchwork that confused admissions officers and
the public.”); Walter Dellinger and Dahlia Lithwick, The Breakfast Table, Slate, June 25, 2003
(remarks of Walter Dellinger praising Grutter and Gratz precisely for their Solomonic wisdom
and arguing, “When it comes to an issue like this, . . . Supreme Court adjudication isn’t the same
as excelling at Logical Puzzles 101. . . . On an issue like this, the most logical answers aren’t
necessarily the right ones.”); Joel L. Selig, The Michigan Affirmative Action Cases: Justice
O’Connor, Bakke Redux, and the Mice That Roared But Did Not Prevail, 76 Temple L. Rev. 579,
579 (2003). See also Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 How. L.J. 705, 705 (2004)
(noting that “civil rights advocates across the country proclaimed victory” following the issuance
of Grutter); Joel K. Goldstein, Beyond Bakke: Grutter—Gratz and the Promise of Brown, 48 St.
Louis U. L.J. 899, 901 (2004) (calling the decisions “a triumph for those advocating racial
preferences in admissions decisions”); Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 347, 381-82 & nn.163-66 (2003) (collecting positive public reactions to Grutter). For
remarks that are broadly critical of Grutter, see Larry A. Alexander and Maimon Schwarzchild,
Grutter or Otherwise: Racial Preferences and Higher Education, __ Const. Comm. __ (2004).
3
For broadly similar conclusions from differing points along the political spectrum, see
Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory 139-40 (1999); Cass. R.
Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court, ch. 6 (1999).
2
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illustration of a basic principle of legal discourse: the political heat of an issue is
inversely proportional to the light that legal debate can shed on it.
This article, then, is not a brief for or against affirmative action, in higher
education or elsewhere. It is not, at least on express terms, a Fourteenth
Amendment article at all. The question raised by this article is a quite different
one.
To uncover that question, it may help to recall that Grutter addressed the
constitutionality of affirmative action not once and for all, but in a limited
context. It asked only whether there is a “compelling state interest in student
body diversity” in “the context of higher education.”4 The answer to that
Fourteenth Amendment question – whether the University of Michigan Law
School’s race-conscious admissions policy withstood the strict scrutiny required
by the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence – depended in turn on certain
important assertions about the First Amendment. Briefly restated, the Court’s
reasoning ran as follows:
•
•

•
•

•

Universities “occupy a special niche in [the] constitutional
tradition” of the First Amendment.5
That special role accords to universities a substantial right of
“educational autonomy,” within which public higher educational
institutions are insulated from legal intrusion.6 Within that
autonomous realm, universities are entitled to deference when
making academic decisions related to their educational mission.7
Educational autonomy includes “‘[t]he freedom of a university to
make its own judgments as to . . . the selection of its student
body.’”8
More specifically, a public university has a compelling interest in
selecting its student body in order to ensure a “‘robust exchange of
ideas,’”9 of which one means is the selection of a “diverse student
body.”10
The Court’s scrutiny of the law school’s admissions program,
although ostensibly strict in nature, must take into account this
compelling First Amendment-based interest.11

4

Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338.
Id. at 2339.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (Powell, J.)).
9
Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (quoting in turn Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967))).
10
Id.
11
Id.
5
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•

Ergo, the Court ultimately held, the law school’s race-conscious
admissions policy withstands Fourteenth Amendment strict
scrutiny, given the compelling state interest of “student body
diversity”12 and the level of deference accorded the university in
tailoring its admission policies.

Much debate over the University of Michigan decisions will doubtless
pass lightly over these assertions, or focus on them primarily for their role in the
larger Fourteenth Amendment discussion. But the implications of this decision –
that “attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of [a university’s] proper
institutional mission,” and that there is a strong First Amendment in “educational
autonomy”13 – ought to be of equal interest to First Amendment scholars.
If history is any guide, however, Grutter is unlikely to attract much
sustained attention as a First Amendment case. Consider the fate of Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke.14 Although Bakke has entered the legal
canon and gained public notoriety for its central role in the affirmative action
debate, Justice Powell’s pivotal opinion in that case is also grounded in the First
Amendment, as the Grutter Court recognized.15 As one of the leading students of
the relationship between American constitutional law and academic freedom has
observed, Bakke represented a significant shift in the constitutional law of
academic freedom: a shift from a concept of academic freedom as an individual
right to “a concept of constitutional academic freedom as a qualified right of the
institution to be free from government interference in its core administrative
activities, such as deciding who may teach and who may learn.”16
Yet Bakke receives virtually no mention in any of the leading First
Amendment treatises and casebooks.17 Indeed, most of these prominent texts
essentially sweep aside the entire subject of academic freedom, on which both
Bakke and Grutter are grounded. Nor have the law reviews done much to fill the
gap. While there is obviously an extraordinary amount of legal scholarship
12

Id. at 2337.
Id. at 2339.
14
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
15
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339 (noting that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke “invoked
our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of
educational autonomy.”).
16
J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment”, 99
Yale L.J. 251, 257 (1989).
17
In fact, I could find only one mention of Bakke in any of the many casebooks and
treatises devoted solely to First Amendment law that I surveyed. See Rodney Smolla, 2 Smolla
and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech §§ 12:21, 13:20, 17:37 (1996). Indeed, while some casebooks
and treatises pay attention to issues concerning free speech in the public school context, few
devote any space at all to First Amendment issues dealing with academic freedom in higher
education.
13
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dealing with Bakke as a Fourteenth Amendment case, and a significant but
somewhat isolated volume of legal scholarship dealing with academic freedom on
its own terms, very few scholars have dug deeply into the question of the
relationship between Bakke – and now, Grutter – and the First Amendment.18
And those few treatments have generally not pressed the question whether the
First Amendment principles announced in Bakke, and reaffirmed in Grutter, have
(or should have) any application beyond the narrow context of race-conscious
admissions policies in public higher education. That general reluctance to make a
home for Bakke and its newest progeny in First Amendment scholarship, let alone
to deal seriously with its implications, is unfortunate.
This article aims to fill that gap. It proposes to take Grutter seriously as a
First Amendment case. It asks: What does Grutter’s First Amendment mean?
What are the implications of its approach?
The answers to that question are surprisingly wide-ranging. If one reads
Grutter for all it is worth as a First Amendment opinion, one may reap a wide
harvest of possible implications on a variety of subjects, some closely related to
the First Amendment and others farther afield in constitutional law:
•

•
•

Notwithstanding the contrary caselaw, Grutter suggests that
universities may be entitled to greater latitude in formulating
speech codes to address racist, sexist, or other harassing speech on
campus.
Grutter offers new avenues for universities that wish, on academic
grounds, to curtail at least some forms of religious speech on
campus.
As some litigants have already recognized, Grutter may help fuel
arguments against the Solomon Amendment, which forbids law
schools that receive public funding from barring on-campus
interviews by the military. But a serious reading of Grutter also
suggests that most of the plaintiffs in these cases lack standing to
pursue their claims against the application of the Solomon
Amendment. Thus, a recent district court decision addressing
these issues was arguably wrong in its conclusions on both the
justiciability issues and the merits.

18

For some attempts to address these issues, see Darlene C. Goring, Affirmative Action and
the First Amendment: The Attainment of a Diverse Student Body is a Permissible Exercise of
Institutional Autonomy, 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 591 (1999); Alfred B. Gordon, When the Classroom
Speaks: A Public University’s First Amendment Right to a Race-Conscious Classroom Policy, 6
Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L.J. 57 (2000). See also Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation,
43 UCLA L. Rev. 1839 (1996) (criticizing affirmative action in higher education admissions as a
species of content-based speech regulation).
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•
•
•

Grutter may support universities’ opposition to legislation that
would purport to enshrine the principles of academic freedom in
the law.
Despite the leading case on the subject, Grutter suggests that
universities may be able to justify the maintenance of racially
based scholarship programs.
Grutter invites universities (or other higher educational
institutions, such as military academies) to revisit the issue of
publicly supported single-sex schools. It may also provide a basis
for arguments in favor of the maintenance of racially exclusive
institutions of higher education, without specific regard to the race
involved.

In looking at this list of possible extensions of Grutter, a few things should
be clear. First, each of these prospects should prove attractive to at least some
First Amendment and/or constitutional law scholars. Second, it is unlikely that
any individual scholar will find all of them attractive. Third, some who support
one of the potential outcomes listed above will find others on the list utterly
repugnant to their understanding of the First Amendment or other constitutional
values. Yet, on one reading,19 all of these applications of Grutter’s First
Amendment are equally compelled by the logic of the decision.20
Finally, the broader implications of the case and its reasoning should
persuade First Amendment scholars that they need to make a proper home in their
work for Bakke and Grutter. Whatever explains the failure in First Amendment
scholarship to fully examine the implications of Bakke’s institutional autonomy
theory of academic freedom, and now its sequel in Grutter, the omission should
be remedied.
That is particularly true because, on another reading of Grutter,21 the case
raises interesting questions of consistency between the approach taken to the First
Amendment in that case and the approach taken elsewhere in First Amendment
doctrine. That is certainly so for the Justices who signed onto Grutter: While an
argument could be made that Grutter’s view of the First Amendment is consistent
with the approach taken elsewhere by some of the majority, one or more of the
Justices in the majority clearly adopt a different approach in most of their First
Amendment jurisprudence.22 Conversely, a number of the Justices who dissented
in Grutter have been described elsewhere as taking a strong view of the
19

See Part III.A, infra.
I stress the importance of the word “logic” here. I do not mean to suggest that all of these
implications will follow from Grutter – only that they could follow from Grutter, if its First
Amendment discussion is taken seriously. See Part III.B.5, infra.
21
See Part III.B, infra.
22
See Part III.C, infra.
20
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importance of intermediary institutions in the law23 – a position that is arguably
consistent with the majority in Grutter and inconsistent with the dissenters’
position in that case.
Why have both the Court and the community of First Amendment scholars
failed to fully confront the implications of Grutter as a First Amendment case?
To be sure, Grutter is a recent case, and reactions to it are still in the formative
stage. But it cannot be merely a function of this case’s novelty. Grutter’s First
Amendment is, with significant changes, a restatement of Justice Powell’s opinion
in Bakke, and that case is now a quarter of a century old. Nor is Grutter the first
time the Court has confronted the First Amendment implications of Bakke: the
Supreme Court acknowledged the implications of Bakke’s First Amendment
discussion, and its tensions with other aspects of First Amendment doctrine, more
than a dozen years ago.24
What, then, can we say about the inability or unwillingness of the Court
and its observers to fully confront the First Amendment implications of Bakke –
and, I venture to assume, Grutter? What are its causes, and what are its
consequences? I suggest that three important conclusions follow from the status
of these cases as neglected, if not unwanted, stepchildren of the First Amendment.
First, perhaps the most sensible conclusion one can draw is that the
Supreme Court never meant anyone to take Bakke seriously as a First Amendment
case,25 and will similarly ignore the First Amendment implications of Grutter in
future cases. Perhaps Bakke and Grutter, in their First Amendment dimensions at
least, are the proverbial tickets good for one trip only.26 Thus, the relative lack of
attention to Bakke’s First Amendment implications, and what I venture to predict
will be a similar silence with respect to Grutter’s meaning as a First Amendment
case, may be simply a tacit acknowledgement that the First Amendment elements
of these cases are mere makeweights, best left forgotten lest they complicate
matters if imported into other areas of First Amendment doctrine.
If that were the only conclusion that could be drawn from the relative
neglect of the First Amendment consequences of Bakke and Grutter, it would still
23

See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 485 (2002).
24
See Univ. of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
25
Cf. Byrne, supra note __, at 315 (“An early reader of Bakke could be pardoned if she
doubted that the Court was serious about a First Amendment right of institutional academic
freedom. Was it not merely a chimera of a doctrine, affirmed only for that day, to provide an
acceptable ground on which Justice Powell could preserve affirmative action while condemning
racial preferences?”). Byrne suggests that the principle has had at least some vitality beyond
Bakke. See id. at 316.
26
See, e.g., Mark G. Yudof, The Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 Loy. L. Rev. 831,
855-56 (1987) (suggesting just that about Bakke).
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deserve public comment. Recent history suggests that many constitutional
scholars don’t much care for restricted-ticket cases.27 Less trivially, however, it is
surely worth pointing out that while the Court and constitutional scholars alike
have treated Bakke seriously (and will do the same for Grutter) as a case about
affirmative action, far less careful attention has been paid (and likely will be paid,
in Grutter’s case) to the First Amendment implications of those cases.
But there is more to it than simply pointing fingers. Grutter and Bakke are
paid scant attention as First Amendment cases because of the dismal area in
which they arise. Grutter’s First Amendment is the domain of constitutional
academic freedom, and the federal courts have never adequately addressed the
many questions that have arisen every time they venture into this field. As this
article suggests, both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have never
adequately confronted the scope and meaning of constitutional academic freedom
– or, rather, the Court has alternated between extraordinarily sweeping statements
and narrow, evasive statements about the First Amendment bounds of academic
freedom. Nor have legal scholars, despite many fine efforts, been able to provide
the order and coherence to this area that the Court has not.28
If the Court in Grutter seemed little conscious of the potential implications
of its First Amendment discussion, that is simply par for the course in the Court’s
treatment of constitutional academic freedom. As this article explains, Grutter,
like Bakke before it, is a significant extension of the original notion of
constitutional academic freedom. On one reading of the case,29 it is grounded on
a contestable view of academic freedom – one that sees academic freedom as
serving larger democratic values, rather than narrower truth-seeking values. But
that grounding is less secure than it seems, for the Court has offered no clear
explanation of what constitutional academic freedom is or ought to be. At the
same time, it would be difficult for it to do so, for whatever meaning
constitutional academic freedom may have, it is clear that the professional
conception of academic freedom on which the Court has drawn is constantly
changing and contested.
That the Court cited and deferred to a particular, democratically oriented
conception of academic freedom in Grutter is interesting for another reason: It
presents interesting conflicts with the Court’s broader rejection of a specifically
democratic or republican conception of free speech in favor of a system of general

27

See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and the already voluminous scholarship criticizing
the Court’s opinion in this case on precisely this ground.
28
See Byrne, supra note __, at 320 (“One reason that institutional academic freedom
remains little more than a potential constitutional right is that it has not been explained
satisfactorily by legal scholars.”).
29
See Part III.B, infra.
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rules – or, alternatively, it suggests that the Court paid little attention to the
significance of its own First Amendment language in Grutter.
The First Amendment discussion in Grutter and its parent case, Bakke, is
interesting for a third and more novel reason, one that ultimately forms the most
important contribution of this article. Grutter, with all its expansive deference to
educational institutions, is that rare case in the Supreme Court’s recent First
Amendment jurisprudence – a case that takes institutions seriously in the First
Amendment.30
For the most part, the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in recent
decades has proceeded along very different lines. The Court’s refusal to confer
rights on the press that differ from those enjoyed by other speakers,
notwithstanding the separate presence of the Press Clause in the First
Amendment;31 its ever-increasing focus on content-neutrality as the linchpin of
free speech analysis, including much speech by religious individuals and
institutions;32 its refusal to single out religious conduct for special accommodation
against generally applicable rules33 – all of these developments speak to the same
trend. The Court has repeatedly sought to use general principles, such as
neutrality and equality, as its guiding principles in First Amendment
jurisprudence.
While that approach may have much to recommend it, it also serves to
blind the Court to the real-world context in which many speech acts take place. In
particular, it blinds the Court to the importance of the institutions in which so
much First Amendment activity – worship, study, debate, reporting – occur. The
Court’s failure to observe “the increasingly obvious phenomenon of institutional
differentiation” may hamper its ability to fully appreciate the extent to which
different institutions might require different responses when First Amendment
issues arise.34
Grutter’s First Amendment approach thus stands out as a rare, though not
unprecedented,35 exception to the Court’s generally institution-indifferent
approach. By recognizing the special status of universities in our society and
attempting to carve out special rules applying to them alone, the Court has
departed sharply from its usual practice.
30

For excellent discussion of this issue, see Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and
the First Amendment, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1998).
31
See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 991-92 (1972); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798-802 (1978).
32
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of
Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 49, 50 (2000).
33
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
34
See Schauer, supra note __, at 87.
35
See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
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For that reason, Grutter’s First Amendment demands careful attention. I
will argue that this institution-sensitive approach can be rationalized and ordered
according to a number of basic principles that should guide the Court should it
continue to move in this direction. Moreover, this approach is not limited to
universities alone, but applies equally to a variety of other First Amendment
institutions who play a crucial role in the formation of public discourse. At the
same time, this reading raises a number of important questions about the potential
pitfalls of an institution-sensitive approach to the First Amendment to educational
institutional autonomy – pitfalls that in some ways are exemplified by Grutter
itself. Although I believe this institution-sensitive reading of Grutter has much to
recommend it as a shift in First Amendment doctrine, and strongly argue for that
approach here, the questions it presents deserve attention too.
Part II of this paper provides some necessary background. It discusses the
development of the concept of academic freedom outside the courts, and notes
some of the contending justifications for what I call professional academic
freedom. The second half of Part II discusses the development of the
constitutional law of academic freedom, tracing its development through the early
cases to Bakke and Grutter. Part III fleshes out the possible implications of
Grutter. It begins by imagining some of the possible impact on various issues if,
as one reading of Grutter suggests, the Court has concluded that universities must
be given substantial deference in taking steps in service of any proper academic
goal. It then discusses the ramifications of a second possible reading of Grutter –
one in which the Court does not simply defer to the academic judgment of the
University of Michigan Law School, but positively endorses a specific,
democratically oriented conception of academic freedom. Finally, Part IV
discusses the First Amendment implications of Grutter’s willingness to take
universities seriously, and accord them special status, as First Amendment
institutions.
II.

PROFESSIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC
FREEDOM

A.

The Roots of Professional Academic Freedom

Any proper discussion of the nature and scope of academic freedom as a
constitutional value must begin far beyond the Constitution itself. Although the
Supreme Court has largely developed the notion of academic freedom as a
constitutional value over the past fifty years,36 it was not writing on a blank page.
Academic freedom in the United States is the product of almost 150 years of
discussion and development within the academy itself. To understand the growth
of constitutional academic freedom, then, we must begin with an understanding of
the professional understanding of academic freedom.
36

See infra Part II.B.
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This section therefore offers a brief history of the development of
academic freedom outside the courts. It is a decidedly truncated version of a
complicated story.37 Even a brief recitation of this history, however, suggests
three significant conclusions. First, academic freedom, even in its professional
setting, comprises a set of shifting, contested norms and values. Second, and
relatedly, efforts by courts to define any single set of values as fundamental to
academic freedom are thus likely to be unavailing. To the extent the Supreme
Court has attempted to construct a stable definition of constitutional academic
freedom on the foundation provided by the understanding of professional
academic freedom, it has built on unsteady ground. It should be unsurprising,
then, that even the concept of constitutional academic freedom discussed below
has quietly morphed from one form to another, depending on the underlying
justification selected by the Court.
Finally, this section should make clear the dangers of a single-minded
focus on the judicial conception of academic freedom. Writing in the customary
judicial language of rights talk, the courts have neglected the responsibilities that
accompany academic freedom. In fact, academic freedom typically is
accompanied by a set of professional norms and rules that may constrain
academics’ speech more than other individuals’ speech. Although this final point
is not of immediate concern, it may ultimately play an important role in framing
an institutionally based vision of the constitutional role of academic freedom.38
The development of the professional conception of academic freedom in
the United States begins in the period following the Civil War. Prior to that time,
academic freedom would have been a difficult concept to grasp.39 Colleges were
far smaller institutions, with far more modest goals. Learning consisted of rote
instruction within a limited curriculum.40 Instructors were expected to hew close
to those subjects, and performed little if any research and independent

37

For more detailed treatments, see, e.g., Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, The
Development of Academic Freedom in the United States (1955); Matthew W. Finkin, On
“Institutional” Academic Freedom, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 817 (1983); Walter P. Metzger, Profession
and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1265 (1988)
[hereinafter Metzger, Profession and Constitution]; David M. Rabban, Does Academic Freedom
Limit Faculty Autonomy?, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1405 (1988); The Concept of Academic Freedom
(Edmund L. Pincoffs, ed. 1972); Byrne, supra note __; Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom, in Freedom and Tenure in the Academy 3 (William W. Van
Alstyne, ed. 1993) [hereinafter Metzger, 1940 Statement]; David M. Rabban, A Functional
Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, in
id. at 227 [hereinafter Rabban, Functional Analysis].
38
See infra Part IV.
39
See, e.g., Byrne, supra note __, at 269.
40
See, e.g., id. at 269; Finkin, supra note __, at 822.
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scholarship.41 Students themselves were assumed to be “wayward[ ] and
immatur[e],”42 and in need of the close supervision of their instructors, which
further curtailed their research time and constrained them in the role of guardians
and drillmasters.43 Finally, the colleges were under the close control of lay
governing bodies.44 Taken together, these institutional factors left little room for
the development of the sort of robust scholarship and public activity that might
compel the establishment of a set of principles of academic freedom.45
For a variety of reasons, circumstances changed in the post-Civil War
period. One significant factor that contributed to the growth of an American
conception of professional academic freedom was the influence of the German
universities, which recognized a strong, if delimited, set of principles governing
academic freedom. That influence was “transplanted onto American soil” by
American students and academics who studied in Germany in significant numbers
in the mid-nineteenth century.47
46

For German universities of the era, academic freedom consisted of three
central principles. Lehrfreiheit, roughly translated as “teaching freedom,”
distinguished academics, who were civil servants, from other government
employees. Under this principle, professors could pursue their teaching and
scholarship “without seeking prior ministerial or ecclesiastical approval or fearing
state or church reproof.”48 Significantly, it was a “distinctive prerogative of the
academic profession” in Germany, and not a subpart of the civil liberties
generally enjoyed by German citizens.49
Lernfreiheit, roughly translated as “learning freedom,” amounted to an
acknowledgement that German university students were to be treated as “mature
and self-reliant beings, not as neophytes, tenants, or wards.”50 Thus, students
were free of the supervisory rules that governed American college students of the
same period. German students were free to choose their own courses, largely free

41

See Byrne, id. at 269; Hofstadter and Metzger, supra note __, at 279; Metzger, Profession
and Constitution, supra note __, at 1268 (noting that American college professors in this era had
been “pedagogues pure and simple”).
42
Hofstadter and Metzger, id. at 279.
43
See id. at 280-81.
44
See Finkin, supra note __, at 822.
45
See, e.g., Byrne, supra note __, at 268-69; Hofstadter and Metzger, supra note __, at 279.
46
For more extended discussion, see, e.g., Byrne, supra note __, at 269-73; Hofstadter and
Metzger, id.
47
Metzger, Profession and Constitution, supra note __, at 1269; see also Hofstadter and
Metzger, id., Ch. 8; Finkin, supra note __, at 822-29.
48
Metzger, id. at 1269; see also Hofstadter and Metzger, id. at 386-87.
49
Hofstadter and Metzger, id. at 387.
50
Metzger, Profession and Constitution, supra note __, at 1270.
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of attendance or examination requirements, free to live in lodgings of their own
choosing and to govern their own lives.51
Finally, German universities enjoyed the right of Freiheit der
Wissenschaft: the right of academic self-governance. Notwithstanding the status
of the German university as a state-funded institution, with substantial state
control over appointments, universities were entitled to make their own decisions
on internal matters, under the direction of the senior faculty.52 The concept of
academic self-governance that undergirds Freiheit der Wissenschaft is surely
recognizable as a forerunner of the emphasis on institutional autonomy that
developed in the courts’ discussions of academic freedom and culminated in
Grutter.
Although the American conception of academic freedom had its roots in
the German university system of the nineteenth century, it was not until early in
the 20th century that it had its proper birth, with the establishment of the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the drafting of its
1915 Declaration of Principles.53 Some aspects of the Declaration are of
particular relevance here. First, as Metzger notes, the drafters of the Declaration
“evolved a functional rather than idealistic rationale for freedom of teaching and
research.”54 That function revolved around the search for truth.55 The primary
purpose of the university was to “promote inquiry and advance the sum of human
knowledge.”56 Modern academic scholarship had an “essentially scientific
character”57 that could best thrive if researchers were afforded “complete and
unlimited freedom to pursue inquiry and publish [their] results.”58
To be sure, the Declaration recognized that teaching was also a significant
function of the university, and that academic freedom could be justified on the
grounds that professors needed the latitude to speak with “candor and courage” if
they were to serve as adequate role models.59 But this value was decidedly
secondary. First and foremost, the Declaration advanced the view that “free
employment of the scientific method would lead to the discovery of truths that
51

See, e.g., id.
See id.; Finkin, supra note __, at 823.
53
For this history, see, e.g., Hofstadter and Metzger, supra note __, ch. 10; Metzger,
Profession and Constitution, supra note __, at 1267-85; Byrne, supra note __, at 276-79.
54
Metzger, Profession and Constitution, supra note __, at 1274.
55
See Byrne, supra note __, at 279 (“[T]he American tradition of academic freedom
emerged from the professional organization of scholars dedicated to the search for truth”).
56
American Association of University Professors, General Report of the Committee on
Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure (1915), reprinted in Van Alstyne, ed., at 393, 397
[hereinafter 1915 Declaration]
57
Byrne, supra note __, at 277.
58
1915 Declaration, supra note __, at 398.
59
Id.
52
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exist autonomously in the world.”60 To the extent the university served a broader
democratic function, it was not to serve as a mirror of society, or a breeding
ground of future leaders, but as a think tank: universities would serve as a source
of experts who could help legislators resolve “the inherent complexities of
economic, social, and political life.”61 Here, too, academic freedom was needed,
if legislators were to trust in the “disinterestedness” of the academic expert’s
research and conclusions.62
Thus, the first important conclusion one can draw from the 1915
Declaration is that academic freedom in America, at least as understood in its
early stages, was fundamentally a truth-seeking device. No broader social or
democratic values were served by it, except to the extent that society benefited
from a corps of disinterested experts.
Second, it is worth noting that the 1915 Declaration concerned itself only
with academic freedom for academics. Lehrfreiheit was the concern here, not
Lernfreiheit.63 Thus, although the AAUP often addressed issues of student
speech, its founding principles dealt only with research and speech by professors
themselves.64
Nor did the Declaration deal in express terms with institutional autonomy,
or Freiheit der Wissenschaft. As Metzger writes, the reason for this shift from the
German model of academic freedom “went to the heart of the difference between
the German academic freedom and their own.”65 Whereas German universities
were state institutions, which required some model of autonomy to protect them
against their masters outside the university gates, American universities were
governed by lay bodies. It was those very governing bodies, composed of
potentially intrusive non-experts,66 that posed the greatest perceived threat to free
inquiry, not the state. Since the AAUP was unwilling to advocate the elimination
of lay governing bodies,67 it adopted another approach altogether: crafting a set of
principles designed to shelter academics from external or internal interference,
from restrictions by the state or restrictions by governing bodies. In short, the
Declaration “exalt[ed] the neutral university at the expense of the autonomous
university.”68
60

Byrne, supra note __, at 277.
1915 Declaration, supra note __, at 398.
62
Id. at 399; see also Derek Bok, Beyond the Ivory Tower: Social Responsibilities of the
Modern University 5 (1982).
63
See id. at 393 (“It need scarcely be pointed out that the freedom which is the subject of
this report is that of the teacher[,] [not the student]”).
64
See Metzger, Profession and Constitution, supra note __, at 1271-72.
65
Id. at 1276.
66
See Byrne, supra note __, at 275-76.
67
See Metzger, Profession and Constitution, supra note __, at 1277.
68
Id. at 1280 (emphasis in original).
61
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Finally, although the Declaration took the unusual step, prompted by the
AAUP’s observation that academics were more likely to encounter reprisal for
statements in public on general topics than for statements made in the classroom,
of protecting statements by academics outside their areas of expertise,69 it is
important to observe that the committee “rejected any view that academic
freedom implied an absolute right of free utterance for the individual faculty
member.”70 The Declaration is emphatic that “there are no rights without
corresponding duties.”71 Thus, “only those who carry on their work in the temper
of the scientific inquirer may justly assert” any claim to academic freedom.72
Significantly, the Declaration assumed that departures from proper professional
norms would be monitored and punished by colleagues within the same
discipline, rather than lay governors. Nevertheless, from the outset, it was clear
that although academics enjoyed a substantial scope of freedom from interference,
that freedom was accompanied by additional limitations on their ability to speak,
at least to the extent that their speech represented a departure from generally
accepted standards of competence and professionalism.73
In 1940, the AAUP issued a new declaration, the 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure.74 Despite some important
variations and differences,75 it remained true to the salient features of the 1915
Declaration discussed above. In particular, it renewed the assertion that academic
freedom stemmed primarily from the need to safeguard “the free search for truth
and its free exposition.”76 Thus, an academic’s freedom to pursue research was
“fundamental to the advancement of truth.”77 Similarly, the statement echoed the
earlier declaration’s focus on preventing interference with academic freedom by
the university itself, rather than outside forces, although it cautioned that
professors should be duly aware of their obligations to their institutions and speak
accordingly.78 And the statement again warned that academic freedom “carries
with it duties correlative with rights.”79

69

See id. at 1274-76.
Byrne, supra note __, at 277.
71
1915 Declaration, supra note __, at 401.
72
Id.
73
See Byrne, supra note __, at 277-78.
74
American Association of University Professors, 1940 Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom and Tenure (1940), reprinted in Van Alstyne, ed., at 407 [hereinafter 1940
Statement].
75
See Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, in id. at 3.
76
1940 Statement, supra note __, at 407.
77
Id.
78
See id. at 407-08.
79
Id. at 407.
70
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Thus, we can draw a number of conclusions about the nature of
professional academic freedom in America, at least in its early stages: (1) It was
primarily concerned with academic freedom’s role in safeguarding the search for
truth, not with any broader democratic or social functions served by higher
education. (2) Although it was influenced by a German model of higher
education that itself recognized the importance of institutional autonomy, the
American version of professional academic freedom was not as concerned with
academic self-governance. Because American academics feared interference
from internal forces rather than external forces, their version of academic freedom
emphasized the neutrality of the academic institution rather than its insulation
from outside influence. (3) It recognized that any academic bill of rights must be
accompanied by a set of obligations, subject only to the limitation that these
obligations were to be enforced by other academics rather than lay governors.
Academics were to adhere to the accepted standards of their field of study.
Academic freedom was not a liberty; it was a conditional license.
For present purposes, let us focus on the first conclusion – that
professional academic freedom was justified on truth-seeking grounds. Two
aspects of this conclusion are of particular interest here. First, as Professor Byrne
has noted, this argument for academic freedom has long been a site of
contestation.80 A variety of competing values have been advanced as additional,
or even primary, values served by higher education. In particular, a number of
scholars have argued for a “democratic value in higher education.”81
Broadly speaking, the democratic justification for higher education
“view[s] education as instrumental, conferring benefits on the general public,
rather than as a good in itself or in its diffuse, long-term consequences.”82 Higher
education is thus not simply, or even primarily, valued for its contribution,
through research and teaching, to the search for truth. It is not simply a repository
of experts. Nor does it strive for neutrality among various visions of the good.
Rather, democratic education seeks to serve specific, non-neutral goals directly
linked to society at large: it “is . . . committed to allocating educational authority
in such a way as to provide its members with an education adequate to
participating in democratic politics, to choosing among (a limited range of) good
lives, and to sharing in the several sub-communities, such as families, that impart
identity to the lives of its citizens.”83
80

See Byrne, supra note __, at 279.
Id. at 281.
82
Id.
83
Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education 42 (1987); see also id. at 42 (“a democratic state
of education tries to teach . . . what might best be called democratic virtue: the ability to
deliberate, and hence to participate in conscious social reproduction”) (emphasis in original);
Suzanna Sherry, Republican Citizenship in a Democratic Society, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1229 (1988)
(book review).
81
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Obviously, this is a starkly different vision of the values and functions of
higher education, and it may coexist uneasily with the classical vision of the
university and of academic freedom described above.84 Certainly the differing
emphasis of these two visions of higher education may result in different views
about what are acceptable practices in an institution of higher education. Thus, a
purely truth-oriented vision of the university could lead to a strict principle of
non-discrimination, whether favorable or invidious, in university admissions.85
By contrast, to the extent an emphasis on the democratic values of higher
education stresses the importance of universities in preparing and filling the ranks
of future leaders, affirmative action in admissions would be “relevant to one of
[the] legitimate social functions” of the university.86 Thus, democratic
educational values may complement or diverge from truth-seeking justifications
for higher education; the question will depend on whether the “ideal of the true”
and the ideal of the “useful” lead to the same policy prescriptions.87
I have focused on two particular visions of the value of universities, and
thus, necessarily, of the purpose and value of academic freedom. Other
competing values could have been discussed, although I think these two are the
most relevant and illustrative.88 Given the existence of these competing
approaches, it follows – and this is my second conclusion – that a court that draws
on one of these values alone in defining and shaping constitutional academic
freedom is making a value-laden choice with potentially significant
consequences; at the same time, a court that attempts to incorporate multiple
justifications in defining academic freedom risks inconsistency, if not
incoherence. Professional academic freedom is not a stable or uniform concept.
It is a constantly shifting and deeply contested idea, grounded on very different
views of what universities were meant to achieve and how they should operate.
Indeed, as if that tension were not enough, other writers have questioned whether
an argument for academic freedom can be made on any stable and defensible
grounds.89 It is thus unsurprising that, as we shall see, the courts have see-sawed
among various visions of what constitutional academic freedom means.
84

Of course, it is also quite possible to construct democratic justifications for a broad
defense of academic freedom. See, e.g., Gutmann, id. at 175-81.
85
I emphasize that it could do so because it need not lead to such a rule. It would not be
hard to craft an argument – indeed, Justice Powell seemed to accept such an argument in Bakke –
that a diversity of views and experiences, including those stemming from racial and ethnic
background, contribute to the university’s truth-seeking function.
86
Gutmann, supra note __, at 210.
87
Byrne, supra note __, at 283.
88
For at least one other value, see Byrne, id. at 279-80 (discussing the so-called
“humanistic” approach to higher education values).
89
See, e.g., The Future of Academic Freedom (Louis Menand, ed. 1996); David M. Rabban,
Can Academic Freedom Survive Postmodernism?, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 1377 (1998) (book review); cf.
Stanley Fish, Holocaust Denial and Academic Freedom, 35 Val. U. L. Rev. 499 (2001) (defending
academic freedom on non-foundationalist grounds).
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I thus conclude this sub-section with one central observation.90
Professional academic freedom, as opposed to constitutional academic freedom,
is a contested and shifting concept, subject to significant disagreement about its
purposes, its scope, and even whether it can be justified at all. In understanding
the courts’ own shifting definition of academic freedom as a constitutional value,
including its discussion of academic freedom in Grutter, we must appreciate the
challenge the courts have faced from the beginning: to attempt to arrive at a stable
understanding of a value whose own immediate beneficiaries cannot settle on its
meaning. To the extent the courts’ discussion of constitutional academic freedom
seems inconsistent or incoherent, that fact has much to do with the unstable
foundation on which they have built. Conversely, to the extent the courts can
settle on a stable definition of constitutional academic freedom, it is unlikely to be
entirely convincing if, as seems inevitable, it diverges from the shifting
understanding of professional academic freedom.
B.

The Roots of Constitutional Academic Freedom
1.

The Pre-Bakke Cases: The Birth Pangs of Constitutional
Academic Freedom

With this unstable foundation laid, we may turn from professional
academic freedom to constitutional academic freedom – that is, from the
understanding of academic freedom that exists outside the courts to the
constitutional understanding of academic freedom as a First Amendment value.
As is the case for most of our First Amendment jurisprudence, academic
freedom as a constitutional value is primarily a creature of the 20th Century.91
Although academic freedom made its first appearance as a potential First
Amendment value in a dissent by Justice Douglas in 1952,92 its true lineage can
be traced to a case decided five years later, Sweezy v. New Hampshire. 93 Pursuant
to a state statute, Paul Sweezy was subpoenaed and questioned by the Attorney
General of New Hampshire on a host of subjects, including lectures he had

90

The other lesson of the description of professional academic freedom I have offered here
– that it carries with it duties as well as rights, and may in fact constrain academic speakers more
than ordinary speakers – is addressed again in Part IV, infra.
91
That is not to say that it does not have earlier, deeper roots. For a discussion of those
roots, see Finkin, supra note __, at 830-40.
92
See Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 509 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing
threat of loyalty proceedings under state law rendering members of subversive organizations
ineligible for employment as public school because “[t]he very threat of such a procedure is
certain to raise havoc with academic freedom”).
93
354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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delivered at the University of New Hampshire.94 He refused to answer and was
jailed for contempt.95
The Court overturned the conviction on narrow grounds: the state
legislature’s delegation of authority to the Attorney General was so vague that it
was unclear what questions the legislature would have wanted that officer to
pursue. Holding Sweezy in contempt for failure to answer these questions thus
violated his due process rights.96 Before reaching this conclusion, however, the
Court detoured for a discussion of the First Amendment implications of the case.
Writing for a plurality, Chief Justice Warren bluntly asserted that the questions
posed to Sweezy constituted “an invasion of petitioner’s liberties in the area of
academic freedom and political expression – areas in which government should
be extremely reticent to tread.”97 The next passage is worth quoting at length:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate
the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and
train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of
our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended
by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is
that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die.98
Some themes sounded in this passage are worth noting. First, the Court’s
novel assertion that academic freedom would join political expression as an area
“in which government should be extremely reticent to tread”99 clearly presages
the Court’s modern approach, prominent in Grutter, of deferring to higher
educational institutions – for the Court makes clear that its concern is with the
academic freedom of universities, not elementary or secondary schools.
It is equally clear, however, that this statement cannot be over-extended.
Nothing in the plurality opinion in Sweezy suggests that the Court thought
government ought to defer to university decision-making as a general matter. Its
94

Id. at 243-44. For biographical information on Sweezy, see Louis Uchitelle, Paul
Sweezy, 93, Marxist Publisher and Economist, Dies, New York Times, March 2, 2004, at A25.
95
Id. at 244-45.
96
Id. at 251-55.
97
Id. at 250.
98
Id.
99
Id.
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clear concern was with the regulation of speech made in an academic context.
There is no hint at this point that government ought to steer clear of other aspects
of university life. Nor does the Court indicate that it would be concerned with
restrictions on speech initiated by a public university itself, rather than the state.
Although the passage embraces “[t]eachers and students” alike,100 it leaves
unaddressed the question of whether a university is entitled to restrict or penalize
speech by teachers, whether a university may restrict speech by students, and
whether teachers in turn may restrict student speech.
Second, the Court’s conception of academic freedom is grounded first and
foremost on the view that academic freedom is necessary to safeguard the search
for truth. Academic freedom is necessary on this view to ensure an environment
in which “new discoveries,” whether in the hard sciences or in the social sciences,
is possible.101 To be sure, the Court looks beyond the college gates to the “vital
role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth.”102
But the Court is not here subscribing to the view that academic freedom is
important to inculcate democratic values within the university. Rather, academic
freedom is prized primarily because its contribution to truth-seeking will yield
discoveries or insights that will ultimately benefit society at large. Chief Justice
Warren’s opinion in Sweezy is thus far closer in spirit to the AAUP’s 1915
Declaration than it is to Bakke or Grutter’s vision of academic freedom.
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, concurred in the result, but
based his concurrence directly on First Amendment grounds. Like the plurality,
Frankfurter viewed universities as serving a truth-seeking function, not a
democratic function. The public benefit of a university, in his view, was not to
create better citizens, but to advance human knowledge.103 “‘In a university
knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end.’”104 If Frankfurter thus
sought to protect a university’s “‘atmosphere’” of “‘speculation, experiment[,]
and creation,’”105 it was for instrumental purposes, not in order to serve some
larger vision of public dialogue or deliberative democracy.
Like the plurality, Frankfurter argued that universities ought to be left
undisturbed by the state. As Byrne notes, Frankfurter “would have held that
university freedom for teaching and scholarship without interference from
government is a positive right,”106 which may only be abrogated for “exigent and
100

Id.
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
104
Id. at 262 (quoting a statement of a conference of senior scholars from the University of
Cape Town and the University of the Witswaterstrand).
105
Id.
106
Byrne, supra note __, at 290.
101
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obviously compelling” reasons.107 But Frankfurter gave more content to this
right, setting out its boundaries more clearly than the plurality’s opinion had.
Quoting approvingly from a statement by a group of South African academics, he
suggested that “four essential freedoms” govern the life of a properly functioning
university: the freedom “to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.”108
In those words – the freedom “to determine . . . who may be admitted to
study” – lie the jurisprudential roots of Bakke and Grutter and their command of
deference to university admissions programs. But if Frankfurter’s Sweezy
concurrence has been such fertile ground for future doctrinal developments, it is
not because his opinion provides a meaningful definition of constitutional
academic freedom or proper guidance on its application. To the contrary,
Sweezy’s influence stems from the combination of its sweeping grandiloquent
rhetoric109 and its lack of real guidance for future courts.110
Frankfurter’s concurrence in Sweezy is a curious artifact. The opinion
appears to locate the First Amendment freedom it outlines in the protection of the
autonomy of the university as a whole. It seeks to protect the university as a
separate sphere. To be sure, it does so not strictly for its own sake, nor precisely
for the sake of vigorous dialogue within the university, but for the sake of the
individual activities – writing, research, teaching – that will thrive in the proper
hothouse atmosphere of discussion and debate. But the freedom is nonetheless to
apply to the university as a corporate body. Yet the University of New
Hampshire had little to do with the facts of the case: Sweezy presents a struggle
between the state and an individual academic, not a university. Despite its grand
trappings, then, Sweezy offers little clarity about whether the First Amendment
right to academic freedom should be thought of as an individual or institutional
right. Nor does it offer any prediction of how the courts will deal with intramural
conflicts between an academic and the university itself.

107

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262.
Id. at 263 (quotations omitted). For a discussion of the historical background of the
South African scholars’ statement, see Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom vs.
Faculty Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: A Dubious Dichotomy, 29 J.C. &
U.L. 35, 45-55 (2002).
109
See, e.g., Byrne, supra note __, at 292 (noting the “fertile ambiguity” produced by
“Frankfurter’s loose and essayistic writing”).
110
Cf. Paul Horwitz, Law’s Expression: The Promise and Perils of Judicial Opinion Writing
in Canadian Constitutional Law, 38 Osgoode Hall L.J. 101, 120-25 (2000) (advocating an “opentextured minimalist” approach to judicial opinion writing in constitutional cases during the early
stage of the development of new constitutional doctrine, which pairs a minimalist approach to the
holding with “provocative, debate-encouraging language” in dicta to spark dialogue while leaving
room for future development).
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Compounding this uncertainty is a further question: How strongly are we
to read Frankfurter’s reference to the “four freedoms” of a university? Two
questions in particular arise. First, are they to be read as particular freedoms
available under the First Amendment, or as general examples of the kinds of
liberty that will be safeguarded if the state is precluded from investigating
academic speech only? A proper reading of the opinion, with its reference to the
presumptive freedom of “thought and action” in the academy from government
intrusion,111 suggests that Frankfurter intended the more protective reading to
apply. But even if the statement had come in the plurality opinion and not a mere
concurrence, it again sweeps far outside the facts of the case before the Court.
The concurrence also provides minimal guidance on another question:
What is the scope of these four freedoms? Are they absolute or subject to internal
or external limitations? Here, Sweezy provides some guidance, albeit minimal:
The university is free to act within the sphere of the four freedoms to the extent its
decisions are based “on academic grounds.”112 Thus, a determination such as an
admission decision that is based on non-academic grounds is entitled to no special
protection under the rubric of constitutional academic freedom. That limitation,
of course, begs the question of what should be considered “academic grounds” for
a decision, and on this point the opinion is silent. Nevertheless, that internal
limitation underscores the importance to academic freedom doctrine of the
Court’s understanding of the function of universities. As the discussion of Bakke
and Grutter that follows will suggest, much turns on whether the Court believes
universities are a site for the search for truth, or whether they serve additional
functions.
In one area, at least, Frankfurter is sufficiently clear. Subsequent
commentators have objected that a strong principle of constitutional academic
freedom would grant constitutional rights to universities or academics not enjoyed
by other First Amendment speakers.113 But the concurrence properly emphasizes
that the freedoms accorded to the university do not confer a special status on the
university for its own sake, but for the ultimate benefit of the public.114 Again,
this suggests that Sweezy’s vision of academic freedom has little to do with a civic
democracy view of education; the purpose of college is not simply to breed more
thoughtful, sensitive citizens. It is to provide the public with the more immediate
fruits of research, teaching, and scholarship – the advancement of knowledge. In
any event, although the categories of academic freedom listed by Frankfurter –
111

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 1219 (emphasis added).
Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
113
See, e.g., Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 412 n.13 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[W]e
note that the argument [that professors are entitled to academic freedom protections under the First
Amendment] raises the specter of a constitutional right enjoyed by only a limited class of
citizens.”).
114
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262.
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freedom to select a curriculum, to determine who may be admitted to study, and
so forth – are specific to educational institutions, the opinion suggests that First
Amendment academic freedom simply tracks the same core activities protected
when individuals engage in political speech.115
Whatever unanswered questions it may have left in its wake, Sweezy was a
landmark moment in the development of constitutional academic freedom. It
marks the first occasion on which the Court identified academic freedom as a
First Amendment right, although the plurality rested on other grounds. Sweezy
strongly suggests that academic freedom inheres in the institution as a whole: it is
thus less an individual right that operates as a trump against the state, and more an
attempt to define the university life as an area into which the state is
presumptively forbidden to intrude. Still, any understanding of Sweezy’s
implications must take account of its context. The case itself did not involve
institutional speech. Nor did it involve less speech-oriented matters such as
university admissions. Most important, Sweezy relies on a narrow conception of
the purpose of a university, one that emphasizes the search for truth and not any
alternative justifications for academic freedom.
This trend continued in the next major Supreme Court discussion of
constitutional academic freedom, Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University
of the State of New York.116 Like the earlier Adler case, which involved the same
law, Keyishian was fundamentally a loyalty oath case. The case involved a
challenge to a state law requiring employees of public educational institutions to
certify that they were not Communists and to disclose any past affiliations to the
Communist Party.117
Unlike Sweezy, Keyishian was decided on First Amendment grounds.
Like the earlier case, the grounds offered had little to do with academic freedom.
The Court struck down the law as impermissibly vague. Thus, no special rights of
academic freedom, institutional or individual, were required to address the case
before it. Again, however, the Court could not resist adding a broader discussion
of the institutional context in which the case arose. Justice Brennan wrote:
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall
of orthodoxy over the classroom. The classroom is peculiarly the
marketplace of ideas. The Nation’s future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
115
116
117

See id. at 266.
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
Id. at 591-94.
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which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, rather than
through any kind of authoritative selection.118

In keeping with the narrow factual context in which it arose – state
regulation of teachers’ political affiliations – and the narrow legal grounds on
which it was decided, Keyishian sounds many of the same themes as Sweezy, and
the discussion is equally unnecessary. It situates academic freedom squarely
within the First Amendment and treats it as a right against the state, without
addressing how or whether the public university itself may govern speech on
campus. And it emphasizes that any special rights enjoyed by the university are
“of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.”119
What is significant here is the subtle shift in the Court’s justification for
constitutional academic freedom. Although the passage quoted above appears to
invoke the same truth-seeking value offered by the plurality and concurring
opinions in Sweezy, there are in fact two justifications at work here. The Court is
concerned not only with the knowledge that is the product of the search for truth,
but with the civic value of the process of discussion itself. It is less concerned
with the particular truths that may emerge “out of a multitude of tongues”120 than
it is with the capacity of vigorous discussion to produce citizens who are
accustomed to the “robust exchange of ideas.”121
Keyishian’s reference to the classroom as “peculiarly the marketplace of
ideas” is, on this reading, misleading.122 The marketplace of ideas metaphor is
generally understood to relate directly to the search for truth: “the best test for
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”123 Keyishian, on the other hand, is less interested in the results of that
competition than it is in the social value of training future leaders and other
citizens in the habit of vigorous dialogue. If Keyishian finds its roots elsewhere in
First Amendment doctrine, then, they lie not in Holmes’ Abrams dissent but in
Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Whitney v. California,124 which was

118

Id. at 603 (quotations and brackets omitted).
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
For discussions of Keyishian that focus on the marketplace of ideas concept, see, e.g.,
David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom
Under the First Amendment, in Freedom and Tenure in the Academy 228, 240 (William W. Van
Alstyne, ed. 1993); John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, The
Academy, and the McCarran-Walter Act, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1481 (1988); Mark G. Yudof, Three
Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 Loy. L. Rev. 841 (1987).
123
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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similarly concerned with inculcating a free citizenry that is accustomed to public
discussion and debate.125
Keyishian thus marks a significant shift in the Court’s understanding of
academic freedom: while the traditional justification for academic freedom both
in the academy and in the Court’s jurisprudence had turned on the search for
truth, the Court now suggested that academic freedom serves quite another
democratic virtue: the training and shaping of the nation’s citizens. That shift is
important for at least two reasons. First, to the extent future applications of the
constitutional principle of academic freedom may turn on the underlying purposes
of academic freedom, it is important to understand what those purposes are. More
broadly, though, constitutional academic freedom must be understood not just on
its own terms, but in terms of its relationship to First Amendment doctrine. Any
justifications raised in support of academic freedom may have equal application
and important implications elsewhere in the First Amendment; conversely, if the
democratic justification of the First Amendment has found little traction
elsewhere in the caselaw, academic freedom doctrine may stand all the more
exposed for its inconsistency with the broader body of law.
Sweezy and Keyishian provided the richest descriptions of the Court’s
understanding of the constitutional dimensions of academic freedom, albeit they
remained inconsistent and grounded on at least two distinct theoretical bases.
Subsequent caselaw did little to give further shape to the doctrine.126 In one case,
Healy v. James,127 the Court did add some additional information about the scope
of academic freedom. In holding that Central Connecticut State College had
improperly denied the campus chapter of Students for a Democratic Society
certification as a campus group, the Court necessarily suggested that academic
freedom may in proper circumstances be a right held by against the public
university itself by members of the university community – in this case, students.
To be sure, as in Sweezy and Keyishian, the Court could have reached the same
ruling without referring to academic freedom. It could simply have held that the
college had failed to act in a viewpoint-neutral fashion with respect to speech
within what was basically a public forum. But the Court went further, situating
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For discussion of Whitney, see, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of
Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 653
(1988); Paul Horwitz, Citizenship and Speech, 43 McGill L.J. 445 (1998).
126
See, e.g., Ailsa W. Chang, Note, Resuscitating the Constitutional “Theory” of Academic
Freedom: A Search for a Standard Beyond Pickering and Connick, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 915, 922
(2001); but see William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the
Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, in Van Alstyne, ed., supra
note __, at 79 (purporting to find “some clearer sense of what counts as an academic freedom
interest” in the post-Keyishian caselaw).
127
408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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the student group’s claim within “this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding
academic freedom.”128
Healy thus suggests that the “four freedoms” identified in Frankfurter’s
Sweezy concurrence – including, presumably, the freedom to determine who may
be admitted to study – do not delineate spheres of absolute non-intrusion for
university officials. They are subject not only to the requirement that the
university act on “academic” grounds,129 but may potentially be subject to
whatever competing academic freedom rights can be asserted by other members
of the university community.130
At the same time, Healy suggests those limits work both ways: the Court
made clear that student groups on campus would still be required to abide by
generally applicable rules of conduct governing the university – SDS could not
“infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with
the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.”131 Again, that
conclusion is an unexceptional exercise of time, place, and manner doctrine.
Because the Healy Court invoked academic freedom, however, we may read the
limitation for something more. It suggests that academic freedom rights are
subject to constraints specific to the unique circumstances of the university. After
all, Healy involved certification of a student group, which allowed it to post
notices on campus bulletin boards, hold meetings, and other such actions.132 The
Court’s conclusion that SDS could have been refused certification altogether if it
was unwilling to abide by the university’s rules of conduct suggests that, where
conflicts with the rules of civility that govern university speech are concerned,
permissible restrictions on speech may be broader on campus than off-campus.
2.

Bakke: “. . . Who May Be Admitted to Study”

All of the cases discussed so far deal with paradigmatic speech acts, and
could have reached the same results without any recourse to a novelty like
academic freedom. Bakke133 is a different story altogether. For the first time, the
Court invoked one of the “four freedoms” of Sweezy that has little to do directly
with speech: the freedom “to determine . . . who may be admitted to study.”134
Bakke represents perhaps the Court’s most significant affirmation to that date that
academic freedom was not simply an individual right, but contained a significant
128

Id. at 180.
See supra note __ and accompanying text.
130
For discussion of the competing interests involved in intramural speech within the
university, see, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Intramural Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First
Amendment, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1323 (1988).
131
Healy, 408 U.S. at 189.
132
Id. at 176.
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Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263.
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component of institutional autonomy for colleges and universities.135 If taken
seriously as a First Amendment case, Bakke considerably develops the doctrine of
constitutional academic freedom.136 Whether it ought to be taken seriously as a
First Amendment case, as we shall see, is another matter.
The facts of the case are well known and need not long detain us. Bakke
brought suit challenging the admissions policies of the University of California at
Davis’s medical school, which ensured admission to a specified number of
minority applicants.137 A fractured Court held that the school’s admissions policy
was illegal, but that the Constitution did not bar the consideration of race as one
of a number of “plus” factor in an admissions decision.
In his pivotal opinion, Justice Powell rejected all the grounds advanced by
the university in support of its admissions programs, save one: “the attainment of
a diverse student body.”138 That interest was linked directly to academic freedom,
“a special concern of the First Amendment.”139 Under the “fourth” element of
constitutional academic freedom enumerated in Sweezy, a university must be free
“to make its own judgments as to education[,] includ[ing] the selection of its
student body.”140 The Court drew on Keyishian to emphasize the importance of
the “robust exchange of ideas” on campus.141 That robust exchange of ideas “is
widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body.”142 The university’s
judgment that racially diverse admissions would help create an atmosphere of
robust discussion thus posted a “countervailing constitutional interest, that of the
First Amendment,”143 which constituted a compelling state interest.144
Viewed strictly for its First Amendment value, a number of aspects of
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke merit discussion. First, it offers further
evidence that the Court’s view of academic freedom itself had changed over time,
although its view was stated with something less than clarity. As we have seen,
the Court to this point had variously described constitutional academic freedom as
serving the search for truth and as serving the more democratic function of
training leaders habituated to engaging in the robust exchange of ideas. The only
135

See Byrne, supra note __, at 313.
See, e.g., Yudof, supra note __, at 854.
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Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-70.
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Id. at 311.
139
Id. at 312.
140
Id.
141
Id. (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
142
Id.
143
Id. at 313.
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Cf. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Bakke: A Constitutional Analysis, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 69, 75-76
(1979) (observing that Justice Powell’s reliance on diversity in Bakke focused on “an interest of
the institution . . . rather than an interest held by the represented minority group.”) (emphasis
omitted).
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case suggesting that a university should enjoy autonomy in its admissions
decisions, Sweezy, was clearly grounded in the search for truth and no other value.
Indeed, to the extent the Sweezy concurrence tracks the AAUP’s 1915 principles
in hewing to the search for truth justification, it was unlikely to offer much
support for diversity-oriented admissions policies, let alone race-conscious
admissions.145
But although Powell relies on Sweezy for the right to make admissions
decisions, it is difficult to find any trace of its underlying justification in Bakke.
Instead, Powell explains academic freedom in terms closer to those used in
Keyishian: universities must be free to seek a diverse student body because the
nation’s future leaders ought to be exposed to a wide range of “ideas and
mores.”146
Bakke is also noteworthy for its indication that academic freedom means
universities “must have wide discretion in making the sensitive judgments as to
who should be admitted.”147 As Timothy Hall observes, it was on this ground that
the university staked its argument in Bakke.148 But whatever autonomy the
universities may have won in Bakke, it is far from unbounded. Institutional
autonomy is still subject to the constraint of “constitutional limitations protecting
individual rights.”149
Moreover, by settling on and emphasizing diversity as a compelling state
interest, Powell specifies the grounds on which universities may engage in
admissions decisions, rather than leaving those institutions free to make
admissions decisions on any academic grounds they wish to select. If any opinion
in Bakke truly represents the institutional autonomy strand of academic freedom,
it is not Powell’s, but Justice Blackmun’s.150 Rather than focus on the particulars
of the admissions programs at issue, Blackmun simply places his faith in the
hands of the universities, arguing that “[t]he administration and management of
educational institutions are beyond the competence of judges and . . . within the
special competence of educators,” subject to constitutional limits.151
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See Byrne, supra note __, at 314 (“To the drafters of the AAUP’s 1915 Statement,
benefitting a scholar because of his race would have been as repulsive in principle as penalizing
him.”); Timothy L. Hall, Educational Diversity: Viewpoints and Proxies, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 551,
578-79 (1998).
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Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
147
Id. at 314.
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Hall, supra note __, at 581.
149
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
150
On this point, Wendy Parker observes that Justice Blackmun’s opinion is the true
predecessor of Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter. See Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots:
Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federalism, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1691, 1700 n.51 (2004).
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Bakke, 438 U.S. at 404 (Blackmun, J.).
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In sum, Bakke represents a significant change in the Court’s treatment of
academic freedom. Notwithstanding Frankfurter’s opinion in Sweezy, academic
freedom up until this point had been relevant only to disputes involving academic
speech, whether by professors or students; the Court had never applied the
principle to academic institutional decision-making. Justice Powell’s treatment of
diversity left it unclear whether his approval of diversity as a compelling interest
was based on the principle of deference to the autonomy of the university or on a
more intrusive blessing of the particular justification offered by the university for
diversity in admissions. But it is at least evident that the Powell opinion in Bakke
had moved a considerable distance from the truth-seeking justifications offered in
support of academic freedom by the AAUP and the Supreme Court’s earlier
decisions. Nevertheless, given the peculiar place of academic freedom in the case
– its status as a “countervailing value” rather than a clearly defined ground for
decision – Bakke’s import as a First Amendment case was far from clear.
3.

Grutter: Revisiting Constitutional Academic Freedom

If, as I observed at the beginning of this paper, Bakke never made its way
into the First Amendment canon, one reason is surely that few observers took
Justice Powell’s reasoning on this point seriously, at least in its implications for
academic freedom. Mark Yudof, for example, noted his suspicion that “the
Powell approach to academic freedom . . . was for that day and trip only and that
this face of academic freedom will quickly fade.”152
The evidence in favor of this view was mixed. On the one hand, the Court
in subsequent decisions paid lip service to the principle of educational
institutional autonomy set out in Bakke. On at least two occasions, the Court
turned back student due process challenges to university decisions dismissing
them from academic programs.153 On both occasions, the Court stressed that
courts owe great deference to “genuinely academic decision[s]” made by
university faculties.154
These decisions, as Yudof notes, simply refused to interfere with an
established decision-making procedure within the university. When those
procedures were challenged, however, or when a university sought to carve out
additional rights against the state on the basis of institutional autonomy, the Court
rebuffed those attempts.155 Thus, in Minnesota State Board for Community
Colleges v. Knight,156 the Court rejected a challenge by community college
152

Yudof, supra note __, at 855-56; see also Byrne, supra note __, at 315.
See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985); Bd. of Curators of Univ. of
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instructors to a state statute requiring public employers to bargain on certain
issues with the exclusive bargaining representative selected by their professional
employees, holding that there was no “constitutional right of faculty to participate
in policymaking in academic institutions.”157 Thus, notwithstanding the Court’s
repeated call for deference to academic decisions based on “the faculty’s
professional judgment,”158 faculty were not constitutionally entitled to participate
in the formulation of academic policy. And in refusing to grant a university any
privilege against the disclosure of confidential peer review materials in job
discrimination suits, the Court emphasized that its “so-called academic-freedom
cases” all involved instances of content-specific speech regulation and nothing
more.159 “The post-Bakke decisions [thus] appear[ed] to reinforce the view that
institutional academic freedom in the public sector is a make-weight.”160
The past Term’s decision in Grutter makes clear that Bakke was
something more than a ticket good for one day and time only. In holding that the
University of Michigan Law School had “a compelling interest in attaining a
diverse student body,”161 based on principles of academic freedom grounded in
the First Amendment, the Supreme Court gave a far more detailed explanation of
the purpose and scope of educational institutional autonomy than the discussion
offered by Justice Powell in Bakke. Justice O’Connor’s discussion of academic
freedom in Grutter may be considered more carefully by looking in turn at a
number of key elements.
Deference to educational institutions. The most significant hurdle facing
the Law School in Grutter was the Court’s increasingly demanding use of strict
scrutiny in reviewing all governmental classifications by race, whether for benign
or malevolent purposes.162 Although the Court purported to be applying strict
scrutiny here, it is surely right to observe that its actual approach demonstrated
“remarkable latitudinarianism.”163 The key to understanding that approach lies in
the Court’s posture of deference toward academic institutions. The Court places
its approach within its purported “tradition of giving a degree of deference to a
157

465 U.S. at 287.
Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225.
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Univ. of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990).
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Yudof, supra note __, at 857. But see Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression
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university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.”164
Thus, Justice O’Connor suggests, its strict scrutiny of the Law School’s
admissions policies must “tak[e] into account complex educational judgments in
an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university,”165 albeit within
constitutional limits.166
This deference is extraordinary for a number of reasons. First, it
represents a strong reaffirmation that the Court stands by its prior statements
singling out universities as institutions uniquely worthy of substantial deference.
Certainly the Law School was accorded a deference far beyond that granted to
any other institution whose affirmative action policies had come before the Court
since Bakke.
Moreover, notwithstanding the Court’s rhetoric, it is unlikely that the
deference the Court showed toward the Law School can be based simply on the
fact that universities make “complex educational judgments.”167 Every institution
makes complex judgments. As Peter Schuck notes, those institutions whose
programs had failed strict scrutiny between Bakke and Grutter – employers,
government agencies, and others – are not so differently situated from academic
institutions. They operate with some greater level of expertise and experience
with respect to their own affairs than a court would be likely to possess. They
presumably structure their policies with the particular circumstances of their
profession or institution in mind. And they are subject to a host of “political,
ideological, competitive, social, legal, and institutional pressures,” both internal
and external.168 The Court’s hands-off treatment of the Law School’s program
must be based on its regard for the special social role of educational institutions,
and not merely on its respect for the expert judgment of educators.
Finally, if one takes the Court’s opinion seriously, it is clear that deference
to the Law School’s educational judgments performed real work in Grutter. In
the face of the Court’s stringent approach in recent cases to the requirement that
racial distinctions be “narrowly tailored to achieve [the] compelling state
interest,”169 it is hard to believe that the Court would have left the Law School so
free a hand to shape its admissions policies had it not proceeded from a posture of
deference to university decision-making.170 So, if one assumes the Court meant
what it said and did not simply refer to the need to defer to educational
164
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institutions as a make-weight in support of its Fourteenth Amendment
conclusions, deference made a significant difference in Grutter.
The Court’s approach is all the more remarkable because it is not clear
that the level of deference displayed in Grutter is justified by the caselaw.
Although the Court cites its decisions in Ewing and Horowitz in addition to
Bakke, and both cases speak in strong terms about the importance of respecting
the discretion of university faculties,171 neither opinion comes close to suggesting
the kind of deference applied here. Those cases merely held that even if students
were entitled to due process protection when public universities make decisions
affecting their enrollment, the procedures in place at those schools were sufficient
to satisfy those rights. Neither case suggests that the Court owes universities the
level of deference they were given by the Grutter majority.
Conversely, when universities argued on institutional autonomy grounds
for a limited carve-out from the EEOC’s disclosure requirements for peer review
materials, the Court did not hesitate to shut down the argument, asserting the right
to determine for itself what constitutes legitimate or illegitimate academic
decision-making.172 It is a curious form of deference to deny a university the
right to maintain the confidentiality of peer review materials while permitting it to
exercise its own best judgment in crafting admissions policies that may skirt the
boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Academic freedom and institutional autonomy. Justice O’Connor’s
opinion in Grutter links the Court’s deferential treatment of the Law School to the
broader constitutional value of academic freedom. “Universities,” the Court
makes clear, “occupy a special place in our constitutional tradition.”173
Specifically, the Court affirms Justice Powell’s statement in Bakke that
universities enjoy a constitutional “dimension” of “educational autonomy,”
including the right to make its own decisions on whom to admit to study.174 The
Court did not note, as it has in the past, the shifting and uneasy nature of the
question whether academic freedom inheres in the individual, the institution, or
both.175
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What is not clear from Grutter is whether any exercise of institutional
autonomy by a university, or at least those involving “academic decisions,”176
operates within a sphere of government non-interference. The Court seconded
Justice Powell’s invocation of the right to “make its own judgments as to . . . the
selection of its student body.”177 But that point is closely tied to the Court’s
discussion of the particular merits of diversity in education, which I discuss
immediately below. Would a university’s invocation of academic freedom
insulate from attack some other set of admissions criteria not tied to diversity if
those criteria raised constitutional questions? Grutter does not answer that
question. The implications of this open issue will be treated at length later in this
paper.
Academic freedom and student diversity. The core of Grutter’s First
Amendment discussion is its treatment of the Law School’s proffered compelling
interest: “obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body.”178 On this point, the Court provides an illuminating discussion with
profound potential implications for constitutional academic freedom. Drawing on
Justice Powell’s citation of Keyishian in Bakke, the Court accepted that a diverse
student body will contribute to the “robust exchange of ideas,” and held that the
Law School’s search for a critical mass of minority students would serve that
end.179
Significantly, the Court’s holding that the Law School had a compelling
interest in the educational benefits of diversity was “informed by our view that
attaining a student body is at the heart of the Law School’s educational
mission.”180 This statement can be read in a number of ways. Perhaps the Court
was simply acknowledging here that the Law School’s institutional autonomy
gave it the freedom to set its own educational goals, which would qualify as a
compelling interest. That reading is supported by the prelude to the Court’s
discussion of educational diversity, which sounds precisely those notes.
Similarly, perhaps the Court meant to suggest that any set of admissions policies –
including but not limited to diversity-oriented policies – that qualified under some
unarticulated definition as the result of an “academic decision” would be entitled
to the same degree of deference.
In truth, there seems to be something more going on here. Although this
section of the Court’s opinion focuses on the First Amendment, and although the
scope of this paper is limited to that issue, obviously the Court’s treatment of
academic freedom is significantly underwritten by the Fourteenth Amendment
176
177
178
179
180
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context in which the case arose. Thus, a third natural reading of the Court’s
opinion in Grutter suggests that, far from deferring to the general expertise of
academic officials, the Court here offered its own blessing on the educational
benefits of diversity. If so, of course, that is precisely the kind of “complex
educational judgment[ ]”181 that the Court had just declared itself incompetent to
evaluate.
Certainly that reading of the Court’s treatment of the Law School’s
diversity argument is supported by the depth and breadth of its discussion of the
benefits of racial and ethnic diversity in education. Far from relying on the Law
School’s own determination on that issue, the Court offers extensive discussion of
the educational benefits of student exposure to classmates of different
backgrounds: it “promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial
stereotypes, and enables [students] to better understand persons of different
races.”182
Significantly, the Court’s tribute to the benefits of student diversity looked
beyond the immediate pedagogical benefit of learning in a diverse environment to
the external benefits of student diversity – its value in preparing students as
citizens, workers, and leaders.183 The Court stressed the democratic value of
diversity in education, its capacity to prepare students “for work and
citizenship.”184 Diversity in this view serves a dual purpose: to prepare students
for citizenship by exposing them to diverse views, and to ensure that a diversity of
views are heard in the polity by taking measures to provide the benefits of higher
education to members of diverse racial and ethnic groups.185 And the Court added
that in the context of elite legal education, diversity helps members of different
races achieve eventual leadership and so ensures that those leaders have
“legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.”186
Having canvassed the Court’s prior caselaw on academic freedom, it
should be evident on this account that Grutter is not merely a restatement of the
Court’s prior views. There is little here that the authors of the Sweezy majority or
concurrence would recognize as following from their handiwork. In particular,
there is no trace in Grutter of the truth-seeking rationale for constitutional
academic freedom that was the centerpiece of both opinions in Sweezy, and that
was the core of the original AAUP principles.

181
182
183
184
185
186

Id.
Id. at 2339-40 (quotations and citations omitted).
Id. at 2340-41.
Id. at 2340 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2340-41.
Id. at 2341.
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Nor does Grutter perforce rest on the reasoning in Keyishian, or even the
reasoning in Bakke. True, Grutter shares with the earlier cases a shift from a
truth-seeking to a democratic rationale for academic freedom. But Keyishian and
Bakke ultimately remained safely within the college gates, arguing that a proper
democratic education would give students exposure to the vigorous clash of ideas.
Thus, Justice Powell, quoting Keyishian, focused on the contribution made by a
diverse student body to an “atmosphere of speculation, experiment and creation”
in the academy.187 Grutter’s First Amendment shares that concern,188 but adds
something more. Here, the concern is not merely with the quality of education,
with its capacity to prepare students for work and citizenship; the Court is
concerned that education be representative, irrespective of the immediate
educational benefits supplied by a diverse student body.
To be sure, that reasoning follows as much (or more) from the Court’s
Fourteenth Amendment premises as its First Amendment premises. But the two
cannot be easily disaggregated. Grutter presents a detailed vision of the social
role of education, particularly elite higher education. Although that vision cannot
but help sound in terms of equal protection, it is ultimately still a statement about
the “proper institutional mission” of the university, and thus about the basis for
constitutional academic freedom.189
I do not mean at this juncture to criticize that vision. Indeed, whether or
not Grutter is a sound application of the specific principle(s) of constitutional
academic freedom, it surely is consistent not only with our constitutional ideals
but with a longstanding stream of thought about the broader democratic purposes
of the university.190 But Grutter’s vision of academic freedom is still indisputably
one that would be unrecognizable to the framers of the AAUP principles, or to the
drafters of the early academic freedom cases.191
In sum, then, Grutter may represent a significant moment in the
development of the law of academic freedom. Again, as with Bakke, whether it
does not or not will depend on whether the Court takes its own words seriously or
treats the case as a “sport” for First Amendment purposes.192 But as a First
Amendment case, it raises a number of issues worthy of serious attention and
187

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
See id. at 2340 (discussing diversity’s contribution to lively classroom discussion).
189
See Jack Greenberg, Diversity, The University, and the World Outside, 103 Colum. L.
Rev. 1610, 1619 (2003) (“Justice O’Connor structures her argument so that preparation for the
world beyond graduation has the constitutional protection of being a subset of academic
freedom.”).
190
See Lee C. Bollinger, A Comment on Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger, 103 Colum. L. Rev.
1589, 1591-92 (2003).
191
See Hall, supra note __, at 578-79 (making similar point with respect to Bakke).
192
See Yudof, supra note __, at 855-56 (discussing fate of Bakke as academic freedom
case).
188
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reflection: (1) It buttresses the view that educational institutions are entitled, on
First Amendment grounds, to substantial autonomy in their decision making. (2)
It reaffirms that “complex educational judgments”193 will be given substantial
deference by the courts – indeed, enough deference to overcome strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause. (3) Although it is difficult to discern which
elements of the Court’s discussion of educational diversity speak to its First
Amendment understanding and which speak to issues of equal protection, Grutter
also represents a further move away from a truth-seeking rationale for
constitutional academic freedom, and toward one that focuses instead on the
internal and external democratic goals served by higher education.
III.

TAKING GRUTTER SERIOUSLY

This section aims to do something the Court and commentators likely will
not do: it proposes to take Grutter seriously as a First Amendment decision. If
read for all it is worth, Grutter has a number of wide-ranging and significant First
Amendment implications.
For these purposes, Grutter may be read in one of two ways. First, it
could be read for its enthusiastic support for the “constitutional dimension,
grounded in the First Amendment, of institutional autonomy.”194 That reading
assumes that the particular educational goals put forward by a university are less
important to the courts than the fact that the goals are propounded by educators
making “complex educational judgments.”195 On this view, provided a university
policy is based on genuine academic reasons, it is entitled to act substantially free
of government interference. It may only act “within constitutionally prescribed
limits,”196 but as Grutter itself suggests, it may certainly skirt those limits and will
in fact be given considerable latitude to do so. This institutional autonomy
reading of Grutter offers support for positions – often, conflicting positions –
taken by partisans on both sides of a host of First Amendment and educational
policy debates.
The second reading of Grutter focuses not on institutional autonomy, but
on the Court’s justification for academic freedom, and for the Law School’s
admissions policies in that case. It asks what First Amendment implications
follow from a conception of academic freedom centered around the democratic
function of higher education: its role in preparing students to serve as citizens, and
in serving as an entry point for a more representative set of elite professionals,
citizens and leaders.197 This approach to Grutter carries a different set of
193
194
195
196
197

Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2340-41.
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implications for particular First Amendment disputes. More importantly,
however, this reading of Grutter suggests that significant faultlines exist between
the Court’s approach in this case and its approach in other areas of First
Amendment doctrine.
A.

Institutional Autonomy and its Implications

Begin with the assumption that Grutter stands for the proposition that
courts will defer to a substantial degree, though within loosely defined
constitutional limits, to an institution of higher education’s academic judgments
about whether certain programs or measures will serve its educational interests.198
What measures might a university justify under this standard?
1.

Hate Speech on Campus

An obvious candidate for reexamination under Grutter’s strongly
deferential approach to university officials is the question of the constitutionality
of campus speech codes. The late 1980’s and early 1990’s saw a flurry of efforts
by universities to regulate hostile speech targeted at individuals on campus by
virtue of their race, sex, ethnicity, and so forth.199 The University of Michigan,
for example, adopted a policy on discrimination and discriminatory harassment
that created grounds for disciplining anyone who engaged in “[a]ny behavior,
verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of
race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry,
age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status,”200 provided it met
certain other conditions. Among the specified circumstances in which this sort of
speech would be grounds for discipline were cases in which the speech “has the
purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with an individual’s
academic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored extracurricular activities or personal safety.”201 Although these measures sparked
enormously heated debates, they were largely abandoned or allowed to fade into
obscurity after several courts found such codes unconstitutional.202
Those cases relied largely upon general First Amendment doctrine,
rejecting or giving short shrift to any argument that the courts should defer to the
judgment of the universities that had promulgated the codes. Thus, in Doe v.
University of Michigan, the district court struck down the University of Michigan
policy described above on vagueness and overbreadth grounds.
198

See id. at 2339 (“The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential
to its educational mission is one to which we defer. . . . within constitutionally prescribed limits.”).
199
The materials discussing this topic are voluminous. For a history of these developments,
see Timothy C. Shiell, Campus Hate Speech on Trial (1998).
200
Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
201
Id.
202
See Robert M. O’Neill, Free Speech in the College Community 20-21 (1997).
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Academic freedom did no significant work in the case. To the contrary,
the court suggested that the general First Amendment principles it cited, such as
the importance of content neutrality, “acquire a special significance in the
university setting, where the free and unfettered interplay of competing views is
essential to the institution’s educational mission.”203 But academic freedom
provided no thumb on the scales here. The decision surely would have been the
same whether or not the court had acknowledged the university setting of the
case. Indeed, the judge who decided this case later suggested the decision to
largely omit any discussion of academic freedom was quite deliberate, and
distinguished, oddly, between the constitutional academic freedom issues raised
by the case and the First Amendment issues it raised.204 A similar code
promulgated by the University of Washington met the same fate, without any
mention at all of academic freedom.205
By comparison, in Dambrot v. Central Michigan University, 206 the Court
acknowledged that academic freedom concerns might arise in reviewing a
university’s discriminatory harassment policy, but held that the speech in question
– racially offensive locker-room talk by a college basketball coach – “served to
advance no academic message”207 and therefore did not “[e]nter the [m]arketplace
of [i]deas [o]r the [r]ealm of [a]cademic [f]reedom.”208 Dambrot thus admitted
the relevance of academic freedom to its First Amendment inquiry, while
narrowing the scope of academic freedom to embrace only classroom speech.
Like other courts faced with academic freedom claims, the Sixth Circuit resolved
the issue by using First Amendment doctrine that is generally applicable to other
public employees. 209
The speech code cases are thus marked by two distinguishing factors:
First, they proceed on the view that standard First Amendment analysis – are the
codes content-neutral? Is the university, or some parts of it, a public forum? –
may be applied in the context of university speech as it would be applied
elsewhere. Second, and relatedly, they pay lip service to academic freedom but
203

Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 863.
Avern Cohn, A Federal Trial Judge Looks at Academic Freedom, in Unfettered
Expression: Freedom in American Intellectual Life 117, 131 (Peggie J. Hollingsworth, ed., 2000)
(“[I]n my written decision I used the words academic freedom only twice and then obliquely. My
concerns were directed to the First Amendment implication of the code in action.”).
205
See UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis.
1991).
206
55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995).
207
Id. at 1190.
208
Id. at 1188.
209
See id. at 1185-86 (discussing application of Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), and
similar cases); see also Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (adopting same
approach); Chang, supra note __; Rebecca Gose Lynch, Comment, Pawns of the State or Priests
of Democracy? Analyzing Professors’ Academic Freedom Rights Within the State’s Managerial
Realm, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1061 (2003).
204
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are unwilling to let claims based on academic freedom shift the balance. If hate
speech is susceptible to regulation on campus, the university must perforce
address the same speech and in the same way as any other public body, and may
only reach that speech that would otherwise be properly subject to regulation.210
In the heyday of the speech code debate, a number of academics entered
the lists in favor of a more permissive approach to the regulation of
discriminatory speech on campus.211 Those advocates argued in part that the law
has failed to take adequate account of the harms wreaked by discriminatory
speech on its targets – failed, in Mari Matsuda’s words, to consider the victim’s
story.212 But they argued as well that campus speech codes could be justified on
pedagogical grounds. Thus, Mari Matsuda argued that students on campus, young
and often far from home for the first time, are especially vulnerable to racist
speech, and that universities thus carry a special obligation not to tolerate such
conduct.213
More centrally to this paper, it has been argued that campus speech codes
are appropriate not only because of the vulnerability of students but because they
represent the settled judgment of the university that particular kinds of speech do
not contribute to its educational mission. A university may reasonably determine
that the kind of speech covered by a discrimination policy or other code affecting
campus speech is simply not of the intellectual quality demanded in an
environment of scholarly inquiry – just as it would not hesitate to conclude that a
professor teaching creationism in a biology class may be subject to discipline or
dismissal, or that a student pursuing an argument in favor of Holocaust
revisionism may receive a failing grade in a history class. When the university
concludes, in light of all the circumstances, that “the proscribed speech hurts,
more than it promotes, high-quality intellectual debate in a university
community,”214 it may properly take action to restrict that speech.

210

See Rodney Smolla, Academic Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea of a University, in
Van Alstyne ed., supra note __, at 196, 224 n.125.
211
See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda et al., Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive
Speech, and the First Amendment (1993); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules:
Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 343 (1991).
212
See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story,
in Matsuda et al., supra note __, at 17. Chi Steve Kwok has argued that some advocates of
affirmative action in university admissions and campus speech codes, such as Matsuda, adopt
startlingly divergent assumptions about the vulnerability of students depending on which policy
they are addressing. See Chi Steve Kwok, A Study in Contradiction: A Look at the Conflicting
Assumptions Underlying Standard Arguments for Speech Codes and the Diversity Rationale, 4 U.
Pa. J. Const. L. 493 (2002).
213
See id. at 44-45.
214
Mary Becker, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review in Speech Cases, in The Price We Pay:
The Case Against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda, and Pornography 208, 211 (Laura Lederer
and Richard Delgado, eds., 1995).
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Other scholars have taken a slightly more nuanced position, arguing that
given the special educational mission of a university, and its duty to protect and
encourage the most vulnerable members of the campus community,
administrators must be given more discretion to regulate racist speech than might
be available to other regulators, but within carefully circumscribed limits. In Kent
Greenawalt’s terms, universities might restrict speech if they adopted regulations
that are both “narrow” in scope and “noncategorical” in nature, treating all vicious
remarks similarly rather than discriminating among such remarks on the basis of
categories such as race.215 At the margins, however, as Greenawalt’s formulation
suggests, it is not clear that these careful approaches are significantly altered by
considerations of academic freedom. While they begin by recognizing the special
role of the university, they often end with recommendations about the proper
scope of campus speech codes that simply track existing categories of First
Amendment jurisprudence: narrowness as against vagueness, non-categorical
approaches as against content- or viewpoint-specific regulation.
Ultimately, then, the campus speech code debate is fought on different
grounds in academic circles and in the courts. The academic debate has turned
less on the applicable doctrine than it has on the question of the mission of the
university.216 Is it the unfettered search for truth?217 If so, it may be difficult
(although not impossible) to justify speech codes. Is it the free and robust
exchange of ideas, not simply for purposes of truth-seeking but for the democratic
education inherent in “allow[ing] students to interact as citizens do in the wider
polity?”218 Then arguments may be made on both sides: speech codes must be
prohibited because they obstruct the free exchange of ideas, or they must be
permitted because racist speech itself impedes some students’ ability and
willingness to participate in the broader debate.219 This debate has been largely
beside the point for the courts that have actually decided speech code cases; what
has mattered there is simply whether the codes can withstand the strict scrutiny
aimed at speech regulation by standard First Amendment doctrine. The
universities’ attempts to bring a deeper sense of context to the courts’
deliberations have been unavailing.
215

Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech 76
(1995); for a similar approach, see Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech
197-204 (1993).
216
For an example of various contending visions regarding academic freedom and its
consequences for campus speech codes, see Hollingsworth, ed., supra note __.
217
See, e.g., Donald J. Weidner, Academic Freedom and the Obligation to Earn It, 32 J. L.
& Educ. 445, 465 (2003); Vince Herron, Note, Increasing the Speech: Diversity, Campus Speech
Codes, and the Pursuit of Truth, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 407, 434 (1994).
218
Kwok, supra note __, at 505; Robert C. Post, Free Speech and Religion, Racial and
Sexual Harassment: Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 267, 321 (1991).
219
See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431, 452.
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The reading of Grutter I have emphasized above – a reading that places in
the foreground the Court’s substantial deference, on First Amendment grounds, to
the university’s right to make “complex educational judgments”220 in shaping
policies to serve its educational mission – would significantly shift the balance of
power with respect to speech codes at public universities from the courts back to
the schools. This approach respects the fact that there is, finally, no one
“educational mission.” Different universities may properly emphasize different
aspects of the academic mission.221 One school may emphasize pure research and
truth-seeking, or believe that learning ought to occur in an unchecked
environment of vigorous and even out-of-bounds debate. Another may focus on
teaching over research, and come near adopting an in loco parentis relationship
toward its students. Another may believe in the exchange of ideas subject to a
carefully bounded set of civility norms. Surely all of these fall well within what a
university may properly view as its educational mission. Indeed, a campus is a
large and varied place, and a university or its component faculties may believe
that different missions are at the forefront of different sectors of university life.
On all these matters, according to the deference reading of Grutter, the
courts must remain agnostic. A university may set its own course, and having
done so, the courts must respect its considered determination that some set of
rules or policies is vital to the fulfillment of that mission. On this view, the courts
err when they apply standard First Amendment analysis, without more, to the case
of a campus speech code. Those distinctions that a university may choose to draw
between different kinds of speech, or different types of offensive speech, are not
mere content distinctions; they, too, are a product of the university’s “complex
educational judgments”222 and should be respected.
Thus, the gift of Grutter’s deference to educational mission is the same
with respect to speech codes as it is to admissions policies: the gift of discretion.
A university may quite reasonably conclude that a campus speech code is
unwarranted, or that it conflicts with its educational mission. But if its vision of
its educational mission would be served by imposing restrictions on campus
speech, it ought to have wide latitude to do so. In each case, the determination
rests with the school. If a university enforces a speech code upon careful
professional judgment about its own desired ends, “the state is powerless to
interfere.”223
220

Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
See Greenawalt, supra note __, at 74.
222
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
223
Peter J. Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 Geo. L.J. 399,
425 (1991). Byrne limits his recommendation to cases in which the university “acts to safeguard
liberal education, which is understood both as the disinterested pursuit of truth according to
disciplinary criteria and the elaboration and instruction in culture.” Id. That analysis assumes that
prohibitions of racist speech on campus are only justified when they serve the particular functions
of a university, which Byrne is concerned to identify. Because this section assumes that the
221
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The few courts that have examined campus speech codes have arguably
fallen into error by assuming that academic freedom concerns do not alter the
need to perform the traditional First Amendment analysis that would be
performed in other speech contexts. Under Grutter’s First Amendment, their task
would be quite different: (1) to look for evidence that the university’s restrictions
on speech were justified by reference to its educational mission; (2) to look for
evidence that the restrictions were the product of a genuinely “academic”
decision-making process; and (3) given a finding that the university met
conditions (1) and (2), to accord wide latitude to the nature and scope of the
measures adopted by the university. In that inquiry, the courts must assume the
university’s good faith absent contrary evidence.224
In short, the elaborate architecture of First Amendment jurisprudence – its
inquiries about whether a public forum is present and what kind of forum, its
effort to smoke out content and viewpoint distinctions – must take a back seat to a
deferential, context-specific inquiry into whether a university’s speech code
relates to its educational mission. Under this test, it is quite conceivable that the
courts would uphold restrictions on campus speech.
Interestingly, in his concurrence in the Southworth case,225 Justice Souter
(joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer) recognized that a strong institutional
autonomy approach to university policies affecting student speech might carry
precisely this implication.226 As he recognized, an institutional autonomy
approach like that suggested by Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy “might seem to
clothe the University with an immunity to any challenge to regulations made or
obligations imposed in the discharge of its educational mission.”227 For that very
reason, Justice Souter was at pains to emphasize the limited nature of the Court’s
prior academic freedom jurisprudence and the fact that Southworth interposed
student First Amendment rights as against the university’s First Amendment right
to institutional autonomy. “It is enough to say,” he concluded, “that protecting a
university’s discretion to shape its educational mission may prove to be an
important consideration in First Amendment analysis of objections to student
fees.”228

Grutter Court privileged deference to academic institutions generally over any particular vision of
the university, it need not accept that aspect of Byrne’s argument. It does, however, play a more
significant role in the next section of this paper.
224
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
225
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
226
Id. at 239 n.5 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Indeed, acceptance of the most
general statement of academic freedom (as in the South African manifesto quoted by Justice
Frankfurter [in his Sweezy concurrence]) might be thought even to sanction student speech codes
in public universities.”).
227
Id. at 237.
228
Id. at 239.
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However limited his conclusions about the status of institutional autonomy
as a First Amendment right of universities may have been, though, Justice Souter
at least acknowledged that this approach may indeed support a university’s right
to restrict student speech on campus. That is the approach taken by the majority
in Grutter – a majority that included Justices Souter, Stevens, and Breyer.
Ultimately, I take no position on whether such codes are wise. 229 The
question here is simply whether they are permissible. Under Grutter’s First
Amendment, as long as the wisdom of campus speech restrictions is left in the
university’s hands, the court need not conduct the same searching inquiry into
constitutionality. Thus, Grutter’s First Amendment may well support the
imposition of speech codes on campus.
2.

Content Distinctions On Campus, With Special Attention to
Religious Speech

Universities have become a prime ground of contention in the Court’s
ongoing effort to police permissible and impermissible regulation of religious
speech and activity in the public sphere. In recent years, some of the Court’s
most important pronouncements on the boundaries of acceptable government
support for or regulation of religion under the Establishment Clause have taken
place in the context of the university.230 Here, too, Grutter may suggest a
different approach.
Debates over the inclusion of religious speech in campus life have
centered on a simple conflict. On the one hand, it is argued, public institutions
must comply with the absolute prohibition on certain kinds of state support for
religion indicated by the language of the Establishment Clause and the
separationist approach of the Warren-era Supreme Court. On the other, the Court
and various advocates before it have increasingly turned to a speech-oriented
model in evaluating public religious conduct.
Widmar v. Vincent illustrates this conflict. There, a student religious
group challenged a decision of the University of Missouri at Kansas City
prohibiting it from meeting on university grounds “for purposes of religious
worship or religious teaching.”231 The university argued that the restriction was
necessary to comply with the Establishment Clause.232 The Court was unanimous
in agreeing that the university was not required to restrict religious speech on
229

See Greenawalt, supra note __, at 72 (noting that the constitutionality and the wisdom of
university speech regulations present two different questions).
230
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819
(1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1982).
231
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265-66 (quotation and citation omitted).
232
Id. at 275.
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campus. But it fractured on the question of whether the university could restrict
the speech.
For the majority, Justice Powell – the author of the pivotal Bakke opinion,
it should be noted – assumed that the proper course of analysis was through public
forum doctrine. Because the university had created a forum for the activities of
varied student groups, it was not entitled to discriminate among those groups
based on the content of their speech.233 On this point, the Court’s analysis was
rather thin; any consideration of whether the university had truly engaged in
content discrimination, or whether the case actually involved some form of
viewpoint discrimination,234 would receive more careful consideration in
Rosenberger.
The Court did acknowledge that a university is not, in all respects, the
same as a traditional public forum, and suggested that the decision did not
question a university’s “authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible
with [its educational] mission upon the use of campus and facilities.”235 At the
same time, it asserted that persons entitled to be on campus, including students,
enjoy the usual array of First Amendment rights.236
In rejecting any special right of the university to exclude the religious
speech at issue, moreover, Justice Powell turned to a significant use of the Court’s
own prior academic freedom jurisprudence. Because the university “is peculiarly
the marketplace of ideas,” he suggested, it was under a particular obligation not to
discriminate among the speakers in that “marketplace.”237 Of course, that phrase
found its way into the academic freedom jurisprudence in Keyishian. In Bakke,
Justice Powell had quoted that case (carefully omitting the sentence containing
that phrase) for the proposition that a university may select for diversity when
choosing its students.238 The marketplace of ideas metaphor thus supported the
university’s discretion in Bakke. Here, the same phrase served to narrow that
discretion. Thus, despite its mention of academic freedom and its suggestion that
universities might enjoy some breathing room in the grant of access to university
facilities, Widmar again proceeded on a standard First Amendment analysis basis
that rendered any constitutional principle of academic freedom irrelevant.

233

See id. at 267-70.
See id. at 284 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
235
Id. at 268 n.5; see also id. at 276 (“Our holding in this case in no way undermines the
capacity of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. Nor do we
question the right of the University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce
resources or to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”) (quotations and citations omitted).
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Id. at 268-69.
237
Id. at 268 n.5 (quotation and citation omitted).
238
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
234
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The Court took a similar approach in Rosenberger. There, again, the case
turned on the workings of public forum doctrine and the requirements of content
and viewpoint neutrality, not on the University of Virginia’s unique status as a
university. Thus, in asserting that “[t]he first danger to liberty lies in granting the
State the power to examine publications to determine whether or not they are
based on some ultimate idea and if so for the State to classify them,”239 the Court
seemed to assume that any constitutional test that would apply to state action
applied in precisely the same way to a public educational institution.240
Indeed, to the extent the university’s status as an educational institution
weighed in the balance, it was against its discretion to regulate viewpoints on
campus. As with Widmar, the Court treated the university’s status as a locus of
“thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic
tradition”241 as a constraint on its discretion, rather than a basis for according it
autonomous status under the law. As for Widmar’s statement that a university
might be entitled to greater leeway in “mak[ing] academic judgments as to how
best to allocate scarce resources,”242 the Court effectively cut back sharply on this
apparent grant of discretion, labeling it no more than a lame recognition that a
university may “determine[ ] the content of the education it provides.”243
Three relevant conclusions may be drawn from these cases. First, where
conflicts arise between student speech on campus and the university’s own efforts
to direct or limit that speech, the Court is inclined to turn to standard First
Amendment tests in resolving those conflicts.244 Second, as a corollary to the first
conclusion, claims of constitutional academic freedom will buy universities little
additional discretion. Third, to the extent academic freedom is involved in these
cases, the majority of the Court has treated it as an additional obligation to follow
rules of content- and viewpoint-neutrality, rather than as a grant of discretion to
shape and channel the content of on-campus speech more freely.
Grutter’s First Amendment might approach these cases quite differently.
Perhaps because they believe these conflicts are best dealt with under the rubric of
the Establishment Clause, or perhaps because of their recognition that the courts
will ultimately treat these cases according to established First Amendment
jurisprudence, universities have not argued that they are entitled to regulate
religious speech on campus in service of their educational mission. No doubt
many universities quite properly believe that since their educational mission
239

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at __.
See also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000).
241
Id. at __.
242
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 278.
243
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at __.
244
See also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233 (proper protection of students’ First Amendment
interests requires application of viewpoint neutrality rule where university allocates funding
support to student groups).
240
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includes the provision of access to a wide variety of forms of student speech in
order to encourage a vibrant pluralism of religious and other views on campus,
such an argument would actually contradict their own idea of a university.245
Accordingly, they may believe, if there is any basis for treating religious speech
differently, it must come from the Establishment Clause.
But such an argument is hardly inconceivable. Even leaving aside strongform arguments in favor of a strictly secular campus, a plausible weak-form
argument could be made in favor of some careful restrictions on campus religious
speech. For example, a university might argue that campus speech should be
directed toward the creation of spaces in which students can engage in productive
dialogue and debate. Many religious organizations and activities may provide
opportunities for that kind of dialogue; indeed, even some forms of religious
teaching may provide that kind of productive exchange of ideas. But religious
worship is not, at least in some traditions, an opportunity for dialogue. It is rather
a communal experience that assumes a group of like-minded individuals and may
(again, in some traditions only) exclude non-believers. Even if this is too harsh a
view, a university may simply make the considered judgment that worship
services, however meaningful and valuable, are far from the core educational
mission of a modern public university.
I would hesitate long before suggesting that such an argument would
succeed, even under the Grutter vision of substantial deference to a university’s
academic judgments. But it must at least be clear that a court applying Grutter’s
deferential approach would differ considerably in its view of the same case than
one applying traditional First Amendment standards. First Amendment scrutiny
of speech allocation decisions in a public forum is highly exacting, and begins
from the assumption that all speech that is not distinguishable on time, place, and
manner grounds is equally valuable and equally entitled to share in the use of the
commons. By contrast, a court starting from the position of Grutter deference to
an educational institution assumes that the most important factor is the
university’s own evaluation of the value of particular forms of speech within the
college gates.
Under this approach, provided that a university can make a colorable
claim that its policy is the result of a considered academic judgment, the court
must treat that judgment with something less than the exacting scrutiny usually
demanded under the First Amendment. Something of the flavor of this approach
is evident in Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Widmar. There, he suggested that
“the use of the terms ‘compelling state interest’ and ‘public forum’ to analyze the
question presented in this case may needlessly undermine the academic freedom
245

Cf. id. at 233 (“The University may determine that its mission is well served if students
have the means to engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and
political subjects in their extracurricular campus life outside the lecture hall.”).

Published by Digital USD, 2004

47

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 16 [2004]

Grutter’s First Amendment

47

of public universities.”246 He would thus have held that a university may limit
access to speech within the college gates to a greater extent than the administrator
of other public forums, provided it can supply a valid reason for the limitation.247
Because the only reason put forward by the University of Missouri in that
case was its “fear of violating the Establishment Clause,”248 Justice Stevens
concurred in the Court’s judgment. But his approach, which refuses to
“encumber[ ]” universities “with ambiguous phrases like ‘compelling state
interest,’”249 plainly would give greater scope to universities to move beyond an
Establishment Clause rationale and advance other, more academically grounded
reasons for imposing restrictions on certain forms of religious speech, and would
subject those reasons to a far more forgiving level of scrutiny.
Thus, if read seriously, Grutter’s emphasis on the importance of deferring
to the academic judgments of universities would compel a different approach to
the question of religious speech on campus. Because restrictions on religious
speech commonly raise non-academic arguments such as a concern about
violating the Establishment Clause, it is not clear that the results of such disputes
would differ significantly. But this approach would still be significant if only for
its assumption that universities are not obliged to treat all forms of speech the
same, that they are not subject to the same kinds of scrutiny that may apply to
other administrators of what may be characterized as public forums. If a
university could advance a plausible academic argument in favor of any
restrictions on particular forms of religious speech, Grutter’s First Amendment
would place a good deal of weight on that argument.
3.

The Solomon Amendment

Under the bylaws of the American Association of Law Schools, every
member school is bound to a policy of equal opportunity in employment,
including equal treatment without regard to sexual orientation.250 Schools are
expected to limit the use of their facilities in recruitment or placement assistance
to those employers who are willing to abide by these principles of equal
opportunity.251 One potential employer is the United States military, which
discriminates against gays and lesbians.252 Because of its policies, the military

246

Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277-78 (Stevens, J., concurring).
See id. at 280.
248
Id.
249
Id. at 279.
250
AALS Bylaw § 6.4(b). Separate principles apply to religiously affiliated law schools.
See AALS Interpretive Principles, [cite].
251
See id. § 6.19.
252
See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (mandating discharge of members of the armed forces who engage
in “homosexual acts”).
247
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has been the subject of various protests, limitations, and outright restrictions on its
ability to recruit law students on campus.253
Congress responded to this state of affairs in 1994 by passing the so-called
Solomon Amendment.254 Under that statutory provision, a university or its
“subelement,” such as a law school, may not prohibit or prevent the government
from recruiting students on campus, or restrict the government’s access to student
information for recruiting purposes.255 Failure to comply with this provision
carries with it significant funding consequences, for both the law school and the
university. A law school’s non-compliance may result in the government
withdrawing all Defense Department funding from the university as a whole, and
a significant portion of non-defense government funding from the law school
itself.256
Since the passage of the Solomon Amendment, law schools have
attempted by a variety of means to reconcile their non-discriminatory policies
with the terms of the Amendment.257 In recent years, however, the government
has become increasingly strict in its interpretation of the Amendment. As a result,
law schools have effectively suspended their non-discrimination policies with
respect to military recruitment.258
Recently, a number of different groups of plaintiffs brought suit to
challenge the government’s enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.259 The
253

See, e.g., Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, Civ. A. No. 034433(JCL), -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2003 WL 22708576, at __ (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2003) (hereinafter FAIR).
254
For commentary, see, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Equal Opportunity Recruiting, Am. Law.,
Jan. 2004, at 57; Amy Kapczynski, Note, Queer Brinksmanship: Citizenship and the Solomon
Wars, 112 Yale L.J. 673 (2002); Sylvia Law, Civil Rights Under Attack by the Military, 7 Wash.
U. J.L. & Pol’y 117 (2001); W. Kent Davis, Swords Into Ploughshares: The Dangerous
Politicization of the Military in the Post-Cold War Era, 33 Val. U. L. Rev. 61, 105-07 (1998);
Francisco Valdes, Solomon’s Shames: Law as Might and Inequality, 23 T. Marshall L. Rev. 351
(1998).
255
See 10 U.S.C. § 983(b).
256
See FAIR, -- F. Supp. 2d at __ (discussing current state of Solomon Amendment and its
implementing regulations). A recent bill passed by the House of Representatives reinforces this
legal regime by stating clearly that military recruiters must be granted the same access to students
that other employers receive and adding to the list of agencies that may withhold funding for
noncompliant schools. See H.R. 3966 (approved by House on March 30, 2004).
257
See Law, supra note __, at 123-29. Chai Feldblum and Michael Boucai of Georgetown
University Law Center have published a handbook for law schools seeking to “ameliorate” the
perceived conflict between law schools’ non-discrimination policies and their obligations under
the Solomon Amendment. See Chai Rachel Feldblum and Michael Boucai, Due Justice:
Amelioration for Law School Compliance with the Solomon Amendment: A Handbook for Law
Schools (2003), available at www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/handbook.pdf.
258
See FAIR, supra note __, at __.
259
See Complaint, Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, Civ. A. No.
03-4433 (D.N.J.) (hereinafter FAIR Complaint); Complaint, Burt et al. v. Rumsfeld, Civ. A. No. __
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complaints brought by these plaintiffs, who include a variety of law professors,
law students, and student and professional groups, raise a number of statutory and
constitutional claims, including First Amendment, due process, and equal
protection objections to the enforcement of the Amendment. Most of those
arguments sound in standard First Amendment terms: the Amendment constitutes
a form of viewpoint or content discrimination, is void for vagueness, violates the
plaintiffs’ First Amendment association rights, and so forth.260 Not surprisingly,
all of the plaintiffs have also argued that the Solomon Amendment violates their
academic freedom.261 For the most part, these arguments are barely fleshed out in
the complaints and appear to be mere supplements to the other arguments.262
One set of plaintiffs, however, has advanced an academic freedom
argument that clearly contemplates the influence that Grutter’s First Amendment
discussion may have in the Solomon Amendment litigation. The Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights (“FAIR”), a recently formed, largely
anonymous “association of law schools and other academic institutions,”263 has
suggested that “Grutter supports the idea that universities should be free to define
their own concepts of discrimination, . . . and that law schools have a powerful
interest in placement policies that avoid invidious discrimination.”264 Its
complaint is replete with language about law schools’ educational missions, the
“pedagogical value” of the schools’ policy regarding on-campus recruiters, which
“pronounc[es] values that students do not necessarily learn from casebooks and
lectures,” and the schools’ interest in “nurtur[ing] the sort of environment for free
and open discourse that is the hallmark of the academy.”265 Unlike the plaintiffs
(D. Conn.) (hereinafter Burt Complaint); Complaint, Burbank et al. v. Rumsfeld, Civ. A. No. __
(E.D. Pa.) (hereinafter Burbank Complaint); Complaint, Student Members of SAME
(Student/Faculty Alliance for Military Equality) et al. v. Rumsfeld, Civ. A. No. 3:03CV01867 (D.
Conn.) (hereinafter SAME Complaint).
260
See, e.g., FAIR Complaint ¶¶ 45-47, 51-53; Burt Complaint ¶¶ 36-47; Burbank
Complaint ¶ 39.
261
See, e.g., FAIR Complaint ¶ 44; Burt Complaint ¶ 33; Burbank Complaint ¶ 37.
262
The student plaintiffs in the SAME case, who are members of student groups at Yale Law
School, do not mention academic freedom in express terms in their complaint at all. They do,
however, raise the argument at least tangentially in their opposition to the government’s motion to
dismiss. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
SAME v. Rumsfeld, Civ. A. No. 3:03CV1867, at 10-11 (filed Feb. 20, 2004) (citing Grutter, supra
note __, and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), in support of the proposition that plaintiffs’
asserted right to receive information under the First Amendment is especially crucial in the
university context).
263
See Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Questions & Answers About the
Solomon Amendment Litigation 11, available at ___ (hereinafter Questions and Answers).
264
Id. at 5; see also id. at 8 (“Our claim is that law schools are entitled to define their
institutional values, at least insofar as those self-definitions do not violate rights specifically
protected by the constitution.”).
265
FAIR Complaint ¶¶ 23-25. Notwithstanding its reference to “free and open discourse,”
the plaintiffs’ arguments in the FAIR litigation would also appear to support the imposition of
speech restrictions on law school campuses. Indeed, the complaint revealingly illustrates the
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in the other Solomon Amendment lawsuits, FAIR and its fellow plaintiffs have
made academic freedom “the principal basis of the[ir] legal challenge.”266
In a recent decision, the district court in the FAIR litigation rejected that
position, at least as an initial matter. In Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, Judge Lifland of the District of New Jersey denied
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the
Amendment, holding that plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims (a point I
discuss below), but had failed to show a likelihood of success on their
constitutional claims.267 The court acknowledged that Grutter required courts to
defer to academic decisions made by universities, but suggested that the fact that
“such institutions occupy ‘a special niche in our constitutional tradition’ implies
that they remain part of, and not sovereign to, that constitutional tradition.”268
Here, the court made clear, any academic freedom interests asserted by the
plaintiffs failed in the balance against the asserted interests of the government
itself.

conflict between a view of academic freedom that believes on-campus discourse should be free
and unfettered and one that emphasizes the need to restrict on-campus speech to ensure civility
and prevent the silencing of disfavored groups. See id. ¶ 20 (“Diversity serves no purpose if
students and faculty feel inhibited from engaging in discourse. Thus, law schools have promoted,
demanded, and strictly enforced, not merely diversity, but also tolerance and respect.”).
Feldblum and Boucai’s handbook offering ways for law schools to “ameliorate” their
compliance with the Solomon Amendment strikes a similar note of perhaps unintended irony.
Thus, on the one hand, the authors allow that “one should expect a range of views on the part of
faculty, students and staff regarding the acceptability of homosexuality,” let alone the Solomon
Amendment itself. Feldblum and Boucai, supra note __, at 8. On the other, they make clear their
view that discussion of these issues in the context of “amelioration” activities such as teach-ins
should be anything but free and open, on the basis that the mere fact that military recruiters are
present on campus is sufficient to represent the view that “the service of openly gay individuals is
destructive to the military.” Id. at 11. Accordingly, they would permit, if not quietly encourage,
ignoring supporters of the Solomon Amendment even within teach-ins and other educational
programming. See, e.g., id. at 11 (“[A] law school can legitimately choose not to include any
panelists supporting the military’s policy in the [educational] program”), 12 (“Law schools . . .
need not feel they must expend excessive energy to find [individuals who support the Solomon
Amendment or military policy with respect to gays and lesbians] in order to have a ‘balanced’
program”), 13-16 (advocating various means of supporting groups and activities on one side of the
debate only). The handbook evinces little recognition that some students or faculty might oppose
the government’s policy on gays in the military and support on-campus military recruiting.
266
Questions and Answers, supra note __, at 1. That is not to say that the other plaintiffs
have ignored academic freedom generally or Grutter specifically. Their arguments, too, are
replete with references to both the general principle of academic freedom and Grutter. But the
FAIR case represents perhaps the most fully fleshed out version of the argument from Grutter and
academic freedom.
267
The plaintiffs appealed the ruling, and the Third Circuit heard oral argument in the case
on June 30, 2004.
268
FAIR, -- F. Supp. 2d at __ (quoting Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339).
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More interesting was another aspect of the court’s decision: its conclusion
that “[t]he concept of academic freedom seems to be inseparable from the related
speech and associational rights that attach to any expressive association or
entity.”269 In other words, “the right to academic freedom is not cognizable
without a foundational free speech or associational right.”270 The court
effectively concluded that because academic freedom is a “First Amendment
interest,”271 and because the Solomon Amendment did not directly interfere with
any speech act on the part of individual speakers, such as professors, any
academic freedom claim in the case would have to arise from and be parasitic on
some independent First Amendment violation.272 Because the court found no
such violations here, any academic freedom claim would necessarily fail.273
I want to suggest here that the district court in FAIR erred in three
important respects. First, it failed to give sufficient recognition to Grutter’s
principle of substantial deference to decision making by higher educational
institutions. Although it accurately quoted Grutter as speaking in terms of “‘a
degree of deference,’”274 it gave short shrift to the real degree of deference
accorded there. Given the Supreme Court’s treatment of the University of
Michigan Law School’s program in that case, Grutter can only be fairly read as
according substantial deference to university decisions. As Peter Schuck has
quite properly noted, the Court’s “latitudinarian” treatment of the Law School’s
admissions policy is truly striking, particularly when contrasted with the Court’s
normal brand of Fourteenth Amendment strict scrutiny.275 That treatment is best
read as suggesting that university decisions are, under the First Amendment,
substantially insulated from the normal processes of judicial review.
Nor is it a sufficient rejoinder to suggest that universities “remain part of,
and not sovereign to,” the Constitution and its limitations.276 If Grutter’s gentle
treatment of the Law School’s program means anything, it surely means that
“constitutionally prescribed limits”277 are themselves fluid and context-dependent.
They are, in Robert Post’s terms, the product of a continuous negotiation between
internal constitutional law and external cultural norms.278 Thus, as I have argued,
Grutter suggests that within the bounds of institutional autonomy provided by the
269

Id. at __.
Id. at __.
271
Id. at __.
272
See id. at __ (“If the Solomon Amendment violates Plaintiffs’ right to academic freedom,
it is because it also intrudes on their rights to free speech and expressive association.”).
273
See id. at __.
274
Id. at __ (quoting Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339).
275
See Schuck, supra note __.
276
Id. at __.
277
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
278
See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8-9 (2003).
270
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First Amendment, universities enjoy substantial freedom to experiment with
policies that serve their educational missions. Within those boundaries, they are
free at least to flirt with, and even bend, traditional constitutional limits.279
Indeed, the product of those experiments itself will go a long way toward defining
the boundaries of constitutional conduct, at least in that specific context.
In short, it was not enough for the district court in FAIR to simply state
that universities are “not impervious to competing societal interests.”280 The point
of Grutter’s First Amendment is that universities have substantial freedom to
negotiate between those interests, and the balance they strike should generally be
respected as the product of “complex educational judgments in an area that lies
primarily within the expertise of the university.”281
The court erred, too, by suggesting that academic freedom claims must be
grounded on “foundational free speech or associational right[s]” to be
sustainable.282 Unless the university’s right to select those who shall be admitted
to study, which has been recognized since Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in
Sweezy, is conceived of as a species of associational right, Bakke and Grutter
themselves involved no foundational speech or association claims; and conceiving
of admissions decisions as associational rights simply does not capture what was
going on in those cases. Although the academic freedom arguments in those
cases arose as defenses rather than as claims for relief, Grutter’s vehement
discussion of the vital First Amendment role of universities does not suggest that
academic freedom is a shield only, and not a sword. Rather, Grutter’s First
Amendment recognizes that universities play a special role in the First
Amendment firmament, and must be granted discretion to design and implement a
broad range of educational policies, whether conceived as direct speech acts or as
decisions that shape the structure and composition of universities as a whole.
I do not mean to suggest that the court was therefore wrong in denying
FAIR’s motion for a preliminary injunction, or that FAIR ought to prevail at trial.
Constitutional limits still exist. In this case, the court might properly conclude
that FAIR’s lawsuit looked less like the internal admissions policy at issue in
Grutter and more like the unsuccessful privilege claim in the EEOC case – a
positive claim for something more than “the protect[ion] [of] the normal decisionmaking processes of educational institutions.”283 Certainly the unique context of
the case, in which FAIR challenged the law schools’ obligation to abide by the
terms of their public funding, offers a complicating factor that was not present in
Grutter. Even on this point, however, the Supreme Court has suggested in dicta
279
280
281
282
283

For expansion on this point, see infra Part IV.
FAIR, -- F. Supp. 2d at __.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
FAIR, -- F. Supp. 2d at __.
Yudof, supra note __, at 856.
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that universities may occupy a more privileged position than other actors when
they accept government funding that carries conditions that may affect academic
freedom.284
Nevertheless, the district court’s decision notwithstanding, Grutter does
suggest that university and/or law school plaintiffs in litigation against the
Solomon Amendment ought to be granted substantial deference to structure their
academic policies – including their decisions about on-campus access to
employment recruiters – in order to suit their educational missions. Whether or
not that institutional autonomy ought to overcome the substantial interests of the
government in maintaining access to potential recruits is another question.
Surely, however, if institutional autonomy is enough to support university
admissions policies that fall under the Court’s strict scrutiny, it ought at least to
weigh heavily in the balance against the government’s asserted interests in this
context.
I have as yet barely touched on the third potential error in the district
court’s decision in the FAIR litigation. The court suggested that all of the
plaintiffs in this case – FAIR, “an association of law schools and law faculties”;285
the Society of American Law Teachers; two law professors; three law students;
and two law student groups – had standing to pursue their claims against the
government.286 The court based its conclusion on the view that the individual
plaintiffs and associations enjoyed First Amendment rights as “beneficiaries,
senders, and recipients of the message of non-discrimination sent by their schools’
non-discrimination policies.”287
That conclusion suggests, consistently with the Court’s pre-Grutter
academic freedom jurisprudence, that members of the university community
enjoy a substantial degree of First Amendment freedom on campus,
notwithstanding the institutional setting.288 But Grutter itself sounds in
284

Thus, in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Court did suggest that government
funding could not overcome all First Amendment claims on the part of the recipient of funds. In
particular, it noted that “the university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to
the functioning of our society that the Government’s ability to control speech within that sphere by
means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment.” Id. at 200. But that dicta only
suggests that specific vagueness and overbreadth arguments, which were made and rejected in
FAIR, might prevail in a government funding context. It did not suggest that a free-standing claim
of academic freedom would necessarily prevail in any contest with the government over the terms
of public funding for universities.
285
FAIR, -- F. Supp. 2d at __.
286
See id. at __.
287
Id. at __.
288
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, __ (1969) (“It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
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institutional terms. The freedom described there is not a right of professors to
enjoy the communicative benefits of a diverse student body, but the discretion of
an educational institution to set educational policies and make academic decisions
– to fulfill a “proper institutional mission.”289
Thus, one fair reading of Grutter suggests that academic freedom is a
fundamentally institutional right, not one enjoyed by university faculty. At the
very least, it suggests that “educational autonomy”290 is an institutional right, not
an individual right, and may therefore only be invoked by the institution itself.291
That conclusion is fortified in a case like the Solomon Amendment litigation. For
whatever the position of the institutions involved may be with respect to the
Solomon Amendment, it is far from clear that the individuals and groups within
those institutions agree on the propriety or impropriety of on-campus military
recruitment. Thus, under the cover of academic institutional autonomy, we may
face a situation in which some students and professors are acting to alter the
educational policy of their institutions without apparent regard to the official
policies of the institution itself, let alone the views of any professors or students
who want the military to recruit on campus.292
Because the plaintiffs in FAIR apparently included at least two law
schools, the academic freedom claims could still proceed even if they could only
be invoked by educational institutions.293 But this reading of Grutter does
289

Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339 (emphasis added).
Id.
291
Cf. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 412 (“Appellees ask us to recognize a First Amendment right of
academic freedom that belongs to the professor as an individual. The Supreme Court, to the extent
it has constitutionalized a right of academic freedom at all, appears to have recognized only an
institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs.”). That conclusion might be more apt in
cases like Grutter and the Solomon Amendment litigation, which involve educational policies set
by the institution as a whole, than in Urofsky itself, which involved limitations on informationgathering activities by professors themselves. For commentary on the standing issues raised by
Urofsky, see Alvin J. Schilling and R. Craig Wood, The Internet and Academic Freedom: The
Implications of Urofsky v. Gilmore Standing as a Constitutional Concern: A Required Threshold
Issue, 179 West’s Educ. L. Rep. 9 (2003); Kate Williams, Note, Loss of Academic Freedom on the
Internet: The Fourth Circuit’s Decision in Urofsky v. Gilmore, 21 Rev. Litig. 493, 507 (2002)
292
For example, a number of law student groups comprised of service members, reservists,
veterans, and non-veterans filed a brief amicus curiae in the Third Circuit in the FAIR litigation,
arguing that the exclusion of the military from on-campus recruiting would “undercut their ability
to participate meaningfully in the classrooms and halls of American law schools.” Brief of the
UCLaw Veterans Society et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, No.
03-4433 (3d Cir.), filed Feb. 24, 2004.
293
See FAIR, -- F. Supp. 2d at __ (noting that second amended complaint identified two law
schools as members of FAIR, and that two more law schools had informed the court by letter that
they were also members of the association). The decision says nothing about the nature of those
law schools’ commitment – whether they represented the decision of the faculty as a whole, or of
the law school itself, whether that decision was authorized in turn by the governing body of the
university, and so forth.
290
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suggest that most of the plaintiffs in the FAIR litigation – the non-law-school
members of FAIR, the Society of American Law Teachers, the individual
professors and students, and the student groups – might lack standing to pursue
any institutionally based academic freedom claims. Moreover, because the Burt
and Burbank lawsuits are brought only by law professors and law students, and
not the law schools themselves, this reading of Grutter suggests that any
academic freedom claims in those cases – at least, any academic freedom claims
grounded on institutional autonomy rather than on some individual’s right to
speak or receive information – also must be dismissed.
In sum, the institutional autonomy-based reading of Grutter offers real
ammunition for law schools that wish to challenge the enforcement of the
Solomon Amendment. Law schools’ policies of non-discrimination, and their
efforts to enforce those policies in a variety of settings, including on-campus
recruitment, represent considered academic judgments that are entitled to
substantial deference, notwithstanding any contrary government interests in
maintaining an on-campus presence for military recruitment. But just as those
judgments are properly within the bailiwick of the law schools as academic
institutions, so any institutional autonomy-based arguments against the Solomon
Amendment must be invoked by the institutions themselves, not individual
professors or students or their representatives. Grutter’s First Amendment thus
demands a searching look at the fitness of many of the parties to the Solomon
Amendment lawsuits, even as it also suggests that those lawsuits may have added
merit as a result of Grutter.
4.

The Academic Bill of Rights

Assume for a second that the justifications for academic freedom
discussed above are correct – that academic freedom is justified because of its
contribution to the search for truth, or because of its contribution to a truly
democratic education and, by extension, a truly democratic polity.294 Further
assume for a moment that these are the values that undergird the Court’s decision
in Grutter. What, then, could be wrong with legislation that enshrines these
values in the law? What could be wrong with legislation that purports to support
academic freedom as I have described it?
That question is raised by recent efforts, in Congress and in the states, to
champion legislation called the Academic Bill of Rights. Drafted by conservative
commentator David Horowitz and backed by his and other groups, the document
states, in part, that decisions concerning the hiring, firing, tenure, or promotion of
faculty, students’ grades, curriculum decisions and other aspects of university life
should not be made “on the basis of . . . political or religious beliefs.”295 The
294
295

See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
Academic Bill of Rights, available at www.studentsforacademicfreedom.org.
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Academic Bill of Rights is grounded on views that most readers of this article will
likely support: that the university serves “the pursuit of truth,” that “pluralism,
diversity, opportunity, critical intelligence, openness and fairness” are “the
cornerstones of American society,” that academic freedom serves to “secure the
intellectual independence of faculty and students and to protect the principle of
intellectual diversity.”296
In short, if taken at face value, the Academic Bill of Rights ought to be
largely uncontroversial to those who adopt conventional views of academic
freedom. It should be no more objectionable, say, than a law that declares that
universities must guarantee and support the presence of a diversity of views on
campus.
Whether it need be taken on its face is quite a different question.
Horowitz and his supporters are, by and large, political conservatives, and since
their evident concern is the perception that the university has been colonized and
made the almost exclusive preserve of political liberals, the Academic Bill of
Rights could be viewed simply as a device to force the hiring of greater numbers
of conservative academics and nothing more.297 But if, as Horowitz and his
supporters contend, conservatives are not only underrepresented on campus, but
are underrepresented as a result of active and deliberate choices stemming from
political bias, what is wrong with redressing the imbalance?
Although Horowitz disclaims any desire to see the Academic Bill of
Rights enacted as binding law,298 it has been the subject of a number of legislative
developments. A version of the Academic Bill of Rights has been introduced as a
non-binding resolution in the House of Representatives;299 a similarly nonbinding version was passed by the Georgia state Senate;300 and a binding version
of the Academic Bill of Rights which focused on student rights rather than faculty
issues was withdrawn from the Colorado legislature only after a number of
Colorado university officials reached a memorandum of understanding endorsing
the views provided in the bill.301
Again, these bills are non-binding or, as in the Colorado case, inoperative
with respect to faculty hiring and other fundamental university decisions. But
296

Id.
See generally Yilu Zhao, Taking the Liberalism Out of Liberal Arts, N.Y. Times, April 3,
2004, at __; Stanley Fish, ‘Intellectual Diversity’: The Trojan Horse of a Dark Design, Chron. of
Higher Educ., Feb. 13, 2004, at __ (quoting Horowitz as saying, “I encourage [students] to use the
language that the left has deployed so effectively on behalf of its own agendas”).
298
See Zhao, id.; Fish, id.
299
See H. Con. Res. 318 (Oct. 30, 2003).
300
See Ga. S. Res. 661 (adopted March 22, 2004).
301
See Memorandum of Understanding, available at www.studentsforacademicfreedom.org;
Zhao, supra note __.
297
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what if a binding version of the Academic Bill of Rights were passed? The
Academic Bill of Rights purports to stand on the same principles that the Court
relied on in Grutter – a belief in the importance of academic freedom and
intellectual diversity. What would Grutter’s First Amendment have to say about
such legislation?
The answer is, I think, clear but not without irony. On the institutional
autonomy reading of Grutter, an academic institution whose educational mission
is itself substantive – a university whose mission involves a conclusion about
“political or religious beliefs” – is entitled to substantial deference in framing and
advancing policies that support those substantive views. A religious university
whose educational mission is to advance Southern Baptist views may refuse to
hire or promote academics whose views counter or depart from those beliefs. A
secular university department that concludes that Marxism is a dry well may
eliminate courses advancing Marxist theory, just as surely as a science department
may conclude that its truth-seeking mission would hardly be advanced by
providing lectures advancing a Ptolemaic view of astronomy. A university that
believes its educational mission requires it to advance liberal views on racial
diversity may oppose the inclusion of more voices championing conservative
views on racial diversity. To be sure, a university would have to advance credible
evidence that its substantive views were indeed a part of its educational mission.
But if it did, Grutter’s First Amendment would invalidate any attempt to subject it
to the strictures of the Academic Bill of Rights.
Not without irony, I said. For the Academic Bill of Rights is, on its face,
entirely consistent with the kinds of rationales for academic freedom – truthseeking, intellectual diversity, and the like – that the Supreme Court has typically
treated as supporting a constitutional right to academic freedom. And these are
the same values that undergird the institutional autonomy reading of Grutter.302
Yet, if I am correct, the rule of deference to decisions made by academic
institutions that emerges from these values would foreclose the enforcement of an
Academic Bill of Rights. By contrast, it is at least arguable that these values cut
against prohibitions on hate speech or religious speech on campus. Yet, as I have
suggested, the institutional autonomy reading of Grutter compels the conclusion
that a university may impose these restrictions, as long as they are part and parcel
of its academic mission.
We might draw two conclusions from this seemingly contradictory state of
affairs. The first is that the institutional autonomy reading of Grutter is a
prophylactic rule that has slipped its moorings. Like many prophylactic rules, it
draws a wide boundary around the values it seeks to protect, even when that
302

See Fish, supra note __, at __ (“It’s hard to see how anyone who believes (as I do) that
academic work is distinctive in its aims and goals and that its distinctiveness must be protected
from political pressures (either external or internal) could find anything to disagree with here.”).
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boundary no longer corresponds to the values in question. Thus, although the
institutional autonomy reading of Grutter is based on the value of truth-seeking
and other standard rationales for academic freedom, it serves those values
indirectly, not directly, by giving universities wide latitude to set their own
academic policies. In so doing, as the contrast between the campus hate speech
and Academic Bill of Rights examples suggests, this version of Grutter’s First
Amendment gives universities latitude even in cases in which their academic
policies would disserve the very rationales that have been offered for academic
freedom. Such a rule could still be justifiable, however, if we favor universities to
adopt a diversity of approaches to educational policy and academic freedom. Or
it could be justified if we believe we are better off entrusting decisions on
educational policy to educational institutions without reservation rather than
allowing courts or legislators to make case-by-case determinations.
The second possible conclusion points to a deeper concern, which I
touched on earlier: that the academic freedom values the Academic Bill of Rights
seeks to protect are themselves incoherent, inaccurate, or non-existent. If
Horowitz’s defense of intellectual diversity as a core value of academic freedom
fails under Grutter’s institutional autonomy principle, perhaps that is because
universities do not all agree that intellectual diversity is an important value.303 Or
perhaps they agree on the end but not the means. This again suggests, as I have
argued above, that courts – and supporters of the Academic Bill of Rights –
cannot safely rely on a fixed justification for or definition of academic freedom.
I will canvass those issues more fully below. For now, it is simply
important to note that even as the institutional autonomy reading of Grutter may
support efforts by universities to impose university policies that do not treat all
ideas or speakers alike, it may also bar legislators and regulators from imposing
otherwise unobjectionable norms of intellectual diversity or equal treatment on
universities from above.
5.

Racially Based Scholarships

Grutter’s deferential First Amendment-based treatment of the university’s
right to determine who shall be admitted to study, and the forgiving breadth of
scope with which it treated the narrow tailoring part of its Fourteenth Amendment
inquiry, suggests that courts, colleges, and state and federal education officials
may now revisit another heated issue affecting university admissions: the
constitutionality of racially based scholarships.304
303

Cf. Fish, id. at __ (arguing that neither intellectual diversity nor “[c]itizen building” are
academic activities).
304
For commentary on this issue, see, e.g., B. Andrew Bednark, Note, Preferential
Treatment: The Varying Constitutionality of Private Scholarship Preferences at Public
Universities, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1391 (2001); Amy Weir, Note, Should Higher Education Race-
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The leading case on this issue, Podberesky v. Kirwan,305 addressed the
University of Maryland’s Banneker scholarship program, a merit-based
scholarship program available only to African Americans.306 The university
maintained a separate scholarship program available to all students, but that
program’s merit standards were more stringent. Podberesky, a Hispanic student
who met the Banneker scholarship requirements but not the requirements of the
generally available scholarship program, challenged the university’s maintenance
of a separate program.
The Fourth Circuit decided Podberesky as if Bakke’s diversity interest did
not exist, relying instead on the Supreme Court’s stringent scrutiny of remedial
racially conscious measures in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.307 Thus, it
looked – searchingly and critically – for evidence that the scholarship program
was justified as a response to “the present effects of past discrimination.”308 The
university was unable to meet this high hurdle; whatever racial tensions existed at
the university were not sufficiently linked to past discrimination to justify the
program,309 and in any event the program – which gave scholarships to all
qualifying African American students, and not just those African American
students from Maryland – was not narrowly tailored to remedy the past
discrimination at issue.310
Given the uncertain status of Bakke at the time Podbereksy was decided, it
is perhaps unsurprising that the Fourth Circuit thought to apply Croson rather than
look to the diversity rationale in evaluating the scholarship program. In any
event, it is not clear whether the university advanced diversity as a rationale for its
program.311 It is thus understandable that commentators following Podberesky

Based Financial Aid Be Distinguished From Race-Based Admissions?, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 967
(2001); William E. Thro, The Constitutional Problem of Race-Based Scholarships and a Practical
Solution, 111 Ed. Law Rep. 625 (1996); Kirk A. Kennedy, Race-Exclusive Scholarships:
Constitutional Vel Non, 30 Wake Forest L. Rev. 759 (1995); Brian K. Landsberg, Balanced
Scholarship and Racial Balance, 30 Wake Forest L. Rev. 819 (1995).
305
38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
306
Id. at 152.
307
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
308
Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 153.
309
Id. at 154-57.
310
Id. at 158-59.
311
This may have something to do with the historical context in which it arose. The
constitutionality of racially based scholarship programs was a disputed issue at this point, and at
the time the litigation was conducted, the university may have believed the argument was not
available to it. See, e.g., Weir, supra note __, at 975-76 (noting that Department of Education had
issued statement in 1990 declaring that race-based scholarships were unconstitutional and violated
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1994, and subsequently issued policy guidelines in 1994
suggesting that race-based financial aid was available to create a diverse student body).
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assumed a diversity-based argument for racially based scholarships might be
unsustainable.312
Grutter suggests that racially based scholarships may stand on surer
footing than the Podberesky panel assumed.313 This argument does not require as
much detail as those offered above, because it is little more than a rehearsal of the
Court’s reasoning in Grutter. Quite simply, Grutter holds that universities may
legitimately tailor their admissions programs to meet the educational goal of
maintaining a diverse student body. That interest is grounded in the First
Amendment and measures taken by the university to ensure that diversity, short of
“outright racial balancing,”314 will be viewed with some substantial degree of
deference, despite the ostensibly “strict” level of constitutional scrutiny applied
by the Court.
That reasoning applies equally to the case of racially based scholarships.
A university that has a compelling interest in a diverse student body, and that may
mold its admissions requirements toward that end, surely has an equal interest in
ensuring that it can also “attract and retain” those students who serve the
educational mission of maintaining student diversity,315 particularly to the extent
that such scholarships enable the school to attract and retain a critical mass of
minority students.316 Grutter thus suggests that universities ought to be able to
confidently rely on their educational interest in student diversity in maintaining
racially based scholarship programs.317
6.

Single-Sex Schools, Historically Black Colleges, and Other
Exclusive Educational Institutions.

312

See, e.g., Thro, supra note __, at 623.
Although that is not necessarily what some educational institutions, who have to plan
outside the sanctuary of the law review, have concluded. See Daniel Golden, Colleges Cut Back
Minority Programs After Court Rulings, Wall St. J., Dec. 30. 2003, at A1.
314
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
315
Weir, supra note __, at 987.
316
Admittedly, this argument does not settle the question of whether a university may
maintain racially based scholarships with lower requirements than those scholarships made
available to students who do not belong to the relevant minority group(s). That was the case in
Podberesky, see 38 F.3d at 152; Kennedy, supra note __, at 770. That may depend on whether
one believes that the admissions program employed by the University of Michigan Law School
was as “flexible [and] nonmechanical” as the Court suggested it was in Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at
2342, or whether it actually placed a thumb on the scales of minority applicants. To the extent that
a minority-based scholarship maintains a fixed lower eligibility requirement than the generally
available requirement, it may come closer to the admissions program outlawed by the Court in
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003). But a university that maintained a larger pool of
scholarship funds for minority students without applying a lowered eligibility standard for access
to those funds could credibly argue that its actions fell outside the scope of Gratz.
317
Cf. Gerald Torres, Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v. Bollinger: View From a Limestone
Ledge, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1596, 1599 (2003).
313
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A final controversial issue to which Grutter’s First Amendment may
ultimately speak is the constitutionality of publicly funded single-sex or racially
based educational institutions. As with the regulation of religious speech, I do not
argue here that Grutter necessarily demands a sea change in the law’s current
treatment of those institutions. But it may give ammunition to those who wish to
argue in favor of a different approach.
In both cases involving publicly funded single-sex education that have
reached the Supreme Court, the Court struck down those institutions’ admissions
policies as gender discrimination. In the first case, Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan,318 the Court sustained a challenge by a male applicant to a
state-supported single-sex nursing school. Although the state attempted to justify
the school’s admissions policy on the ground that it “compensates for
discrimination against women,”319 the Court found that the school’s
discriminatory policy reflected “a desire to provide white women in Mississippi
access to state-supported higher learning,” not a desire to compensate them for
any discrimination they had faced.320 Moreover, since the Court found that
women at the time earned most of the baccalaureate nursing degrees in both the
United States and the state of Mississippi itself, it was hard to show that the
program was necessary to compensate women for discrimination in the field.321
Nor could the school justify its policy on the grounds of any pedagogical benefits
enjoyed by women in a single-sex environment: the record did not show that
admitting men to nursing classes affected teaching style, student performance, or
classroom discussion.322 In any event, since men were allowed to audit classes at
the school, those pedagogical arguments would have been hard to make in the
context of the case.323
Similarly, in United States v. Virginia,324 the Court rejected the state of
Virginia’s arguments in favor of its state-supported “incomparable military
college, Virginia Military Institute (VMI).”325 Although the state advanced
pedagogically based arguments that VMI’s single-sex educational environment
offered “important educational benefits” that would be hampered if women were
permitted to attend the academy,326 and that the school contributed to a diversity
of educational approaches in the state’s array of publicly funded institutions of
higher learning,327 the Court concluded that the program had not been established
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327

458 U.S. 718 (1982).
Id. at 727.
Id. at 727 n.13.
See id. at 729.
See id. at 731.
See id. at __.
116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
Id. at __.
Id. at __.
Id. at __.
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for the purpose of advancing diversity in the state’s educational programs,328 and
that to the extent the school’s “adversative” method of training did constitute a
unique approach to learning, the state could not justify excluding women from the
benefits that unique institution offered.329 Indeed, because the women’s military
academy established by the state to compensate for the continued sex segregation
of VMI did not offer a similar adversative style of training, it was a mere “pale
shadow of VMI,”330 and could not justify the continued maintenance of separate
facilities.
For present purposes, it is important to note that neither Hogan nor the
VMI case absolutely foreclose single-sex education.331 Thus, Justice O’Connor
observed in Hogan that, “In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification
favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of
the sex that is disproportionately burdened.”332 And in United States v. Virginia,
the Court repeatedly emphasized the “unique” opportunity offered by VMI’s long
history, resources, reputation, and unusual style of instruction, adding that the
Court did not “question the State’s prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse
educational opportunities.”333 It is possible that Virginia’s system of sexsegregated military academies could have passed muster if a court had found that
such academies had been simultaneously opened, enjoyed similar resources,334
and perhaps had also found that there was some pedagogically sound reason for
the maintenance of gender segregation in the educational system.
Advocates for single-sex education for women have, in fact, advanced a
host of pedagogical arguments in favor of such programs. According to the
(admittedly mixed) research, female students benefit strongly from single-sex
education: they are more likely to engage in classroom discussion, more likely to
receive attention from their instructors, more likely to excel in math and science
and pursue professional interests in those fields, less likely to suffer the
indignities of peer harassment, and ultimately more likely to enjoy better selfimages and seek broader opportunities, including jobs in fields that have
328

Id. at __.
Id. at __.
330
Id. at 2285 (quotation and citation omitted).
331
For discussion, see, e.g., Verna L. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment? Single-Sex
Education and the Construction of Race and Gender, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 15; Amy H. Nemko,
Single-Sex Public Education After VMI: The Case for Women’s Schools, 21 Harv. Women’s L.J.
19 (1998); Catherine A. O’Neill, Single-Sex Education After United States v. Virginia, 23 J. Coll.
& Univ. L. 489 (1997); Denise C. Morgan, Finding a Constitutionally Permissible Path to Sex
Equality: The Young Women’s Leadership School of East Harlem, 14 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 95
(1997); William Henry Hurd, Gone With the Wind? VMI’s Loss and the Future of Single-Sex
Public Education, 4 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 27 (1997).
332
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728.
333
United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 n.7.
334
Cf. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1250 (Phillips, J., dissenting), rev’d, 116 S.
Ct. 2264 (1996).
329
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traditionally been closed to or less attractive to women, than girls or women who
attend co-educational institutions.335 Put in Grutter’s terms, single-sex education
for women may “promote[ ] learning outcomes.”336
All of these considerations gain added strength when considered under the
deferential approach to educational mission that Grutter represents. To the extent
universities enjoy insulation, on First Amendment grounds, when making
“complex educational judgments,” and to the extent a non-diverse student body
enables a school to achieve its educational mission, Grutter suggests that these
institutions should be able to claim substantial deference for their decision to
admit a narrower, rather than a broader, range of students to the student body.
Read for its emphasis on deference, in short, Grutter suggests that what is good
for the goose is good for the gander: if diversity-based admissions can be justified
as a sound means of achieving a school’s educational mission despite the strict
scrutiny of the Fourteenth Amendment, sex-segregated admissions policies may
be able to command the same degree of deference from the courts.
What of racially exclusive colleges and universities? This concern sounds
loudly in Justice Thomas’s dissent in Grutter, building on concerns he has voiced
elsewhere concerning the preservation of historically black colleges and
universities.337 As Justice Thomas observed, Grutter may in fact help preserve
these institutions. If it does, however, it will do so on grounds that might well
justify other efforts at experimentation with racially segregated educational
systems.
There is no doubt that the history of segregation in the American
educational system, including its system of state-supported higher education,
suggests that any pedagogical benefits claimed for historically discriminatory
institutions would face the same problems that the Mississippi nursing school
faced in Hogan. Thus, the law is clear that states may not maintain a system of
racially identifiable, effectively segregated institutions.338 Although historically
black colleges and universities in the United States maintain high enrollments of
African Americans, they may not now simply exclude white or other non-black
students, though the number of such students is tiny.339
A number of legal and educational scholars have argued in recent years
that the promise of Brown v. Board of Education has proved chimerical, and that
335

See Jennifer R. Cowan, Distinguishing Private Women’s Colleges From the VMI
Decision, 30 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 137, 141-42 (1997); Nemko, supra note __, at __-__; see
also Rosemary C. Salamone, Same, Different, Equal: Rethinking School-Sex Schooling (2003).
336
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
337
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2358 (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Fordice, 505
U.S. 717, 745-46 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
338
See Fordice, 505 U.S. 717.
339
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2358 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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black students would be well served by primary or higher education in a
supportive, nurturing, racially exclusive environment.340 Nevertheless, as those
scholars recognize, many publicly supported historically black educational
institutions may be in constitutional peril under the Court’s current equal
protection jurisprudence, fatally tainted by their long association with
segregationist premises even if they have long outgrown the occasion for their
birth.341
As Justice Thomas quite reasonably argued in his dissent, Grutter’s First
Amendment-grounded posture of deference to educational institutions’ proffered
academic justifications for admissions policies lends ammunition to the
maintenance of these historically black institutions. Indeed, it might do so even if
those institutions admitted few or no non-black students. If the majority in
Grutter was entitled to treat with deference the Law School’s claim that a
diversity-based admissions policy would benefit its educational mission, so a
historically black college should be entitled to deference if it argues that “racial
homogeneity will yield educational benefits.”342 Although universities are still
required to act “within constitutionally prescribed limits,”343 Grutter at least
suggests that a university that advanced sound pedagogical reasons for its racially
exclusionary policies might be entitled to some significant leeway, at least as long
as the school was not a mere vestige of de jure segregation, did not produce
adverse impacts on its students, and “persist[ed] with[ ] sound educational
justification.”344
As with single-sex education, those are available, plausible and plentiful.
Historically black universities may properly argue, based on their history and
continuing role in the African American community, that they provide a unique
340

See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Plessy, Brown, and HBCUs: On the Imposition of Stigma and
the Court’s Mechanical Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 40 Washburn L.J. 48 (2000); Frank S.
Adams, Why Brown v. Board of Education and Affirmative Action Can Save Historically Black
Colleges and Universities, 47 Ala. L. Rev. 481 (1996); Wendy Brown-Scott, Race Consciousness
in Higher Education: Does “Sound Educational Policy” Support the Continued Existence of
Historically Black Colleges?, 43 Emory L.J. 1 (1994); Robert L. Carter, Public School
Desegregation: A Contemporary Analysis, 37 St. Louis U. L.J. 885 (1993); Christopher Steskal,
Note, Creating Space for Difference: The Case for African-American Schools, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 187 (1992); Pamela Smith, Note, All-Male Black Schools and the Equal Protection
Clause: A Step Forward Towards Education, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 2003 (1992); Drew Days III, Brown
Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 53 (1992).
341
See, e.g., Strasser, supra note __, at 64-67; Frank Adams, Jr., Why Brown v. Board of
Education and Affirmative Action Can Save Historically Black Colleges and Universities, 47 Ala.
L. Rev. 481, 483 (1996) (“Despite the view of Justice Thomas and many others [concerning] the
present day value of HBCUs, the current state of the law threatens the continuing existence of
these institutions in prior de jure racially segregated states”).
342
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2358 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
343
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
344
Fordice, 505 U.S. at 746 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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educational mix with its own particular set of values.345 Wendy Brown
summarizes some of the common attributes of historically black universities in
these terms:
The features of many HBIs [historically black institutions] which
distinguish the academic experience include open enrollment,
emphasis on public and community service, the inculcation of
moral and ethical values, the promotion of democracy, citizenship,
and leadership skills but also critical analysis as a catalyst for
social change, demonstrated concern for the physical health and
well-being of the student body and the communities from which
they come, preparation for specific careers through liberal arts
education, and African and African-American studies curricula.346
These unique attributes have again contributed to significant “learning outcomes”:
greater intellectual development, positive social and psychological effects, greater
ease in interpersonal relations, and greater cultural awareness.347 Nor can any
pedagogical evaluation of these schools ignore the fact that, to the community
which they primarily serve, they honored as vital and important contributors to
the well-being of the African American community and not as mere vestiges of
segregation.348
All these pedagogical arguments surely are entitled to the same degree of
deference as the arguments for diversity presented in Grutter. If read for all that it
is worth, then, Grutter would appear to support the maintenance of these
universities against an equal protection challenge. Whatever relief that may
provide to supporters of historically black universities, however, it must be
acknowledged as a matter of logic that those arguments could be raised in favor of
a variety of experiments with racially exclusive higher education. Would the
Court support the establishment and public funding of an all-white university,
provided it could advance sound academic reasons in favor of such an institution?
A university deliberately and expressly serving Hispanic students, or members of
some other group? If that outcome seems unlikely for a variety of reasons, it is

345

For an admiring account, see Roy L. Brooks, Integration or Separation? A Strategy for
Racial Equality, ch. 15 (1996).
346
Brown-Scott, supra note __, at 10-11.
347
See Adams, supra note __, at 496-97 (quoting James Washburn, Note, Beyond Brown:
Evaluating Equality in Higher Education, 43 Duke L.J. 1115, 1149 (1994)); see also Leland Ware,
The Most Visible Vestige: Black Colleges After Fordice, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 633, 634 (1994).
348
See, e.g., John A. Moore, Note, Are State-Supported Historically Black Colleges and
Universities Justifiable After Fordice? – A Higher Education Dilemma, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 547,
547 (2000).
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still the case that the argument is supported by the constitutional logic of
Grutter.349
Certainly Justice Thomas is not the only one to recognize this implication
of the Court’s approach. Long before Grutter, Charles Lawrence expressed his
discomfort with a diversity rationale for affirmative action in higher education
admissions, observing that Justice Powell’s reasoning in Bakke, with its emphasis
on deference to the views of the educational establishment, “could as easily
justify an all white school as one that is racially diverse.”350 Strong supporters of
Grutter acknowledged the same discomfort not long after the ruling was handed
down.351
Grutter certainly does not absolutely compel the conclusion that courts
must accept a regime of single-sex or racially segregated higher education, and
Hogan, Fordice and other cases suggest most institutions would be hard pressed
to prove that any racially exclusive admissions policies were motivated by purely
pedagogical purposes. But the “tension” acknowledged by the supporters of
Grutter’s acceptance of the diversity rationale is not a mere phantom. Grutter’s
logic compels the conclusion that a wide range of educational missions may be
entitled to deference on constitutional academic freedom grounds, even if they
skirt different boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment than did the University of
Michigan Law School’s admissions policy.
7.

Conclusion

As this discussion has endeavored to show, the logical implications of the
institutional autonomy reading of Grutter’s First Amendment are wide-ranging
and significant. They counsel a different approach, and potentially different
outcomes, with respect to a variety of controversial First Amendment issues.
Under Grutter’s First Amendment, universities may have much greater discretion
to shape the speech activities of their institutions, including the imposition of
speech codes and the preclusion of at least some forms of religious speech. They
may also have additional ammunition to contest the government’s withdrawal of
349

See also Dixon, supra note __, at 78 (“It would seem to follow [from Bakke’s focus on
diversity as a permissible but not compelled educational value] that academic freedom would
permit some colleges to seek homogeneity if they had a rational basis for doing so.”) (emphasis in
original).
350
Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F.
L. Rev. 757, 771 (1997).
351
Transcript of American Constitution Society Conference, Session E: Segregation,
Integration and Affirmative Action After Bollinger, Aug. 2, 2003 (remarks of Goodwin Liu noting
that the “academic freedom argument . . . would seem to swing both ways” and could support
arguments for segregated universities if they could be justified on educational grounds); see also
id. (remarks of John Payton “acknowledging the tension [in the academic freedom argument]” and
suggesting that the Law School “tried not to make too much of the academic freedom point” in its
brief to the Supreme Court).
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funding where, as with military recruiting on law school campuses, the
government activity conflicts with their educational mission.
Moreover, as in Grutter itself, the implications of Grutter’s First
Amendment carry beyond cases directly implicating speech itself. The
“countervailing [First Amendment] interest”352 of educational institutional
autonomy that is identified in Bakke and reinforced in Grutter may alter the
landscape of other areas of constitutional jurisprudence as well. Thus,
universities, bolstered by Grutter’s First Amendment, may win greater freedom to
employ a variety of race-conscious policies, including the use of race-specific
scholarships and other funding mechanisms. Indeed, they may be able to argue in
favor of single-sex or single-race admissions policies. As I have suggested above,
because the arguments in favor of single-sex or single-race admissions policies
would be grounded in pedagogical rather than remedial justifications, all-white or
all-male institutions might find as much shelter under Grutter as all-female
institutions or historically black colleges and universities.
A few points deserve emphasis here. First, I do not intend to suggest that
any of the varied outcomes I have discussed above are likely to follow from
Grutter. Indeed, I would venture to predict that while some version of the
arguments I have outlined will be advanced in the courts, many will fail. This
seems to be at least one early lesson from the Solomon Amendment. At the very
least, given the significant reshaping of settled precedent that some of these
outcomes represent, these arguments are unlikely to fare well in the lower courts,
although some of them might ultimately find vindication in the Supreme Court.
The point of this discussion has not been to predict real-world litigation outcomes,
but to ask what outcomes follow from Grutter’s First Amendment discussion as a
matter of logical implication.
But the importance of Grutter’s First Amendment, and of this paper, does
not rest on its ultimate success in the courts. Indeed, that is one of the key points
of this paper. Notwithstanding the Court’s bold First Amendment rhetoric in
Grutter, it is quite possible that it will turn out to be a “sport” in First Amendment
caselaw, as Bakke arguably was before it.353 But Grutter and Bakke still demand
greater consideration within the world of First Amendment scholarship. If
Grutter’s First Amendment does eventually have greater influence beyond the
narrow confines of race-conscious admissions policies, the importance of
carefully studying this aspect of Grutter will be obvious. But Grutter will raise
serious questions for First Amendment scholars even if it does turn out to be a
sport: What are the First Amendment principles announced in Grutter? Do they
have greater application beyond the facts of that case? Do they merit greater
application? And if the Court refuses to apply those principles elsewhere, why?
352
353

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
See Byrne, supra note __, at 315; Yudof, supra note __, at 855-56.
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In short, no matter what happens in the courts, Grutter deserves serious
consideration as a First Amendment case.
Finally, it should be evident that the outcomes discussed in this section
point in no particular direction. A university might stress Grutter in arguing for
campus speech restrictions, or in asserting its right to permit a wide degree of
potentially offensive speech. It might assert that its educational mission demands
more religious speech on campus or less religious speech. It might argue in favor
of the educational benefits of a homogeneous student body, but argue that Grutter
supports an all-white or all-male school as much as a traditionally African
American school – or more so, if the all-white school raises legitimate
pedagogical arguments in its defense and the African American school is tainted
in the eyes of the courts by its origins in de jure segregation.
On this reading, then, Grutter’s First Amendment is not about substantive
values, but about deference: provided a university can supply a plausible
academic justification of a policy, that policy may be accorded substantial
deference notwithstanding its potential conflict with First Amendment
jurisprudence or with other constitutional provisions. This reading of Grutter is
therefore bound to please some constituencies and displease others, depending on
the particular educational policy at stake.
To the extent one wishes to police the legal community for consistency,
Grutter’s First Amendment thus provides a nice testing point: Are those who
showered the decision in praise equally willing to live with a set of educational
outcomes they find unwise or distasteful? For example, would the plaintiffs who
have employed Grutter’s emphasis on institutional autonomy to oppose the
Solomon Amendment be equally content to see that emphasis used to support an
educational institution’s ability to discriminate in favor of a different set of
students or potential employers? Conversely, will those who criticized Grutter
nevertheless adopt its First Amendment arguments to support their own set of
educational policies?
There is another possibility, however. As I emphasized at the beginning
of this section, Grutter’s First Amendment is susceptible to more than one
reading. Instead of reading it as adopting a deferential posture toward university
policy-making regardless of the specific educational policies and values at stake,
we might read Grutter as having made a substantive commitment to specific
educational values – and, by extension, to specific political values. It is to this
possible reading of Grutter’s First Amendment that I now turn.
B.

Grutter’s First Amendment As Substantive Commitment

The focus on the institutional autonomy reading of Grutter has yielded a
surprising and wide-ranging set of potential implications for First Amendment
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doctrine and other aspects of constitutional law. But it is based on a particular
reading of Grutter. So far, I have assumed that Grutter adopts a value-neutral
conception of academic freedom. Provided that a university is making “academic
decisions” with respect to policies that serve its “proper institutional mission,”354
it is entitled to substantial deference. What constitutes a “proper educational
mission,” on this reading, is substantially up to the university. A university may
decide that its educational mission demands a diverse student body, or it may
conclude that it has a pedagogical interest in maintaining a gender- or raceexclusive student body. It may decide that its mission demands the imposition of
stringent and viewpoint-specific codes of civility in student speech, or that its
mission demands wide-open debate and precludes the imposition of speech codes.
In each case, the discretion lies with the educational institution. Courts are
not qualified to judge the “complex educational judgments”355 that go into the
formation of a university mission, and must assume that the university has
reached its judgments about its proper educational mission, and the policies
necessary to support it, in good faith.356 This reading of Grutter, which is
substantially based on the Court’s own language, thus preserves universities as
“spheres of independence and neutrality” into which the government may not
intrude.357
It is not, however, the only available reading of Grutter. Another reading
of Grutter is decidedly not value-neutral. Rather, it reads Grutter as having made
a substantive commitment to a particular vision of the proper educational mission
of universities, law schools, and other institutions of higher education.
On this reading, Grutter offers a substantive vision of the university as
fulfilling an important democratic function. This vision blesses the Law School’s
arguments for a diverse student body not simply because they are the product of
autonomous decision-making by an institution that is within its sphere of
expertise, but because diversity in higher education – and particularly within elite
bodies such as the University of Michigan Law School – provides broader goods
that are part of the constitutional framework. Diversity in higher education is not
just an intrinsic good that brings “learning outcomes”358 to the educational
process itself. Rather, it is an important extrinsic good.359 Diverse student bodies
“better prepare[ ] students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and

354

Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
Id.
356
See id.
357
David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in
Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675, 683 (1992).
358
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
359
Cf. Cynthia Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, 7 Green Bag 2d 215, 217-18 (2004).
355
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better prepares them as professionals.”360 They produce a diverse leadership
corps that is better able to deal with the realities of a “global marketplace.”361
More importantly, a diverse student body ensures that equal educational
opportunity is available to all in order to provide for “[e]ffective participation by
members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation.”362 And
diversity in elite educational institutions undergirds democratic legitimacy: it
“cultivate[s] a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry” by
ensuring that “the path to diversity [is] visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity.”363 Thus, on the substantive reading of
Grutter, the Court pledged allegiance to a substantive constitutional vision of the
nature of higher education, one which emphasizes its continuity with a broader
democratic vision of full and equal participation “in the civic life of our
Nation.”364
A number of early examinations of Grutter have focused on this reading
of the case. Robert Post, for example, sees in Grutter a vision of education “as
instrumental for the achievement of extrinsic social goods like professionalism,
citizenship, or leadership.”365 Universities, on this view, are not mere warehouses
for researchers. They are, instead, both models of democratic dialogue366 and
training grounds for a well-trained and representative body of citizens. And Lani
Guinier, in a statement that spotlights the two readings of Grutter I have stressed
in this paper, argues that Grutter makes a positive statement about “the
fundamental role of public education in a democracy,” by “link[ing] the
educational mission of public institutions not only to the autonomy that the First
Amendment gives universities to fashion their educational goals, but also to the
broad democratic goal of providing upward mobility to a diverse cadre of future
leaders.”367 Grutter, in her view, is the starting point for a public discussion about
the “democratic purpose of public education.”368
360

Id. at 2340 (quotation and citation omitted). For commentary on this aspect of Grutter,
see Bryan W. Leach, Note, Race as Mission Critical: The Occupational Need Rationale in
Military Affirmative Action and Beyond, 113 Yale L.J. 1093 (2004).
361
Id. For a thoughtful treatment of this aspect of Grutter, see Thomas H. Lee, Essay,
University Dons and Warrior Chieftains: Two Concepts of Diversity, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 2301
(2004).
362
Id.
363
Id. at 2341.
364
Id. at 2340.
365
Post, supra note __, at 60.
366
See id. at 61 (identifying universities as fora “for participation in civic life”).
367
Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our
Democratic Ideals, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 175 (2003); see also id. at 223 (noting the connection
between “institutions’ educational and public missions”).
368
Id. at 120. For other discussions focusing on Grutter as a substantive commitment to
democratic values in education and beyond, see, e.g., Greenberg, supra note __; Bollinger, supra
note __, at 1591-92.
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As I have suggested above, this vision of the democratic purpose of higher
education is not precisely the same as the description of the purposes of education
offered in support of student body diversity by Justice Powell in Bakke.369 The
focus of that case was on goods that are intrinsic to the educational process. It
was concerned with the exposure of students to diverse ideas and values within
the university itself, in order to foster an atmosphere of “speculation, experiment
and creation.”370 Although that environment might have an impact on the
nation’s future,371 Justice Powell looked only to the educational environment
itself. His diversity argument contemplated “only that the [nation’s future]
leaders, who might all be white, should be attuned to a diversity of ideas and
mores.”372
Grutter, by contrast, is expressly outward-looking; it is concerned not
simply with the intrinsic value of diversity on campus but with the extrinsic value
of education, particularly with regard to leadership and citizenship. Moreover,
unlike Bakke, which is concerned only with the benefits that some putative set of
future citizens and leaders might reap from a diverse student body, Grutter is
concerned with the composition of that caste of citizens and leaders. It suggests
that the legitimacy of higher education, and of the leaders it produces, rests on its
representativeness and inclusiveness. It thus presents a significantly different
picture of the nature and purpose of higher education than the one offered in
Bakke.373
What might we make of this substantive vision of Grutter’s First
Amendment – a vision of academic freedom as serving a particular democratic
vision of higher education as both training for democracy and a miniature model
of diversity in democracy? Most obviously, this reading of Grutter may imply a
different approach to the various free speech and other constitutional issues
discussed above than the approach suggested by an institutional autonomy reading
of Grutter. An educational institution defending a particular policy, such as a set
of restrictions on campus speech or the establishment of a single-sex university,
would be faced with a different justificatory task under this reading: rather than
369

Cf. Post, supra note __, at 60.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
371
See id. at 312-13.
372
Greenberg, supra note __, at 1618.
373
The changing nature of the Court’s vision of educational diversity is acknowledged in
Jeffrey S. Lehman, The Evolving Language of Diversity and Integration in Discussions of
Affirmative Action from Bakke to Grutter, in Patricia Gurin, Jeffrey S. Lehman, and Earl Lewis,
Defending Diversity: Affirmative Action at the University of Michigan 61 (2004). Lehman, who
was involved in the Grutter litigation as Dean of the Law School, acknowledges the difficulties
involved in speaking consistently of diversity over the course of the litigation, in court and in
public, although I suspect he places too much weight on the evolving nature of diversity discourse
in general and too little on the conflict between the Law School’s purposes and its need to fit
within the juridical categories imposed by the Court.
370
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emphasize the connection between its policy and its educational mission, it would
be obliged to show a connection between the educational mission itself and
broader democratic values outside the immediate context of the university.
It is easy to conceive of such arguments regarding some, if not all, of the
issues discussed above. It would be no great stretch, for example, to assert that
“‘education . . . is the very foundation of good citizenship,’”374 and racial epithets
and other instances of campus speech targeted at particular segments of the
university community erect a barrier to the full participation of some groups in
institutions of higher learning. Consequently, racially offensive speech on
campus ultimately impedes some groups’ full enjoyment of and participation in
democratic citizenship. Thus, campus speech restrictions could be as plausibly
justified under the democratic reading of Grutter as they could under the
institutional autonomy reading.
Other issues might compel different outcomes, however. I have
suggested, for example, that under the institutional autonomy reading of Grutter,
a sincere pedagogical justification of single-sex or single-race university
education might justify such admissions policies against any claims of
discrimination. It is not clear that equally compelling reasons could be mustered
in favor of gender- or race-exclusive admissions policies under the democratic
reading of Grutter. To be sure, one could argue that if educational outcomes for
women or African Americans are improved under a system of sex- or raceexclusive higher education, then those programs will ultimately increase the
ability of traditionally disadvantaged groups to fully participate in democratic
society, both as leaders and as citizens. But if Grutter sees universities as both a
conduit to and a model of democratic participation – in Robert Post’s words, if the
Court sees universities as “fora[ ] for participation in civic life”375 – then singlesex or single-sex institutions may be seen as falling short of this participatory
ideal.
I will not develop these alternative arguments at length. Suffice it to say
that it is not clear that the same set of policy implications for other First
Amendment or constitutional issues would follow under the democratic reading of
Grutter as under the institutional autonomy reading of Grutter. The more
interesting questions about this reading of Grutter’s First Amendment, however,
reside beyond the realm of litigation strategy. The democratic reading of
Grutter’s vision of academic freedom is interesting because it raises larger
questions: questions of fit and consistency with the larger body of First
Amendment doctrine, and questions about the Court’s willingness to embrace a
specific, contestable conception of the purpose of the university.
374
375

Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
Post, supra note __, at 61.
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One way to see this problem of consistency is to compare the democratic
reading of Grutter’s First Amendment – the reading of the case as embodying a
substantive ideal of participatory democracy, and as a signal that public
institutions ought to be free to take steps to enhance full and equal participation in
that democracy – with one current stream of First Amendment thought. Several
prominent First Amendment theorists, drawing on the work of Alexander
Meiklejohn,376 have argued that the First Amendment should be understood not as
supporting an individualistic vision of speech as self-actualization, but as serving
a substantive vision of democracy as self-government.377 In Owen Fiss’s words,
“The purpose of free speech is . . . the preservation of democracy, and the right of
a people, as a people, to decide what kind of life it wishes to live.”378 In
Sunstein’s terms, this approach represents a turn from free speech as an
unregulated marketplace of ideas to a system dedicated to deliberative
democracy.379
Under this theory, a purely context-insensitive, rule-oriented approach to
First Amendment issues may properly be amended or abandoned when that
approach interferes with the larger goal of democratic self-government. In order
that “public debate might be enriched and our capacity for collective selfdetermination enhanced,”380 the state “may sometimes find it necessary to restrict
the speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others.”381
This democratic approach to free speech may thus demand a set of
departures from current free speech doctrine. Under this model of free speech and
self-government, the state may properly enact greater restrictions on the spread of
pornography, to ensure that “everyone ha[s] an equal chance to speak and to be
heard”;382 it may allocate subsidies in content-specific ways to “further the
sovereignty of the people by provoking and stirring public debate”;383 it may
restrict hate speech where that speech “helps contribute to the creation of a caste

376

See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the
People (1965); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev.
245; Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (1948).
377
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note __, at xvii (describing his project as the “effort to root
freedom of speech in a conception of popular sovereignty”).
378
Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided: Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State
Power 13 (1996).
379
See Sunstein, supra note __, at 17-23, 50-51 (elaborating on this point).
380
Fiss, supra note __, at 19.
381
Id. at 30; see also Sunstein, supra note __, at 37 (constitutional questions posed in First
Amendment cases should be: “Do the rules promote greater attention to public issues? Do they
ensure greater diversity of view?”).
382
Fiss, supra note __, at 87.
383
Id. at 107.

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art16

74

Horwitz:

74

Grutter’s First Amendment

system”;384 it may intervene in the sphere of election-related speech to “promote
democratic processes.”385 In short, government may employ a number of
regulatory approaches to speech in order to enhance our system of selfgovernment and deliberative democracy.
This approach to First Amendment problems has been criticized
elsewhere, and any lengthy treatment of this question is beyond the proper scope
of this paper.386 For present purposes, I want to make two observations. First,
this democratic self-government approach to the First Amendment may be seen as
closely linked to the democratic conception of education and academic freedom
offered by the second reading of Grutter that I have described. In both cases, the
driving force behind the First Amendment (or its subsidiary, academic freedom) is
a particular vision of free speech as serving a sphere of democratic selfgovernment in which legitimacy depends on the full and equal participation of all
groups. And in both cases, that vision of democracy may demand intervention by
the state (or its subsidiary, the public university) to ensure access to the
democratic forum for all.
Second, both the general democratic approach to the First Amendment and
the democratic reading of academic freedom in Grutter are arguably distinct from
the courts’ usual approach to the First Amendment. Certainly the leading
advocates for a democratic approach to free speech recognize that their views are
not consistent with the larger body of First Amendment jurisprudence.387 While
the democratic theorists of the First Amendment stress the need to shape First
Amendment doctrine to meet specific concerns about equality and diversity of
debate in the public sphere, even if that requires state intervention, the courts
typically approach free speech issues through a lens of state neutrality that is
suspicious of any state intervention in the arena of public debate.388 The
resulting laissez-faire attitude toward speech often ends up supporting existing
distributions of power and media access, a state of affairs that First Amendment
384

Sunstein, supra note __, at 193. This capsule description misses much of the nuanced
flavor of Sunstein’s position, which would not demand sweeping departures from current doctrine.
Nevertheless, it is accurate enough for these purposes to note that Sunstein’s deliberative
democracy account of free speech would compel both a different approach to problems of hate
speech regulation and a somewhat different result.
385
Id. at 85; see also id., ch. 4.
386
See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Citizenship and Speech, 43 McGill L.J. 445 (1998); Robert C.
Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1517 (1997);
William Marshall, Free Speech and the “Problem” of Democracy, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 191 (1994);
Martin H. Redish and Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in
Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 267 (1991).
387
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note __, at 16 (“[A] reconnection of the First Amendment with
democratic aspirations would require an ambitious reinterpretation of the principle of free
expression.”).
388
See Fiss, supra note __, at 5.
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scholars concerned with enhancing public debate find deeply troubling.389 It is
thus clear that these theorists argue for a significant reshaping of First
Amendment theory and doctrine.390
Similarly, the democratic reading of Grutter suggests a different approach
to First Amendment issues, at least in the arena of academic freedom. It does not
rely on a view of the university as a marketplace of ideas. Nor, despite the
Court’s language, does it directly rely on a conception of the university
community as serving the “‘robust exchange of ideas.’”391 Rather, the democratic
reading of Grutter depicts the university as both a small-scale model of and an
entrance gate for a democracy in which “[e]ffective participation by members of
all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential.”392 To that
end, the university may intervene in an ostensibly neutral admissions process to
ensure diversity in the body of students participating in university life and,
ultimately, citizenship and leadership.
This reading of Grutter thus invites questions about whether the Court’s
vision of the First Amendment in this case is consistent with its approach to free
speech issues elsewhere in its jurisprudence. If it is not, at least two responses are
possible. One may take this inconsistency as further evidence that Grutter’s First
Amendment is good for one case and one case only, a conclusion that necessarily
undermines some of the force of the opinion. Alternatively, one may see
Grutter’s First Amendment as an invitation to revisit the Court’s general approach
to the First Amendment. I take up one aspect of that invitation below.393 The
only untenable approach is indifference. By taking a markedly different approach
to the First Amendment, Grutter demands either serious consideration of the
merits of the opinion, or serious reconsideration of the merits of the Court’s
general approach to the First Amendment.
C.

Is Grutter’s First Amendment Consistent With the Court’s First
Amendment Jurisprudence?

In the two sections immediately above, I have offered two potential
readings of Grutter as a First Amendment case – one that focuses on institutional
deference and one that offers a more substantive, democratically oriented vision
of the First Amendment. As I have suggested, if these readings are inconsistent
with the broad run of First Amendment opinions issued by the Supreme Court,
two possibilities present themselves: either Grutter can be treated as a sport for
389

See Sunstein, supra note __, at 50.
See, e.g., id. at 252.
391
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (in turn quoting Keyishian,
385 U.S. at 603)).
392
Id. at 2340-41.
393
See Part IV, infra.
390
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First Amendment purposes, or the Court itself ought to reexamine its First
Amendment caselaw.
But is Grutter, on either of the alternative readings offered above,
inconsistent with the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence? One way to
approach this question is to examine the approach taken to the First Amendment
by the Justices who joined the majority in Grutter, and that taken by the
dissenting Justices in Grutter. What emerges from this discussion is something of
a mixed record, which may in itself be revealing.
Focusing first on the majority Justices, the two Justices who seem most
consistent in their approach with respect to both Grutter and other First
Amendment cases are Justices Breyer and Stevens. In both his extrajudicial
writing and his writing on the Court, Justice Breyer has emphasized an approach
to the First Amendment that “[f]ocus[es] on participatory self-government.”394
Like Sunstein and Fiss, Justice Breyer argues for an approach that looks back to
“the Constitution’s more general objectives,”395 and considers whether a
particular speech regulation serves “the ability of some to engage in as much
communication as they wish and . . . the public’s confidence and subsequent
ability to communicate.”396 Justice Breyer is thus suspicious of First Amendment
rules that treat all speech as equal, and all speech restrictions as equally deserving
of suspicion.397 That approach is inconsistent with the more general objective of
ensuring “democratic government,”398 which may counsel permitting speech
regulations in some cases despite their conflict with general rules of content
neutrality. This context-specific, democratically oriented approach is evident in
Justice Breyer’s writing on such issues as campaign finance regulations and
commercial speech.399
Similarly, Justice Stevens has voiced his suspicion of general First
Amendment rules such as the prohibition on content-based regulation, suggesting
that they may “obfuscate[ ] the specific facts at issue and interests at stake in a
given case.”400 He advocates an approach to First Amendment cases that exhibits
“a sensitivity to fact and context that allows for advancement of the principles
underlying the protection of free speech.”401 This approach is evident in his First
394

Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 245, 254 (2002).
Id. at 255.
396
Id. at 253 (referring specifically to communication in the electoral process).
397
See, e.g., id. at 253, 255.
398
Id. at 255.
399
See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399-405 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, __ (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
See also Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight From First Amendment
Doctrine: Justice Breyer’s New Balancing Approach, 31 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 817 (1998).
400
Hon. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 Yale L.J. 1293, 1307 (1993).
401
Id. at 1305.
395
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Amendment jurisprudence,402 and, as I have suggested above, it is consistent with
his treatment of academic freedom jurisprudence.403
So Justices Breyer and Stevens may be seen as taking positions in Grutter
that are broadly consistent with the drift of their general views on the First
Amendment. What of the other Justices who joined the majority in Grutter?
Here, I think, the record is more mixed. To be sure, at least some of the other
Justices have on occasion taken a more pragmatic, narrow, institutionally oriented
view of First Amendment problems, rather than a broad, institution-indifferent,
rule-based approach. For example, Fred Schauer has argued that Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,404 although
nominally relying on conventional doctrinal rules of First Amendment analysis, in
fact depended on the unique nature of the arts-funding function performed by the
NEA.405 Closer to the subject at hand, as we have seen, Justice Souter’s
concurring opinion in Southworth rejected the imposition of a “cast-iron
viewpoint neutrality requirement” on the University of Wisconsin, and argued
that “protecting a university’s discretion to shape its educational mission may
prove to be an important consideration” when judging the propriety of student
fees under the First Amendment.406
Still, these occasional eruptions of dissatisfaction with traditional doctrinal
analysis are not the same thing as a generally consistent and different approach to
the First Amendment, whether it resembles the institution-specific or democratic
readings of Grutter or some other vision of the First Amendment. Instead, most
of the Justices who joined Grutter have, for the most part, willingly followed
traditional categorical First Amendment rules in a substantial number of cases.
Even Justice Stevens, who I have suggested does have a fairly consistent casespecific approach to the First Amendment, has at times displayed an
unwillingness to depart from traditional First Amendment rules.407
402

See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 778 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976).
403
See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
404
118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
405
See Schauer, supra note __, at 96-97.
406
Southworth, 529 U.S. at __ (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Consistent with the
analysis provided above, Justice Souter was joined here by Justices Breyer and Stevens. See also
Barron, supra note __, at 855-56 (arguing that Justice Souter’s approach to electronic media cases
was “medium-specific and pragmatic,” and skeptical about “the utility of categorical analysis in
resolving the First Amendment issues raised by the new electronic media”).
407
See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1644 (1998)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens here rejected any suggestion that a different First
Amendment approach should apply where a state institution acts as a broadcaster, instead treating
the state public television station in this case as if it were any other state actor subject to the usual
First Amendment restraints on its exercise of discretion. See Schauer, supra note __, at 89. Again
consistent with my suggestion that most of the Justices in the Grutter majority are neither
especially loyal nor especially hostile to traditional forms of First Amendment analysis, Justice
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A similarly mixed reading is possible on a review of the dissenting
Justices in Grutter. In important respects, the Justices who dissented in that case
have regularly hewed close to categorical First Amendment rules, rejecting any
sort of institution-specific or substantive democratic reading of the First
Amendment.408 Thus, Justice Thomas has refused to draw institutional or factbound distinctions in a variety of other First Amendment contexts, including
commercial speech409 and broadcast media regulation.410 That rejection of
institution- or medium-specific distinctions in the First Amendment is of a piece
with his skepticism in Grutter about the “constitutionalization of ‘academic
freedom,’”411 and his rejection of the idea that the First Amendment could provide
special constitutional privileges to a public university.412
In this sense, it might appear at first blush that the dissenters in Grutter, to
the extent the case turned on First Amendment values, acted with greater loyalty
and consistency across a range of First Amendment cases than did the Grutter
majority. That observation might offer some comfort (albeit decidedly cold
comfort) to the dissenting Justices’ more politically conservative allies in the legal
academy.
On another view, however, the dissenting Justices in Grutter are equally
guilty of inconsistency with the First Amendment values they have advanced
elsewhere. For this insight, we may turn to some of these Justices’ own academic
supporters. In recent writing, John McGinnis, among other scholars, has
attempted to characterize the Rehnquist Court as moving toward “an
encompassing jurisprudence” based on the “decentralization and private ordering
of social norms.”413 One vehicle for this process of decentralization is an
Stevens was joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg. Justice Souter also rejected Justice
O’Connor’s institution-specific approach in Finley, treating the NEA as no differently situated for
purposes of First Amendment analysis than any other government actor. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at
2185 (Souter, J., dissenting); Schauer, supra note __, at 96.
408
See, e.g., Barron, supra note __, at 859-72 (discussing First Amendment approaches of
Justices Kennedy and Thomas).
409
See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“I doubt whether it is even possible to draw a coherent distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech.”).
410
See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 812
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). For discussion, see
Barron, supra note __, at 869-70 (arguing that Justice Thomas’s opinion in Denver Area “denie[s]
the validity of any First Amendment theory that is instrumental in its objectives and pluralistic in
its coverage or scope”).
411
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2357 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
412
See id.
413
John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 485, 489 (2002); see also Richard W. Garnett,
The Story of Henry Adams’s Soul: Education and the Expression of Associations, 85 Minn. L.
Rev. 1841 (2001).
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increased “solicitude for civil associations.”414 In a host of cases, including
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,415 Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale,416 and California Democratic Party v. Jones,417 the
Rehnquist Court has offered a far stronger level of protection for freedom of
association than that provided by the Warren or Burger Courts.418 That freedom
necessarily includes the power of associations to “exclude individuals whose mere
presence is antithetical to their expressive norms.”419
If this is an accurate description of the Rehnquist Court’s movement in the
area of freedom of expression, let alone an umbrella description of a
jurisprudence cutting across various constitutional provisions, as McGinnis would
have it, it is hard to square with the dissents in Grutter. Surely the first reading of
Grutter I have canvassed here – the deferential reading – is far more consistent
with the Tocquevillian movement McGinnis describes than the dissent’s approach
to Grutter. It permits educational institutions to organize their “membership” as
they see fit and to shape social norms through a diversity-based approach to
university admissions standards. It does not mandate that they do so, and
recognizes that many universities will not take this approach to the admissions
process. Some may adopt class-based admissions standards, and some may
simply open the gates wide. But those institutions that wish to admit on the basis
of some diversity-oriented vision of the university are free to do so, consistent
with their status as autonomous social institutions. By contrast, the dissenters in
Grutter would shut down entirely any attempt, by public universities at least, to
shape the student community according to a perceived need for diversity.
Thus, if any faction on the Court was following a Tocquevillian vision in
Grutter, it was the majority and not the dissent. To the extent McGinnis can be
read as including Grutter’s dissenting Justices among those who have
championed the jurisprudence he describes, therefore, they stand fairly accused of
inconsistency in Grutter.420
To be sure, there are some reasonable objections to this account. First and
foremost, McGinnis recognizes that even a Court that is more attentive to freedom
of association might still “be less willing to permit associations to exclude
414

McGinnis, id. at 492.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
416
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
417
530 U.S. 567 (2000).
418
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations
and the First Amendment, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1483, 1494 (2001).
419
McGinnis, supra note __, at 533.
420
McGinnis is careful not to associate his description of the Rehnquist Court’s
jurisprudence with any individual members. See id. at 489 n.10. Still, the opinions he treats as
illustrative of the Court’s increased attention to mediating institutions were authored entirely by
Justices – Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy – who dissented in Grutter.
415

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art16

80

Horwitz:

80

Grutter’s First Amendment

[certain] identifiable groups,” such as racial minorities, “on First Amendment
grounds.”421 But McGinnis himself is at least ambivalent about this prospect,422
and he appears to suggest that some greater scope of freedom might be available
to institutions such as universities, including freedom to shape admissions
decisions along racial grounds, if the school advanced the argument that its
“expression of . . . values” would be harmed by state intervention with respect to
its admissions choices.423 That is precisely the objection raised by the University
of Michigan in Grutter.
It might also be argued that whatever additional protections McGinnis’s
Tocquevillian Court has accorded to civic associations, that focus has been on
private institutions rather than public institutions. I do not think this argument
can be fully reconciled with McGinnis’s broader constitutional vision, however.
That vision treats the Court’s protection of private civic associations as only one
component of a broader vision of autonomous and decentralized institutions both
private and public – “states, secular and religious associations, and juries” are
among the honor roll.424 If the Court’s vision instructs us to “focus on
associations themselves, and on the content and function of their expression,”425
perhaps the associative role of public universities should weigh heavier in the
balance than their tenuous connection to government.
In sum, the verdict on Grutter’s consistency with the Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence is, perhaps surprisingly, at least mixed. Surely the
democratic reading of Grutter’s First Amendment offered above presents a fairly
imperfect fit with the larger body of First Amendment caselaw. Even here,
however, it is least consistent with some of the First Amendment writings of
Justice Breyer, and perhaps Justice Stevens. Similarly, the deferential reading of
Grutter, though again not wholly in line with the Court’s generally categorical
and institution-insensitive approach to the First Amendment, is consistent with
some of the Justices’ prior academic freedom opinions, and may present a fit with
a broader tendency on the Rehnquist Court to favor the autonomy of civic
associations.
The fit is decidedly an awkward one, to be sure, and it is hard to resist the
conclusion that no Justice writing in Grutter took seriously its First Amendment
implications. The strongest likelihood is that the Court used the First Amendment
both to buttress its conclusions in Grutter and to limit the reach of this affirmative
action decision to educational institutions. Just the same, the Court’s decision to
frame the case in First Amendment terms leaves those who would seek to find (or
421
422
423
424
425

Id. at 536.
See id. at 537 n.263.
Id. at 537 n.264 (discussing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)).
Id. at 495.
Garnett, supra note __, at 1844; see also id. at 1853.
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impose) a coherent shape on the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence with the
obligation to reexamine that jurisprudence with the new decision in mind. And
the very fact that some coherent tale can be told suggests something. It suggests
that the Court, or some of its individual members, are struggling to find some new
vision of the First Amendment: one that looses the self-imposed bonds of a series
of generally applicable rules, and instead trusts to institutions themselves to shape
their own, more context-sensitive rules. That story of Grutter’s First Amendment
is told in Part IV.
IV.
A.

TAKING FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS SERIOUSLY
Introduction

So far, I have offered two different First Amendment readings of Grutter:
one emphasizing the importance of educational institutional autonomy, regardless
of the content of the academic policies of the institution in question, and one
championing the university in advancing a particular substantive vision of
democracy. Each, as we have seen, has its potential and its problems. The
institutional autonomy reading of Grutter lets a thousand flowers bloom,
encouraging universities to experiment with different visions of education and
academic freedom; but it also permits them to shape academic policies that some
will find profoundly objectionable or inconsistent with the core values of
academic freedom and university education. The substantive, democratic reading
of Grutter advances a vision of democratic education that again will find many
adherents in the academy, especially in the ranks of civic republicans and other
scholars who have articulated a substantive vision of the role of the Constitution
in encouraging participatory democracy. At the same time, it is hard to see this
approach as consistent with the broader body of First Amendment jurisprudence;
nor does it present a perfect fit with visions of academic freedom outside the
courts.
I have refrained from direct discussion of a third reading of Grutter’s First
Amendment until now, although it bears a close kinship with the institutional
autonomy reading of Grutter and may be clear by implication from the discussion
that has preceded this section. It will become clear that, although this vision of
Grutter raises the most troubling questions and must be much more fully fleshed
out, I also believe it is the most promising reading of Grutter and portends a sea
change in First Amendment jurisprudence.
Before turning to that reading of Grutter, it is important to consider the
current state of First Amendment jurisprudence. As Frederick Schauer has
observed, for the most part, the Supreme Court has been “institutionally agnostic”
in its treatment of First Amendment issues.426 Its general approach has been one
426

Schauer, supra note __, at 120.
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of generality and principle rather than specificity, narrowness, and policy on the
ground.427 It has seen the First Amendment through a lens of “juridical
categories,”428 in which all speakers and all factual situations, no matter how
varied, are compressed into a series of legal questions: What general category of
speech is implicated here: incitement, commercial speech, pornography? What
kind of legal rule is implicated: content-neutral, viewpoint-specific, or a time,
place and manner restriction? Is the speaker public or private? These questions
sometimes overlap with questions of factual context, but their contours are hardly
the same and the nature of the inquiry undertaken by the courts is entirely
different. The nature of the speaker, its role in society, the kinds of social or
professional norms that govern a particular kind of speech act even absent the
specter of legal dispute – all these facts have been less important than the
conceptual cubbyhole into which the dispute must be placed once it reaches the
court. In Holmes’s terms, the Court has thought about words, not things.429
This preference for rules over facts, this relative insensitivity to the nature
of the institutions before the courts, is evident throughout the congeries of rules
and principles that govern the law of the First Amendment. A few examples will
suffice to illuminate this point. Consider the role of the press in First Amendment
law. As a general rule, albeit with some exceptions,430 the Court has rendered the
Press Clause of the First Amendment a virtual nullity, refusing to grant special
privileges to the press or to treat media institutions differently than it would any
other speaker under the First Amendment.431 Religious institutions have come in
for similarly categorical, rule-oriented treatment. Thus, a narrow majority of the
Court has refused to grant special accommodations under the Free Exercise
Clause to religious groups where they challenge neutral laws of general
applicability,432 disdaining any approach that would require judges to “weigh the
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.”433 As
427

See id. at 119-20.
Id. at 119.
429
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv. L. Rev.
443, 460 (1899).
430
See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’n of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983) (striking down a use tax on the cost of paper and ink products used in the production of
periodicals). See generally Jon Paul Dilts, The Press Clause and Press Behavior: Revisiting the
Implications of Citizenship, 7 Comm. L. & Pol’y 25, 27 (2002) (listing other instances in which
the press appear to have been granted a preferred status under the Constitution); Timothy B. Dyk,
Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 927, 927-28 (1992).
431
See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798-802 (1978) (Burger, J.,
concurring); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972); see also Anthony Lewis, A
Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 Hofstra L. Rev. 595, 605 (1979) (“No Supreme Court
decision has held or intimated that journalism has a preferred constitutional position”); David
Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 77, 118-19 (1975).
432
See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
433
Id. at 890. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term: Foreword – The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 84-85 (1992) (discussing Smith as an
428

Published by Digital USD, 2004

83

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 16 [2004]

Grutter’s First Amendment

83

many critics have recognized, the Court’s treatment of religion has traveled from
a substantive concern with the distinctive role of religious groups and practices to
a less protective but more generally applicable, fact-insensitive focus on formal
neutrality.434
That institution-indifferent approach is perhaps best captured, however, by
the Court’s focus on content neutrality in free speech cases. That approach
employs a simple, broad taxonomy in evaluating free speech claims, subjecting
them to different levels of scrutiny depending on whether the speech restrictions
at issue are content-neutral, content-based, or viewpoint-based.435 As Erwin
Chemerinsky has observed, this approach “has become the cornerstone of the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.”436
The Court’s attempt to craft a one-size-fits-all methodology of
adjudicating free speech issues may have much to recommend it as a general
rule.437 If we are concerned about the potential for abuse inherent in allowing
courts to weigh the costs and benefits of each speech act according to a balance of
their own devising, it makes perfect sense to constrain them through the
application of general rules. Rules protect us by precluding judges from adding
irrelevant or illegitimate factors to the balance.
But this approach carries its own risks.438 In particular, it carries the risk
that the Court, in attempting to shape actual disputes to fit the Procrustean bed of
content neutrality or other generally applicable rules, will often miss the facts and
policies that counsel different approaches in different cases. It risks missing what
is distinctive about the varied circumstances of speech, and about the particular
exemplar of Justice Scalia’s preference for strict rules over looser standards and balancing tests);
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39
DePaul L. Rev. 993, 1009 (1990) (free exercise of religion after Smith “now means that churches
cannot be taxed or regulated any more heavily than General Motors”).
434
See, e.g., Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad
Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 Ga. L. Rev. 489 (2004); Alan
Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and
Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & Pol. 119 (2002); Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion
Clauses, 33 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 505 (1998); Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and
Prospects of “Tests” Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 323, 390 (noting a
“movement [on the Court] away from robust interpretations of the two Religion Clauses, under
which religion must be treated as special . . . , and toward principles of equal treatment and
legislative discretion”).
435
See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of
an Increasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 60, 70 (1997); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189 (1983).
436
Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 647, 650 (2002).
437
See Schauer, supra note __, at 119-20.
438
For a powerful discussion of these issues, see Frederick Schauer, Harry Kalven and the
Perils of Particularism, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 397 (1989) (book review).
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institutions and practices that contribute to a full and rich public discourse. And
by maintaining a focus on what is internal to law – on how different speech acts
should be classified according to different legal categories – it ignores the fact
that, as we have seen in our discussion of professional academic freedom, various
institutions have their own norms and practices, their own methods of selfgovernance, and their own distinct contribution to make to the greater good.
In short, an institution-insensitive approach to the First Amendment gains
(some) clarity and predictability. But it may often become unmoored from the
particular practices and institutions that make free speech so worth protecting in
the first place. It is simply not true that a library is a university is a private
speaker is a newspaper is a religious community. Each acts distinctively; each
serves a distinctive purpose; each governs itself distinctively according to its own
norms; and each has a distinct and independent value to the broader environment
of free speech. Robert Post puts the point well:
First Amendment doctrine can recover its rightful role as an
instrument for the clarification and guidance of judicial
decisionmaking only if the court refashions its jurisprudence so as
to foster a lucid comprehension of the constitutional values
implicit in discrete forms of social order. The Court must reshape
its doctrine so as to generate a perspicuous understanding of the
necessary material and normative dimensions of these forms of
social order and of the relationship to these values and
dimensions.439
B.

Grutter and First Amendment Institutions

This is where the third, final, and, I will argue, the best reading of
Grutter’s First Amendment comes in. What makes Grutter so important as a First
Amendment case is that, like few other cases in the First Amendment
jurisprudence, and more explicitly than most of those, it abandons the usual
posture of institutional indifference. In its conclusion that educational autonomy
is a significant interest under the First Amendment, and in its effort, however
fraught and imperfect, to tie that interest to a broader understanding of the value
of universities, Grutter does not simply look to generally applicable rules. It does
not suggest that a university is governed by precisely the same rules that apply to
a normal employer, or a library, or a street-corner speaker.440 Instead, it adopts a
constitutional approach to free speech that is highly sensitive to the particular
439

Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1249, 1280-81
(1995) (emphasis added).
440
Cf. Gail Paulus Sorenson, The ‘Public Forum Doctrine’ and its Application in School and
College Cases, 20 J.L. Educ. 445, 445-46 (1991) (noting the difficulties courts have had applying
public forum doctrine to schools and colleges).
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institutional character of the party before the Court. It takes institutions seriously
as First Amendment subjects.
Of the readings of Grutter we have canvassed so far, this is the First
Amendment reading of Grutter that carries the greatest potential implications and
ought to spark the most interest and debate. By taking institutions seriously,
Grutter points the way toward the possibility that the Court’s First Amendment
approach could vary depending on the nature of “local and specific kinds of social
practices.”441
Indeed, Grutter does not just suggest this approach, but exemplifies it.
Consider the gulf between this case and other affirmative action cases the Court
has decided in recent years. Nowhere has the Court been as sympathetic to the
practices and aims of the institution whose affirmative action policies were under
attack as it is here – not when it dealt with a municipal employer,442 nor when it
dealt with the federal government itself as an employer.443 If the Court had
adopted the same approach in Grutter, it is quite likely the outcome would have
favored the plaintiffs, not the law school.
But, to borrow a paraphrase from the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence,
education is different. Speaking of the Court’s affirmative action cases, Akhil
Amar and Neal Katyal once observed that it had said “a lot about contracting and
rather little about education.”444 That observation is key to understanding
Grutter’s First Amendment: it is a First Amendment that is sensitive to the special
character of particular institutions, particular social practices. By singling out
universities as having a special interest in diversity sufficient to give them a
compelling interest in race-conscious policies, and by subjecting those policies to
what any reasonable observer must conclude is a far more deferential level of

441

Post, supra note __, at 1273. It should be evident by now that this article owes a
significant intellectual debt to Post’s work, although it differs from Post in its particular emphasis
on First Amendment institutions and in its desire to descend from theory to more immediate
operational concerns. For a fuller exposition of his vision of the First Amendment, focused not on
First Amendment institutions but on different domains of social order, see Robert C. Post,
Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management (1995).
442
See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
443
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (addressing policy favoring
minority contractors under the Small Business Act). One notable exception is Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which upheld
preferential treatment for racial minorities in the grant of broadcast licenses. Metro Broadcasting
has been widely assumed to have been curtailed, if not overruled, by Pena. In any event, since
that case itself involved a First Amendment institution – broadcasters – it can, if anything, be seen
as supporting Grutter’s institution-sensitive approach to constitutional law.
444
Akhil Reed Amar and Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1745, 1746
(1996).
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scrutiny than would apply to other institutions, Grutter truly suggests that not all
institutions are equal under the First Amendment.445
At the same time, and unlike the educational autonomy and democratic
readings of Grutter offered above, which are only concerned with the special role
of universities, the institution-sensitive reading of Grutter carries potential
implications far beyond the ivory tower. For where one institution has gone,
others may try to follow. Grutter may counsel other institutions – religious
institutions, media institutions, libraries, perhaps professionals,446 and perhaps
still other institutions – to seek from the Court the same recognition that they have
special roles to play in the social firmament and ought, perhaps, to be treated
according to special rules. If one takes Grutter seriously as a First Amendment
decision, as its language certainly allows, it may provide ammunition for a
broader effort to overturn an institutionally agnostic, top-down approach to the
First Amendment in favor of one that builds from the ground up, constructing
First Amendment doctrine in response to the actual functions and practices of
particular social institutions. 447
As I have suggested, this approach is not wholly absent from the Court’s
existing jurisprudence, although it is generally disfavored. But this understanding
of Grutter’s First Amendment implications ties the scattered exceptional cases
together under the common concept of taking First Amendment institutions
seriously.
Thus, in the same week that it issued its opinion in Grutter, the Court
decided United States v. American Library Association,448 holding that Congress
could validly require public libraries that receive federal funding to install filter
software to block the receipt of obscene materials or child pornography by library
computer users. Pivotal to that decision was the fact that library users could
request that the filters be disabled.449 For present purposes, however, the result is
less important than the reasoning by which the Court reached it. The Court began
by asking why we value libraries, and how they operate.450 It began with the
445

For this reason, I doubt Grutter carries much significance for the future of affirmative
action programs outside the university. For discussion of this issue, see, e.g., Cynthia Estlund,
Taking Grutter to Work, 7 Green Bag 2d 215 (2004); Rebecca Hanner White, Affirmative Action in
the Workplace: The Significance of Grutter?, 92 Ky. L.J. 263 (2003-2004).
446
For an argument that the Court already treats professional speech according to different
rules than it applies to other speakers, in an attempt to “preserve its particular social function,” see
Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of
Social Institutions, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 771, 777 (1999).
447
See Philip Selznick, ‘Law in Context’ Revisited, 30 J. L. & Soc’y 177, 181-82 (2003)
(arguing, in context of discussion of academic freedom, that law ought to recognize the
“requirements and dynamics” of particular social institutions).
448
123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
449
See id. at 2306-07.
450
See id. at 2303-04, 2305.
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assumption that a crucial legal question in determining the constitutionality of
Congress’s law was whether libraries were left free to “fulfill their traditional
mission[ ].”451 Accordingly, it held that libraries must be left with substantial
discretion to exercise their professional role of collecting, storing, and distributing
information.452 With this institution-specific approach in mind, the Court rejected
any attempt to shoehorn the library’s practices into some juridical category like
“public forum.”453
Similarly, Frederick Schauer and others have observed that the Court
sometimes treats even the government differently, setting aside traditional modes
of analysis such as public forum, where the government institution in question is
fulfilling the role of a traditional First Amendment institution and is substantially
governed by the norms and practices of that institution. Thus, in Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,454 the Court based its decision that
a federally funded local broadcaster could exclude a candidate from a debate, in
seeming departure from traditional public forum analysis, on the fact that the
broadcaster was acting as a professional journalist and exercising editorial
discretion.455 And in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,456 the Court held
that principles of content neutrality were inapplicable to the government where it
was acting as an arts funding body – an institutional role that requires and
presupposes the need to make content distinctions.
Grutter’s First Amendment, as I have read it here – an institution-sensitive
First Amendment that defers to the practices of particular kinds of First
Amendment actors – provides the link between these otherwise far-flung cases.
Viewed through a traditional First Amendment lens, Grutter and the other cases
involve widely different issues: content discrimination doctrine, public forum
doctrine, the constitutionality of affirmative action. Nor are the facts particularly
similar. But in each case, the Court confronted the practices of a specific First
Amendment institution and recognized that traditional First Amendment doctrine
would not preserve the institutions’ ability to “fulfill their traditional missions.”457
Faced with this dilemma, the Court allowed doctrine to give way before reality.

451

Id. at 2304.
See id.
453
See id. at 2304-05; id. at 2304 (noting that public forum principles were “out of place in
the context of this case”); see also Sorenson, supra note __ (noting similar difficulties in cases
involving schools and colleges).
454
523 U.S. 666 (1998).
455
See id. at 672-74. See also Schauer, supra note __, at 91 (“[I]n the end it is the
institutional character of public broadcasting as broadcasting . . . that appears to have determined
the outcome of the case”).
456
524 U.S. 569 (1998).
457
American Library Ass’n, 123 S. Ct. at 2304.
452
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At this point, even someone who is convinced that there is something to
this reading of Grutter is entitled to ask: How does it work? What does it mean,
precisely? Why should we scrap a reasonable working set of doctrinal rules in
favor of this reading of Grutter if we do not yet know what rules that reading
entails?
In offering a tentative answer to these questions, I am able to offer
something less than a complete blueprint, but something more than a mere mood
or sensibility.458 On this reading, Grutter’s First Amendment entails at least the
following principles:
1. First and most obviously, the Court should recognize the special
importance to public discourse of particular First Amendment
institutions. It is not as yet clear how many such institutions there
are, how to resolve boundary disputes about whether a particular
party falls within this institutional framework (is a blog “the
press?”459), and whether the institutional turn I advocate here
should cover a few important institutions or a large number. But
some candidates are obvious, both because of their own
distinctiveness and because the Court has already signaled its
recognition of some of them: universities, print and broadcast
media organizations, religious groups, libraries, public schools.
2. The Court should adopt a policy of substantial deference to these
organizations, as it did to the University of Michigan Law School
in Grutter. It should do so both because of their distinctive
importance to public discourse and because (as I discuss below) of
the institutional norms that already serve to constrain them.460
3. The boundaries of the Court’s deference will involve two different
sorts of limitations. The first is the limitation acknowledged by the
Court in Grutter – a First Amendment institution is entitled to
deference “within constitutionally prescribed limits.”461 At some
458

I am comforted by the fact that I am in distinguished company in this. See Schauer,
supra note __, at 118, 119-20 (suggesting that both he and the Court have yet to fully grapple with
the implications of an institutionally sensitive approach to the First Amendment); Post, supra note
__, at 1281 (recognizing that his advice that the Court shape its doctrine in ways that are respectful
of particular social practices is “rather abstract advice. It certainly will not assist the Court in
settling any particular controversy.”). Although this article cannot offer an equivalent of Post’s
sophisticated theoretical analysis, I hope it can advance some slightly more concrete suggestions
about how to resolve particular controversies.
459
See, e.g., Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to
Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 Hous. L. Rev. 1371
(2003).
460
For detailed discussion on this point, see Post, supra note __, at 257-65.
461
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339 (emphasis added).
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point, a First Amendment institution runs up against fundamental
constitutional principles that simple deference cannot overcome.
But this, I want to suggest, is the less important limitation. After
all, as Grutter suggests, deference to First Amendment institutions
may allow those institutions to stretch, if not break, otherwise
applicable constitutional rules. Surely this explains the Law
School’s ability to overcome what the Court at least nominally
labeled “strict scrutiny” so easily. Indeed, what Grutter’s First
Amendment ultimately suggests is that, by allowing First
Amendment institutions room to experiment with different means
of carrying out their institutional missions, the Court is really
allowing those institutions to help shape constitutional law outside
the courts.462
4. The Constitution, then, does not provide the primary constraint on
First Amendment institutions. What does? The answer is: the
institution itself. Taking First Amendment institutions seriously
entails recognizing, far more than current First Amendment
jurisprudence does, that these institutions are defined and
constrained by their own institutional culture.463 Universities,
newspapers, religious groups – all these institutions live by their
own, often highly detailed and rigid, norms and practices. And all
of them have means – dismissal, expulsion, denial of tenure – of
enforcing those norms. The most powerful method of
enforcement, however, is not the prospect of formal discipline but
the simple fact that members of institutions operate within the
norms of those institutions, internalize the culture of that institution
as their own ethos, and wish to do so.464 Thus, the most powerful
constraints on the behavior of First Amendment institutions are the
constraints that come from the institutions themselves. In judging
a First Amendment institution’s liberty to act, the Court should
thus begin, as it did in the American Library Association case, by
applying the norms and values of the institution itself. This is why
the Court’s deference in Grutter stemmed from the fact that the
462

On the interrelationship between constitutional law inside the courts and constitutional
culture outside the courts, see Post, supra note __.
463
Cf. Post, supra note __, at 1273 (The most general objection to any single free speech
principle is that speech makes possible a world of complex and diverse social practices precisely
because it becomes integrated into and constitutive of these different practices; it therefore
assumes the diverse constitutional values of these distinct practices.”).
464
For discussion, see, e.g., Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and
Its Implications, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 605 (2004); W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the
Legal Profession: Social Norms in Professional Communities, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1955 (2001);
Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2237 (1996).
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Law School was acting according to a legitimate “academic
decision.”465
5. If the Court is to set the boundaries of deference to First
Amendment institutions according to the practices of those
institutions themselves, it must also recognize that those
boundaries are constantly shifting and changing. Institutional
norms are not fixed and static. They change and evolve as
institutions change and evolve. It once would have been
unthinkable for a university to shift its admissions standards to
reach for racial and ethnic diversity – just as it once would have
been unthinkable for many of the same select institutions to apply
admissions standards in order to achieve absolute meritocracy
without regard to race, ethnicity, or class. Thus, in determining the
bounds within which First Amendment institutions are entitled to
substantial constitutional deference, the Court should be responsive
to shifts in institutional norms and practices over time. We have
already seen that one possible criticism of Grutter, and of other
academic freedom decisions issued by the Court, is that they failed
to realize that the concept of professional academic freedom was
itself a fluid one. This does not present an insuperable dilemma,
by any means; in other contexts, courts are experienced at taking
evidence on and deciding cases according to the evolving
customary practice of an industry. But the Court should be aware
of the issue; it should not rush to enshrine a particular institutional
norm as a fixed constitutional standard.
6. Finally – and this admittedly is more of a mood than a rule – taking
First Amendment institutions seriously entails the recognition that
constitutional law is not simply the creature of the courts. It is the
product of a constantly shifting, negotiated relationship between a
variety of parties and values: the courts’ own understanding of
constitutional law, their understanding of the values and norms of
institutions in the “real world” outside the courts; the institutions’
own understanding of their norms and values; and the institutions’
understanding of their role within the broader constitutional
structure. In Robert Post’s terms, it is a constant negotiation
between constitutional law and constitutional culture. And this
negotiation takes place on both sides: just as courts are constantly
adjusting their understanding of constitutional doctrine to take
account of the real world of social practices, so the institutions are
constantly reevaluating their own norms according to their sense of

465

Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
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the boundaries of the Constitution. So, for instance, universities’
understanding of academic freedom has been influenced over time
both by professional debate over the concept and by the influence
of the changing constitutional landscape. In short, one reason for
courts to defer to First Amendment institutions is because it does
not represent constitutional abdication. Instead, it represents a
more sophisticated understanding of the degree to which First
Amendment institutions already internalize constitutional values,
and the extent to which they help shape constitutional values.
This is decidedly still less than a blueprint. But Grutter and the other
cases discussed above have already gone some of the distance toward giving us
more concrete standards. At bottom, the basic understanding of what it means to
take First Amendment institutions seriously is hardly mysterious. It means
refusing to believe that one size fits all in constitutional doctrine. It requires the
courts to defer substantially to decisions made by fundamental First Amendment
institutions within the shifting scope of their own institutional values. And, at a
more abstract but wholly fundamental level, it entails the courts’ own recognition
that they have a central role to play, but a shared role, in shaping our
constitutional culture.
C.

Democratic Experimentalism, Reflexive Law, and Grutter’s First
Amendment

I have already argued that the institution-sensitive approach to the First
Amendment I have drawn from Grutter is echoed elsewhere in the Court’s
existing jurisprudence, if dimly and imperfectly. Here, I want to briefly suggest
that it also finds echoes in a number of recent approaches to constitutional law. I
want to focus here on two recent arguments that have been made for a more
flexible, decentralized approach to constitutional law that relies substantially on
the subjects of constitutional law to shape their own norms and practices, while
still ensuring an important role for the courts.
The first such argument has been made by a number of scholars,
prominently including but not limited to Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, who
have advocated “a new model of institutionalized democratic deliberation that
responds to the conditions of modern life.”466 Under this approach, which is only
466

Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
Colum. L. Rev. 267, 283 (1998). See also Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional
Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 875, 885 n.29 (2003) (citing examples of scholarship exploring these
ideas). Cf. Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to
the Allocation of Body Parts, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2113, 2125 n.50 (2003) (describing this approach as
the “Columbia School” of thought). For a recent critical but supportive evaluation of democratic
experimentalism, see Jamison E. Colburn, “Democratic Experimentalism”: A Separation of
Powers for Our Time?, 37 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 287 (2004); see also William E. Scheuerman,
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briefly sketched here, courts would leave a variety of local institutions with
substantial latitude “for experimental elaboration and revision [of their activities]
to accommodate varied and changing circumstances.”467 At the same time, courts
would monitor these institutions to ensure that they met basic standards of legality
and did not infringe individual rights.468 Perhaps most importantly,
experimentalist institutions would provide information about the relative success
or failure of their projects, which would in turn inform both other institutions
engaged in similar practices, and the courts themselves, gradually shaping the
courts’ own sense of the outer boundaries of permissible experimentation.469
Thus, the courts would be cast in the role of coordinating authority, allowing a
web of local players to develop ways of addressing a particular policy issue – for
example, nuclear safety, environmental regulation, or the treatment of drug
criminals470 – while establishing a rolling set of benchmarks for “best practices”
that flow up from the local experimenters rather than down from a court or
regulator.471
Although the value of democratic experimentalism can perhaps best be
seen in areas such as administrative law or public policy, rather than in straight
conflicts over rights, the experimentalist school contends that here, too, courts can
act in a way that “call[s] into existence a system of experimentation” rather than
simply “laying down specific rules.”472 In these cases, particularly where a debate
over constitutional rights and duties poses questions of judicial competence
arising either from the moral complexity or the factual complexity of the
situation, a court can decide not to decide too much.473 It can instead lay down a
general standard that could be met in a variety of ways, and so “devolv[e]
deliberate authority for fully specifying norms to local actors.”474
For example, in the field of sexual harassment – a statutory regime, albeit
one with broader, quasi-constitutional aspects and implications475 – the Supreme
Democratic Experimentalism or Capitalist Synchronization?: Critical Reflections on DirectlyDeliberative Polyarchy, 17 Can. J.L. & Juris. 101 (2004).
467
Dorf and Sabel, supra note __, at 283.
468
See id. at 288.
469
See id.
470
See, e.g., id. at 371-88; Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts
and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831 (2000).
471
See Colburn, supra note __, at 289.
472
Dorf, supra note __, at 961; see also Dorf and Sabel, supra note __, at 444-69.
473
Dorf, supra note __, at 886 (experimentalist courts resolve difficult problems by
“giv[ing] deliberately incomplete answers”). Cf. Horwitz, supra note __, at 120-25 (arguing that
courts, particularly in the early stages of a developing and uncertain area of constitutional law,
should issue minimalist opinions rather than attempt to cover the doctrinal field too quickly). This
argument was based on concerns about relationships between courts, and did not discuss the role
of extralegal actors.
474
Dorf, supra note __, at 978.
475
See id. at 961.
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Court has refused to lay down categorical rules governing workplace behavior,
recognizing the “constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships” in the workplace that render a concrete rule beyond the Court’s
competence.476 Instead, by establishing a safe harbor for employers that take
reasonable care to avoid and remedy harassment,477 it has cast courts “in the role
of monitoring employers’ monitoring of their workplaces,”478 while allowing
employers to shape a variety of responses to the problem of workplace sexual
harassment.479 In turn, we may expect a set of “best practices” to emerge as
different policies are shown to be effective or ineffective in addressing the
problem. Thus, rather than making itself a central rights-giver, the Court has cast
itself as a problem-solver, tasking local actors with the primary responsibility for
crafting solutions while maintaining a monitoring and coordinating role.
A similar set of proposals is broadly captured by the overlapping concepts
of “reflexive” or “autopoietic” law.480 In short, reflexive law is “regulation of
regulation.”481 It advocates the abandonment, in at least some cases, of
command-and-control regulation in favor of a regulatory model that “set[s] a
general standard to govern self-regulation by the affected actors.”482 As noted
above, the Court’s approach to sexual harassment law is an example of a reflexive
regulatory strategy.
Similarly and relatedly, autopoietic theories of law begin with the
presumption that society consists of a series of subsystems, such as politics,
education, and the legal system,483 each of which operates according to its own
internal and self-referential norms, and each of which interacts only imperfectly
with other subsystems. Given these boundary issues, the best way to regulate is
not by direct regulation, but by “specifying procedures and basic organizational
norms geared towards fostering self-regulation within distinct spheres of social
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Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998).
478
Dorf, supra note __, at 963.
479
See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001).
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See, e.g., Jean L. Cohen, Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm (2002); Gunther
Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (1993); Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive
Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & Soc’y Rev. 256 (1983). For a related approach, see Philippe
Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (1978). In
describing this complex approach, however briefly, I am all too aware that “its conceptual
architecture is forbidding enough to discourage casual visitors.” Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the
“Relative Autonomy” of Law, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 1987, 2083 (1998). I acknowledge the warning,
but nevertheless will treat reflexive law and autopoiesis as substantially overlapping approaches,
notwithstanding important differences between the two theories that need not concern us here.
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Michael C. Dorf, The Domain of Reflexive Law, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 384, 391 (2003).
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Id. at 393.
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See Baxter, supra note __, at 1993-94.
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activity.”484 The autopoietic approach requires that local actors observe certain
“basic procedural and organizational norms,” but beyond that it gives substantial
autonomy to those actors to craft their own substantive programs.485 The goal,
ultimately, is to find a way to encourage local actors to internalize basic norms of
self-regulation within the norms of their own subsystems.486
The relationship between these approaches and the institution-sensitive
approach to the First Amendment that I have argued forms Grutter’s First
Amendment should by now be clear.487 Each approach begins from a
presumption that local actors, local institutions, should (and, according to
autopoietic theory, must) have an important role to play in shaping even
fundamental public policies. Each proceeds from the assumption that imposing
general rules from above is doomed to result in suboptimal decisions, and that
there should instead be a symbiotic, evolving relationship between the norms of
local actors and the norms adopted by central regulatory authorities. And each
assumes that the best way to achieve this is to cast the central regulatory authority
– here, the courts – in a coordinating role, in which it polices the outer boundaries
of acceptable practice while allowing local actors to substantially craft their own
policies. In turn, each actor – local and central – will learn from and influence the
other.
There are important differences, of course. Crucial to Dorf’s
experimentalist project, for instance, is the demand that local institutions “justify
the deference they demand by producing a record of performance that can
withstand comparative assessments.”488 By contrast, the institution-sensitive
approach to the First Amendment I have advocated nowhere expressly provides
for feedback to the courts or to similar institutions. Its central feature is deference
tout court, without any formal program for monitoring or benchmarking.
Deference is not, in and of itself, experimentation, nor is it necessarily reflexive in
nature.
But one should not make too much of the distinction. For as I have
argued, and as Robert Post has convincingly shown,489 the boundaries between
constitutional law and constitutional culture as it is understood outside the courts
are already constantly blurred. Although the institution-sensitive reading of
Grutter described in this section relies primarily on deference to First Amendment
institutions, it is to be expected in the nature of things that those institutions will
484

William E. Scheuerman, Reflexive Law and the Challenges of Globalization, 9 J. Pol.
Phil. 81, 84 (2001).
485
Id.
486
See id.
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The relationship between democratic experimentalism and reflexive law should also by
now be evident. See Dorf, supra note __, at 386 (acknowledging the similarity).
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Dorf, supra note __, at 981. See also Colburn, supra note __, at 289.
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See Post, supra note __ [Harvard Foreword].
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incorporate basic constitutional norms into their own understanding of themselves
as functioning institutions, just as the courts will incorporate their understanding
of the shifting nature of the cultural norms and practices of First Amendment
institutions into constitutional law as they police the shifting boundaries of
constitutionally permissible deference. Indeed, the requirement that courts, in
setting and policing those boundaries, pay attention to both basic constitutional
norms and basic institutional practices suggests a fundamentally experimentalist,
or reflexive, approach: one in which the courts lay down a general procedural
requirement – for example, is this a legitimate academic decision?490 Is this task
properly within the role of a library?491 Is this an exercise of professional
journalist discretion?492 – while permitting the institutions substantial latitude to
operate within these minimal standards.
Of course, that these approaches are similar does not validate the
institution-sensitive reading of Grutter’s First Amendment, any more than my
reading of Grutter can validate experimentalist or reflexive theories of law.
Rather, these familial resemblances suggest two things. First, they suggest that
the idea of taking First Amendment institutions seriously is no mere frolic. It has
substantial roots in a common set of approaches to constitutional law. If that does
not lend it legitimacy, it at least suggests – particularly when coupled with the fact
that the Court has in fact adopted this approach on several occasions, most
prominently Grutter – that it is a viable, credible approach.
Second, it suggests a common complaint. Legal doctrine needs to be
sufficiently abstract in order to constrain those who make decisions under its
banner, and to cover a variety of factual situations without descending into
unfettered discretion and judicial usurpation. At the same time, the tendency
toward generally applicable rules of law, at least in the First Amendment arena,
moves the courts in a direction that ultimately deprives it of the ability to give due
regard to the varied social systems in which speech acts actually take place.493 If
it no longer makes sense to fit all cases on the rack of content neutrality or other
generally applicable First Amendment doctrine, we need a new approach before
those doctrines become incoherent. A new balance must be struck. Taking First
Amendment institutions seriously is one means of striking a new bargain between
the courts and the First Amendment institutions they oversee.
D.

Questions and Implications, With A Digression on State Action

490
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This section has argued for a reading of Grutter’s First Amendment that
focuses on the importance of taking so-called First Amendment institutions
seriously. It has advocated that courts recognize the important role that First
Amendment institutions play as loci for, and definers of, public discourse. It has
suggested that courts grant these institutions substantial deference to govern
themselves, subject to generous constitutional limits and to procedural and
substantive requirements drawn from the norms and practices of the institutions
themselves. Finally, it has noted a close kinship between this reading of Grutter
and similar projects aiming to encourage the courts to take a more generous role
in allowing local actors to experiment for themselves in shaping their own
practices and working toward the resolution of pressing social issues.
What questions does this approach raise? What implications does it carry
with it? Looking forward, what can we say about the prospects and consequences
for an approach that advocates taking First Amendment institutions seriously?
Looking backward, how well does Grutter itself fulfill the desiderata for an
institution-sensitive approach to constitutional law?
It may be too early to make too settled a pronouncement about these
questions. But at least three significant points are worth making. First, as argued
above, Grutter is not about university education alone. It speaks to the possibility
of deference to a potentially wide range of other institutions that play an equally
important role in the our system of public discourse: religious institutions, media
institutions, libraries, perhaps professionals, arts funding authorities – and perhaps
still other institutional actors.
The Court might, of course, reject those arguments out of hand. If so, it
would lend further credence to the idea that Grutter, like Bakke, is nothing more
than a “sport” as a First Amendment decision; “a chimera of a doctrine, affirmed
only for that day, to provide an acceptable ground on which . . . [to] preserve
affirmative action,” and not truly a statement of First Amendment principles after
all.494 But this article should make clear that, whatever the Court’s motives in
arming itself with the First Amendment in Grutter, it is far from a mere sport.
The Court has taken a broadly similar approach in recent years in examining
government broadcasters, arts funders, and public libraries. It has wanted only a
theory to justify its departure from settled First Amendment doctrine, the
language with which to do so, and a set of rules by which to chart its course.
Drawing on Grutter, this article has sought to provide the Court with the tools it
needs.
Second, this approach is not necessarily a charter of rights for institutions
– even institutions, such as the press, that manage to find special recognition in
the First Amendment. Nor is it an opportunity for the Court simply to surrender
494
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its own judgment absolutely to the “complex judgments” of particular favored
institutions under the First Amendment. It is, in short, neither a brief in favor of
unparalleled license for First Amendment institutions, nor an argument in favor of
judicial abdication in favor of these institutions. To the contrary, in some
instances an institution-sensitive approach to the First Amendment may limit the
freedom to act of First Amendment institutions. And in some cases, an
institutional approach to the First Amendment may impose greater duties on the
courts that oversee them.
As is evident in Grutter itself, an institution-sensitive approach to the First
Amendment may favor granting greater rights to those institutions in some cases.
For example, under one reading of Grutter, a reading that is consistent with the
argument in this section, universities may be permitted greater latitude than other
institutions to craft and enforce campus speech codes. In other cases, the special
social obligations of a particular institution may give it less latitude to speak than
a private individual might possess.495 No one demands that the proverbial soapbox speaker limit himself to a particular subject; no one would hesitate to require
a university lecturer to confine herself to the subject at hand and refrain from
taking a chemistry lecture as an occasion to talk about neoliberalism. A court
would hesitate long and hard before enforcing a seemingly gratuitous “contract”
without clear promises or consideration on either side; but it might be more
willing to find a legally enforceable contract where the agreement takes place
within the journalist’s professional norm of honoring the confidentiality of
sources.496 In short, if the gift of taking First Amendment institutions seriously is
that those institutions have substantial latitude to live by their own norms, the cost
of taking them seriously is that they may be held accountable for failing to live up
to their own norms.
Nor does the posture of deference I have described above utterly liberate
the courts from the obligation to give cases involving First Amendment
institutions serious consideration. As the democratic experimentalists have
observed, liberty to experiment means little without careful monitoring. If the
courts are to defer to First Amendment institutions based substantially on their
compliance with their own norms, values, and practices, they will have to educate
themselves far more carefully about the shifting content of those norms, values,
and practices. In each case, as Schauer observes, the Court will be required to
“inquire much more deeply into the specific character of the institution, and the
function it serves, than it has [so far] been willing to do.”497
Looking back now at Grutter from that perspective, it is far from clear that
the Court did a proper job of taking the First Amendment institution at issue there
495
496
497
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– a university or a professional department within a university – seriously. Its
discussion of the social role of universities, although more complete and
sophisticated than much of the discussion the Court has offered in prior cases, still
exists at a high level of generality. The decision contains no indication of
whether universities’ democratic function coexists with their truth-seeking
function, or with still other social roles served by the university – and thus
whether the social value of race-conscious admissions programs conflicts with the
social value of any other functions served by universities. It contains no
indication of whether the Court believes all higher education institutions serve or
ought to serve roughly the same purposes, or whether there is room for as many
conceptions of academic freedom as there are different kinds of higher
educational institutions.
There are still further problems, less important for situations like Grutter
that involve admissions decisions but with great implications for future academic
freedom cases. Grutter contains no discussion about the norms of professional
responsibility that play such a large role in discussions about the scope of
professional academic freedom. It is difficult to defer to an educational
institution on the basis that it is acting according to a legitimate academic decision
without some understanding of precisely what constitutes a legitimate academic
decision. What if the decision to engage in seemingly preferential admissions had
been arrived at by a pure university administrator without faculty input? What if
it had been imposed on the university administration by the board of governors?
What if it was a result of coercion by some outside group, such as the American
Association of University Professors? None of these questions are answered in
the case.
Nor does Grutter discuss the implications of an institution-specific
approach to academic freedom for other constituents in campus life – most
notably, professors and students. As the discussion above indicates, that omission
leaves room for a variety of potential implications for student speech, admissions
policies, and other matters. What Grutter means for a university’s freedom to
shape its policies with respect to religious speech, hate speech, on-campus
recruiting, and other issues has much to do not only with the university
administration, but with the other stakeholders in the university. If universities
are a special creature of the First Amendment, that still begs the question who
gets to be counted as a member of the university community, and what it means to
be a member of that community. These disputes between component parts of the
university community – tenure disputes, disciplinary appeals, disputes over
campus rules and regulations – are precisely the sorts of academic freedom issues
that arise most often in the courts. Yet Grutter has nothing to say about them.
Nor, given the context of the case, does it fully acknowledge that, under
professional understandings of academic freedom, those rights carry significant
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responsibilities.498 Under an institution-sensitive approach to the First
Amendment, a professor might, in fact, have far fewer speech rights than other
citizens.499
Perhaps, then, Lani Guinier is right to see in Grutter the opportunity for
further public discussion concerning “more foundational concerns about the
democratic purpose of higher education.”500 But if Grutter truly presages a more
institution-specific approach to the First Amendment, it certainly suggests that the
Court will have much more careful work to do to elaborate the nature and scope
of its approach and tie that approach closely to the particular functions and norms
of different institutions.
In any event, whether the Court continues to stick by its generally neutral
approach to particular speakers under the First Amendment or begins to pay more
careful attention to speech acts by particular institutions, Grutter’s significance as
a First Amendment decision should be clear. If it is true that “American free
speech doctrine has never been comfortable distinguishing among institutions,”501
then Grutter represents a rare exception. Whether it will turn out to be a
forerunner of similar approaches where other institutions are concerned, or simply
the exception that proves the rule, remains to be seen.
One last question must be addressed. So far, I have bracketed the
distinction between public universities, such as the University of Michigan and its
law school, and private universities. But there is a crucial distinction between
them: each lies on a different side of the public/private divide. Indeed, Grutter
took on its constitutional character precisely because it involved a public
university. It is widely recognized that, under current constitutional doctrine,
private universities enjoy a far broader scope of freedom than public
universities.502 What role, if any, should this distinction play in taking First
Amendment institutions seriously? How important is it?
For a number of reasons, I want to suggest that this distinction is less
important than it may seem at first. First, the legal landscape is far less clear in
498
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drawing a firm line between public and private universities than one might
assume based on standard state action doctrine. This is so even if one sets aside
arguments that private universities are entitled to be viewed as state actors
because they fulfill a public function, receive significant public funding, or are
intertwined with the affairs of the government,503 and even if one ignores the web
of quasi-constitutional civil rights laws and other statutory requirements that may
place public and private universities under many of the same obligations.504 The
reason the public-private distinction may be less important in this context stems
from state law, not federal state action doctrine.
State law provides two reasons why it may make less sense to treat private
universities as utterly distinct from public universities in their obligations to
observe norms of free speech. First, a number of courts have held that private
universities must honor at least some free speech norms under state constitutions
or statutes. Thus, in the well-known case of State v. Schmid,505 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a non-student for distributing leaflets
without permission on the campus of Princeton University. Drawing on a thenrecent Supreme Court case acknowledging that state constitutions could sweep
more broadly in protecting free speech even in the absence of state action,506 the
court held that Pennsylvania’s constitutional protection of free speech could reach
“unreasonably restrictive or oppressive conduct on the part of private entities that
have otherwise assumed a constitutional obligation not to abridge the individual
exercise of such freedoms because of the public use of their property.”507
Although this willingness on the part of state courts to reach private action under
state constitutional free speech provisions is decidedly in the minority,508
Pennsylvania was not alone in this approach,509 and the state courts might be more
willing to apply their states’ constitutional free speech provisions to private
colleges and universities than the shopping malls and other private actors who
normally litigate these cases. Other states, building on this foundation, have thus
enacted statutes attempting to guarantee that at least some of the players in the
academic community enjoy free speech rights on private campuses.510 Thus,
503
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under state law, some free speech arguments may be available even on private
campuses.
If that discussion suggests that students may not be entirely differently
situated depending on whether they attend a public or private institution, what of
the institutions themselves? If they are arms of the state, why should they be in
the same position as public universities? Here, too, the state constitutional
landscape goes some of the way toward narrowing the gap between public and
private universities. Most state constitutions grant their public universities some
degree of independent constitutional status.511 Michigan, for example, to take an
example close to the heart of Grutter, states in its constitution that the Board of
Regents of the University of Michigan has “general supervision of the institution
and the control and direction of all expenditures from the institution’s funds,”512 a
provision that has been read as granting the university a general right against state
interference in academic affairs.513 Thus, public universities are already in an odd
position with respect to the state action doctrine – part of the state for some
constitutional purposes, but separate from it for others.514 As Peter Byrne notes,
“A state university is a unique state entity in that it enjoys federal constitutional
rights against the state itself.”515
These unusual features of state law suggest that the public-private
distinction is in some ways less important than outside observers might suggest.
But I want to suggest two more reasons, linked less to existing law than to the
potential of Grutter’s First Amendment, why the public-private distinction does
not present a significant factor in thinking about taking First Amendment
institutions seriously, at least with respect to universities. First, concerns about
the public-private distinction in the university context normally concern the
511

See, e.g., Kathy L. Wyer, Comment and Note, A Most Dangerous Experiment?
University Autonomy, Academic Freedom, and the Concealed-Weapons Controversy at the
University of Utah, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 983, 1001 & nn. 88-90; John A. Beach, The Management
and Governance of Academic Institutions, 12 J. Coll. & Univ. L. 301, 310 n.34 (1985); Joseph
Beckham, Reasonable Independence for Public Education: Legal Implications of Constitutionally
Autonomous Status, 7 J.L. & Educ. 177 (1978).
512
Mich. Const., Art. VIII, § 5. For discussion of the effect this fact might have had on the
Grutter litigation, see Evan Caminker, A Glimpse Behind and Beyond Grutter, 48 St. Louis U. L.J.
889, 892-93 (2004).
513
See Byrne, supra note __, at 327.
514
In some senses, public universities thus resemble quasi-autonomous nongovernmental
institutions, or quangos. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional
Law, 108 Yale L.J. 1225, 1257-64 (1999); see also Sandra van Thiel, Quangos: Trends, Causes
and Consequences 2001); Lili Levi, Professionalism, Oversight, and Institution-Balancing: The
Supreme Court’s “Second Best” Plan for Political Debate on Television, 18 Yale J. Reg. 315
(2001); Craig Alford Masback, Independence vs. Accountability: Correcting the Structural
Defects in the National Endowment for the Arts, 10 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 177 (1992). The
implications of this similarity are discussed below, infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
515
Id. at 300.

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art16

102

Horwitz:

102

Grutter’s First Amendment

opposite problem: they involve questions of whether stakeholders within the
private university community, such as professors or students, enjoy fewer rights
than do their counterparts at public universities.516 Here, however, I have
suggested that Grutter’s reading of the First Amendment guarantees institutions
as a whole a substantial right of autonomy from governmental interference. Thus,
Grutter’s First Amendment does not require us to transport First Amendment
norms to the private sector, a phenomenon whose problems were so richly
discussed by Julian Eule,517 but to incorporate private sector norms into the First
Amendment. What implications this trend might have for student and faculty
rights are, as I suggested above, unclear at this point. For now, what is clear is
that taking First Amendment institutions seriously demands giving public
universities more freedom from government interference, and so brings the legal
status of private and public universities closer together.
Second, as I have argued, taking First Amendment institutions seriously
demands that we take them seriously as institutions. This point is particularly
clear where the institution, like the University of Michigan Law School, is a
public one, which might be judged according the standards generally applicable to
other state actors or might be judged according to the purposes and norms of the
particular kind of institution it happens to be.518 Ultimately, it mattered less to the
Supreme Court in Grutter that the Law School was a public institution, although
that fact brought the case within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court certainly did not treat the Law School as occupying a precisely similar
position when considering affirmative action policies as any other government
employer would. Rather, what mattered to the court was the nature of the
institution. It was a university, engaged in legitimate academic decision-making.
That fact insulated it considerably from the rigors of constitutional strict scrutiny.
This approach need not be, and is not, limited to universities alone. As we
have seen, when it came time to apply standard public forum doctrine to another
“government” actor – the Arkansas public broadcaster – the Court balked,
preferring to focus on the institutional aspects and professional norms of the entity
qua media organization.519 Again, what mattered to the Court was the
institutional status of the government entity rather than its public status.
In short, when we take First Amendment institutions seriously, it ought to
make a difference whether a public institution the Law School is treated as “the
government” or as “the university.” But it is also arguable that it ought to make a
greater difference whether a particular institution, whether public or private, is
516

See, e.g., Olivas, supra note __, at 1836-37.
See Julian N. Eule and Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the
Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1537 (1998).
518
See Schauer, supra note __, at 116.
519
See Forbes, 523 U.S. 666.
517

Published by Digital USD, 2004

103

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 16 [2004]

Grutter’s First Amendment

103

“the university,” or “the newspaper,” or some other category of speaker.520
Regardless of their public or private status, these institutions operate “within a
specialized professional culture” whose features are more salient to understanding
their role and function than the source of their funds.521
It is unclear that the Court’s First Amendment approach fully appreciates
and incorporates these distinctions among institutions.522 Yet, as cases like
Grutter, American Library Association, Forbes, and Finley illustrate, neither is
the Court entirely comfortable with the application of standard, one-size-fits-all
First Amendment doctrine to such institutions. The institution-sensitive reading
of the First Amendment I have advanced here suggests the Court’s reluctance to
apply standard doctrinal tests is well-founded, and that the most salient
consideration should be the nature of the institution and its role in strengthening
public discourse. Thus, the public-private distinction, although not irrelevant,
may fade into the background in many cases. At the very least, it should be less
relevant in cases involving conflicts between the institution (whether public or
private) and the state, although its relevance for cases involving intramural
disputes is still uncertain.523
V.

CONCLUSION

As I said at the outset of this paper, there will be more than enough
discussion of the important Fourteenth Amendment implications of Grutter. This
paper has suggested that something more is needed. Serious attention must be
paid to the First Amendment implications of Grutter.
This paper has offered three potential readings of Grutter’s First
Amendment implications. First, the case may be read simply as counseling a
broad degree of deference to academic decisions made by educational
institutions. This reading says little about the implications of the case beyond that
narrow set of circumstances. Even within this confined field, however, I have
520
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suggested that an institutional autonomy approach to academic freedom could
question or upset a number of settled First Amendment doctrines, and point
toward surprising results in a number of cases in the future. Second, Grutter
might be read as advancing a particular substantive vision of education as a
democratic good, and perhaps by extension a particular substantive vision of the
First Amendment as a whole. This reading is fraught with even greater problems.
It sits uneasily with the Court’s approach elsewhere in the First Amendment
jurisprudence, and fails to acknowledge the difficulty in enshrining in the First
Amendment any particular vision of education or academic freedom when those
values are deeply contested outside the courts, in the very communities to whom
the Court was ready to defer.
Finally, and most intriguingly, Grutter’s First Amendment can be read as
a First Amendment that finally and fully takes First Amendment institutions
seriously. This reading counsels a particular sort of deference to a wider range of
institutions than merely universities alone. It suggests that the Court ought to
recognize the unique social role played by a variety of institutions whose
contributions to public discourse play a fundamental role in our system of free
speech. Equally, it suggests that the Court ought to attend to the unique social
practices of these institutions, allowing the scope of its deference to be guided
over time by the changing norms and values of those institutions. In this way,
taking First Amendment institutions seriously may be one method of recognizing
and incorporating into First Amendment jurisprudence a concern for the varied
and particular social domains in which speech occurs. Just as important, this
approach acknowledges that constitutional law is not the sole preserve of the
courts. It is a shared activity, in which legal and nonlegal institutions alike are
engaged in a cooperative attempt to build a constitutional culture that is
responsive to the real world of free speech.
Whether Grutter’s discussion of the First Amendment proves to be longlasting, or merely a ticket good for one day and one trip only, these readings of
Grutter’s First Amendment demonstrate that it richly deserves to be read and
considered for all it is worth. It deserves to be treated as an invitation to ponder a
First Amendment that gives full consideration to the unique role played by
various First Amendment institutions – universities, libraries, private associations,
the media, religious groups – and allows them to flourish and develop their own
norms and rules without fitting within a preconceived, generally applicable,
sometimes Procrustean legal framework. And it deserves consideration because it
begs the question of the limits and implications of that approach.
I close with a simple plea. Grutter will obviously have its day under the
microscope of the Fourteenth Amendment scholars. It would be a great shame,
however, if First Amendment scholars, casebook editors, treatise writers, and
other gatekeepers of the First Amendment canon give Grutter the same treatment
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they have accorded Bakke and relegate it to the footnotes, or ignore it altogether.
Grutter has not yet earned its place in the First Amendment canon, but it is surely
knocking at the door.
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